**SUMMARY:**
Following a sudden outflux of at least 3,000 IDPs from the Juba UN House Protection of Civilian (PoC) site after the outbreak of internal conflict, the CCCM cluster called on partners to launch one of the first formal mobile camp management responses in the country. The sudden displacement and the small population size meant that a full-scale camp management response was not required and the overall goal of the response was to support suddenly displaced people to equitably access humanitarian services and to ensure that the affected population is empowered to manage their own site management and coordination activities.

**KEYWORDS:**
INTERNALLY DISPLACED, COMMUNAL, MOBILE (RESPONSE) TEAMS, CAPACITY BUILDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT</th>
<th>Conflict in UN House PoC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DATE OF EVENT CAUSING DISPLACEMENT</td>
<td>August 2018 – January 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEOPLE DISPLACED</td>
<td>Outside of camps: UNMISS facilitates: 3,600 IDPs – Self relocated in the proceeding weeks: 1,200</td>
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<td>PROJECT LOCATION</td>
<td>Mangateen IDP site, Juba, Jubek State</td>
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<td>PROJECT DURATION</td>
<td>August 2018 – January 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF PEOPLE TARGETED BY THE PROJECT</td>
<td>Mangateen IDP site: 3,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCM COORDINATION MECHANISM</td>
<td>Cluster Activated (active prior)</td>
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**TIMELINE:**

- **12 August 2018**
  - A largescale outbreak of conflict in UN House Protection of Civilian site (PoC) between two community groups.

- **13 - 24 August 2018**
  - One community was forcibly displaced into the weapon free zone (WFZ) to the north of UN House Protection of Civilian site (PoC) 3 in Juba, South Sudan.

- **15 August 2018**
  - Project start date.

- **23 August 2018**
  - Movement of population to Mangateen by UNMISS begins.

- **26 August 2018**
  - CCCM mobile response formally launched.

- **30 August 2018**
  - Advocacy to secure land.

- **15 - 30 November 2018**
  - Intensive capacity building of site committees.

- **1 December 2018**
  - Project Handover.

- **10 February 2019**
  - OCHA request reactivation of Mobile response due to failings in finding transitional solutions across the humanitarian community.
Displacement in South Sudan was caused by multiple and overlapping drivers. South Sudan has faced years of conflict and violence driven by armed groups vying for resources, territory and political power. Despite a peace process in 2017 that culminated with a signed ceasefire agreement, inter-communal violence continued. Violence targeting civilians has led to large-scale displacement as have reductions to agricultural output, leading to limited livelihood opportunities and food insecurity that drives further displacement. Suddenly-onset hazards such as floods occur regularly and additionally add to hardship and displacement.\(^5\) OCHA estimated that 1.9 million people were internally displaced, and an additional 2.1 million South Sudanese refugees were living in neighbouring countries\(^1\). South Sudan also hosts over 200,000 refugees who likewise lacked resources and were highly vulnerable to natural hazards and the ongoing violence. IDPs in South Sudan were living in a variety of displacement sites, including informal settlements, collective centres and UNMISS Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites\(^5\). The Mangateen site had limited services and little coordination at this stage. On 25 August, the CCMC cluster commenced the emergency mobile camp management intervention through the implementing agencies.

**CCCM ACTIVITIES**

The Mangateen site was not prepared for an influx, however humanitarian organisations planned to support the site with short-term humanitarian responses. The government was requested to allocate new land to resettle the newly displaced population, and this site could then have proper site planning and layout. However, this new land has not yet been allocated and the influx from PoC 3 remain at Mangateen as of March 2019.

Shelter provision was by far the largest immediate need at the site. The initial assessment identified a large warehouse of approximately 720 sqm to accommodate 600 IDPs, which was not sufficient to accommodate the 3,379 people that moved into Mangateen. The site was overcrowded, with camp management continuing efforts to coordinate effective space planning with shelter actors and the community. Relations with the host community in Mangateen had proved to be a challenge in the past given the increased access to resources that IDPs received compared to long term residents, and tensions could potentially spill over again. The UN continued to advocate for peace-building activities throughout the project, working to establish joint leadership structures that included both host community and IDP representatives and facilitating continued dialogue between different groups.

The implementing agencies activities at Mangateen site included:

- Strengthening coordination mechanisms
  - Service mapping
  - Chairing coordination meetings involving humanitarian agencies and executive leadership
  - Establishment of regular communication with the CCMC State Focal Point
  - Establishment of technical meetings (protection/SGBV meetings/education meetings)

Enhancement of information management

- Updating the site map
- Registering the self-relocated IDPs

Community engagement for displacement affected communities

- Creation of site committees including women, youth and elders
- Facilitating training for effective feedback collection with community mobilizers and outreach workers from the community

Site maintenance

- Building a community centre/office desk for the site committees to use
- Improving water drainage and monitoring for flooding

Service monitoring and advocacy

- Conducting site level service mapping to end service duplication and report service gaps to relevant clusters
- Using a CCMC Rapid Site Assessment Tool\(^6\) to ensure adequate service provision

At this time\(^6\), further funding was required to continue to support essential protection and WASH services. Mangateen could transition from a site served by humanitarian efforts to a sustainable transit site for current and future populations.

**IMPLEMENTATION**

The situation of Mangateen was opportune for launching one of the first formal mobile CCMC responses in the country due to the presence of two agencies available to support the response with a smooth transition. There was a limited funding basket available for the launch of a full-scale response, which was deemed unnecessary since many of the newly displaced had gained experience and understanding of camp management while staying in the PoC site. Beyond this, in considering the long-term, the CCMC cluster had a State Focal Point working in the area for monitoring and follow-ups. The mobile response was launched based on the idea that Mangateen would be a small site with a population that, building on their experience and knowledge additional training on key components of camp management, would have enabled the community to be capable of day-to-day site management. This has been cited as the “community-based CCMC model in South Sudan.”

The newly displaced population had resided in a PoC for up to 5 years, so they were familiar with camp management and had good relations with the implementing agencies as a camp management agency. Furthermore, a number of members of the population had either held positions on site committees in the PoC or had attended training on camp management and coordination previously. A community-based camp management approach to prepare community committees to take over camp management responsibilities was appropriate for the context.

For this intervention to be successful, two core phases were planned:

- Phase 1 saw the establishment of coordination and community engagement mechanisms;
- Phase 2 saw the handover and intensive capacity building of the community to take on their own site management duties with follow up support to be provided by the CCMC State Focal Point.

In Phase 1, the aim was to provide emergency coordination and establish mechanisms amongst all responding partners in the site, keeping in mind that the UN Peacekeeping Mission made a rapid decision to move a significant number of IDPs out of the UN House PoC site to Mangateen. The circumstances were complex, and there were real concerns about the safety of the population.

Phase 2 focused on building site committees’ skills in managing their own camp management duties, chair their own coordination meetings and work directly with humanitarian service providers. During this phase, capacity building was conducted via classroom training as well as hands-on support, such as having community leaders chair coordination meetings with support and guidance from a member of the mobile team. Once the implementing agency exited as the camp management agency, the State Focal Point was tasked with the regular monitoring of the site.

During the final drafting of this case study in December 2018, Phase 2 was almost at completion. However, due to needs on the site, the implementing agencies were requested to return to Mangateen as Camp Management agency to ensure minimum service delivery as well as begin the implementation of a transitional approach to Mangateen. At the time of writing this document\(^7\), funding was being discussed to turn Mangateen into a formal transit site in Juba, in the context of discussions regarding transitional approaches with respect to positive outcomes of the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan.

**IMPACT OF THE PROJECT**

The project had a positive impact on the affected population. Despite the initial confusion of large number of humanitarian service providers in Mangateen, camp management initiated strong coordination and collaboration between the community leadership and humanitarian service providers during Phase 1. Service mapping and establishing coordination meetings among humanitarian agencies and community leaders, including protection/SGBV meetings set a schedule of activities that can be continued after handover of camp management to the camp committees. Tools, registration lists, and maps were also developed for handover, and site planning mitigated some of the risks faced by the Mangateen community.

During Phase 2, the community leadership has been empowered to take over their own camp management on the site through intensive training. This included the community leadership undertaking site management meetings, coordinating service mapping and provision and acting as a linking point between the community and humanitarian service providers. The community leadership was supported for a time-limited period with mentoring on the ground and follow up support to address key issues.
ACHIEVEMENTS

• The mobile approach allowed flexibility and a rapid response. It utilised core CCCM methodologies and activities to establish rapid coordination mechanisms onsite at Mangateen where a duplication of services and/or gaps existed.
• The implementing agencies ensured a sustainable exit from the site from the onset of planning the response. Day-to-day coordination and management activities were always intended to be left to the community, leaving space for follow-up monitoring.
• The Mangateen response capitalised on the knowledge of the population, who had previous experience with camp management and with the implementing agencies from living in the PoC in Juba. The methodology facilitated community leaders to be directly linked into the humanitarian coordination system, allowing for transition of responsibility directly to the community.

CHALLENGES

• During the initial influx into Mangateen site, a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities between responding partners and the CCCM Cluster was clearly visible.
• Land rights of Mangateen site were unclear and remain an ongoing challenge. Discussions to establish a form of security of tenure remain unresolved.
• Given the general situation in South Sudan of multiple displacements and a history of tensions at the UN House PoC there was a lack of preparation and readiness of the responders to prepare for sudden outflux from the PoC.

LESSONS LEARNED

• Setting an inflexible timeframe for phases of a mobile response is not feasible due to contextual influences, community engagement and host community relations, the level of learning within the population and the willingness and buy-in of the community to establish representative site committees with clear mandates and term times.
• Understanding the role and responsibilities of camp management should be enhanced with all stakeholders, including other responding partners.
• Having an exit strategy from day one is crucial. Beyond this, the community should understand and contribute to establishing the roles and responsibilities of the mobile team from the outset.

1 For a detailed timeline, please see Mangateen: Reflections // A roadmap, published by ACTED
4 PoC 1 site remains the smaller of the two PoC sites in Juba, with a total of 7,515 people currently living there, while the PoC 3 site hosts 24,598 individuals. IOM, DTM, 19.1.2019.
5 Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites. Juba
6 Included in tool section
7 March 2019