SHELTER PROJECTS

SHELTER IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
16 Case Studies

Global Shelter Cluster
ShelterCluster.org
Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter
Shelter Projects – Shelter in the Middle East: 16 Case Studies

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SHELTER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 16 CASE STUDIES

This booklet is a compilation of case studies of humanitarian shelter responses in the Middle East, compiled from the seven past editions of the interagency publication Shelter Projects. The series of publications, initially led by IFRC, UNHCR and UN-Habitat, is now a Global Shelter Cluster product and includes contributions from over 400 shelter practitioners from across the world, from over 60 organizations and over 80 countries, including host governments’ responses.

The projects described in the case studies contained in this booklet represent responses to conflict and complex crises, demonstrating some of the implementation and response options available within the Middle East context. These include collective centre upgrade, tents and emergency shelter support, cash-based interventions, housing repairs and winterization, often coupled with technical assistance.

The publication is intended to support learning by highlighting the strengths, weaknesses and some of the lessons that can be learned from different projects, which try to maximize emergency funds to safeguard the health, security and dignity of affected people, whilst – wherever possible – supporting longer-term shelter needs and sustainable recovery.

The target audience is humanitarian managers and shelter programme staff from local, national and international organizations at all levels of experience. Shelter Projects is also a useful resource for advocacy purposes, showcasing the work done by the sector, as well as for research and capacity-building activities.

All case studies and overviews contained in this booklet, as well as from all editions of Shelter Projects, can be found online at: www.shelterprojects.org

**Note that the original case study codes from past Shelter Projects editions are retained on each case study, for easier reference.**

**These case studies have been translated into Arabic, and are available at the end of this booklet.**

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* Note that the original case study codes from past Shelter Projects editions are retained on each case study, for easier reference.

** These case studies have been translated into Arabic, and are available at the end of this booklet.
**A.9 Iraq (KR-I) – 2013 – Syria conflict**

**Case study**

- **Emergency**: Syria crisis, refugees in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), Iraq.
- **Date**: Conflict begins: March 2011 (ongoing).
- **People affected**: Total: over 3.1 million refugees. KRI: approx. 220,000 (Oct. 2014)
- **Project location**: Duhok Governorate.
- **Beneficiaries**: 2,500 people.
- **Outputs**: 500 households supported.
- **Occupancy rate**: 96% two months after voucher distribution.
- **Shelter size**: Varied – materials provided for improvements to existing shelters.
- **Cost**: US$ 500 per household (materials only), US$ 780 (including project costs).

**Project description:**

Improved living conditions for 500 households through a voucher assistance project to facilitate repairs and maintenance activities.

**Emergency timeline:**

- [b] 100,000 refugees.
- [c] 200,000 refugees.

**Project timeline (number of months):**

- [1-3] Assessment, planning and hiring of staff.

**Strengths**

- The flexibility of vouchers meant that the project could be adjusted to the varying policies of local authorities in different areas.
- Vouchers gave households a degree of choice in goods and services, allowing them to better meet their specific needs.
- There was close cooperation with local authorities to ensure full support for the project modality.
- The selection of lightweight materials allowed for rapid installation, meeting winterisation deadlines and goals and avoided negotiating lengthy building permission applications.

**Weaknesses**

- Having more than two suppliers would have resulted in more competitive pricing.
- The limited project timespan meant that the organisation was unable to address the issue of the vast majority of beneficiaries having no written tenure agreement. Secure shelter was one of the highest priorities for beneficiaries.
- The project was not part of a multi-sector approach and no other humanitarian actors were active in non-camp areas. Consequently, refugees could not be referred to other organisations and some reported re-selling materials in order to meet other needs, such as medicine.

**Observations**

- Though no cases of forced eviction were reported, most beneficiaries preferred materials that could be taken away with them (e.g. water tanks) in case they needed to move.
**Situation before the crisis**

In general, Syrian refugees in the Kurdistan Region came from both urban and rural locations in Syria with large Kurdish populations. Many of the refugees living outside of the camps were later arrivals and more likely to have fewer resources.

**Situation after the crisis began**

The majority of refugees in non-camp settings had secured rental accommodation in urban areas, though some lived rent-free. Only a few households lived with Iraqi host-families. Conditions varied from finished apartments, with written or verbal leases, to crude structures that were poorly built, or erected quickly to lay claim to a piece of land, or to demonstrate that a claim was in process. The latter structures were very poor, including limited or no WASH facilities, lack of windows and/or doors, poor connections to utilities, and damaged roofs.

**Shelter strategy**

When the project started there was no consolidated, holistic strategy for supporting the urban caseload in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) preferring to support refugees in camps. This was despite the fact that an estimated majority of refugees (60%) lived in urban areas outside of camps. The national strategy was drafted in the context of Central and Southern Iraq, and did not account for the specific context in KR-I. The strategy consisted of three combinable approaches:

- Rental subsidies (though these were not seen as viable unless all refugee households benefitted).
- Building low cost shelters on land allocated by the government.
- Subsidies to host families to build additional rooms and/or make renovations.

The KRG’s reluctance to support non-camp populations was based on a concern that it would a ‘pull factor’ by exceeding the level of services in camps. Interventions had to be seen as emergency, life-saving responses, which meant that construction or robust rehabilitation of shelters were not viable options for humanitarian actors.

However, much decision-making power was devolved to the individual governorates and some authorities were more open to supporting the urban caseload than others.

**Project implementation**

The organisation initially planned to facilitate robust housing repairs for those most in need. However, obtaining local authority approval was not possible for a number of reasons:

- The strategy of the local authorities was to avoid incentivising movement out of camps.
- Many rudimentary structures were on government land which meant the local authorities had full control over its official usage.
- In the case of structures built on private land, much of the land ownership was in dispute, so no official applications for building permits could be made.

Given this constraint, the organisation decided to implement a project providing vouchers for some repair and maintenance activities which did not require building permits. Repairs would use light-weight materials and be used to replace parts of the house, rather than adding or extending structures.

This level of intervention required only the permission of the landowner, and each beneficiary was required to provide testimony of the landowner’s agreement, prior to implementing the project.

As this was a pilot-project, the team had to be careful when dealing with sensitive issues such as roofing in order to avoid repairs being re-categorised as requiring building permits. For example, replacing plastic sheets only required the permission of the owner, whereas adding roofing materials to a structure required an application to the municipality.

During the voucher distribution, beneficiaries were asked if they required technical or physical support.
to make the improvements. The small minority that did require assistance were visited by one of two Repair and Maintenance Technicians. However, all of these households had already found other support before the technicians visited the shelter.

Each refugee household was given US$ 500 in vouchers redeemable at pre-selected suppliers. Beneficiaries were free to redeem the vouchers as they saw fit; however organisation staff on-site at the suppliers would question, for example, the intentions of a household purchasing only cement with their vouchers. The organisation placed no restrictions on beneficiaries paying with their own money for additional materials not on the approved list, though it was made clear that the organisation distanced itself from these actions.

Some potential beneficiaries were excluded as their landlords would not permit them to make improvements. The amount of US$ 500 was sufficient for the needs assessed, and was standardised across all beneficiaries to avoid disputes. Households that required additional support were referred to another organisation’s cash-assistance project.

**Beneficiary selection**

A variety of criteria were used to select beneficiary households, including: house condition, economic vulnerability, social vulnerability, and/ or physical vulnerability. In all cases beneficiary households had to meet two of the criteria, with one always being that of poor housing.

The project team visited close to 1,000 households during a 3-month project assessment, and from that list identified 500 beneficiary households, based on social and economic vulnerability criteria.

Families that had built their own shelter had to be excluded from support since self-built shelters were seen to constitute a pull-factor away from camps. These families were put in contact with another organisation’s cash-assistance programme.

**Coordination**

Six months after the project started, the Urban Working Group for shelter, in Duhok, was launched. Before the creation of the group, the focus had almost exclusively been on supporting the camp population. Any coordination for non-camp interventions that did take place was largely done bilaterally between interested organisations. These bilateral discussions gave encouragement to other organisations to explore the possibilities of initiating projects outside of the camps, and the experiences of this project formed key discussions during the establishment of the Urban Working Group.

After the project had been running for a few months, more organisations initiated non-camp projects in a variety of sectors, as acceptance of such interventions grew.

**Materials**

The standardised list of permitted materials was finalised through focus-group consultations with the beneficiaries to ensure that the materials were appropriate.

Materials were sourced by the suppliers and collected by the beneficiaries at the point of sale. The project team was present at each of the suppliers to support households and ensure that the materials exchanged for vouchers were restricted to the permitted list.

In communities located far away from suppliers, each household was permitted to use US$ 20 from the vouchers as a contribution towards transportation. While this amount was not enough for an individual household to transport all materials, the problem was solved by households pooling their money to rent larger trucks.

Identifying suppliers with both the capacity and interest to take part in the voucher distribution was challenging. Of the 12 suppliers approached for the tender process, only two participated. For a distribution of 500 households, two suppliers was sufficient; however additional suppliers would have offered households more choice, and potentially more competitive prices, as many beneficiaries reported that the prices being charged were higher than prevailing market prices.

Following the pilot, the project model was replicated but this time with engagement with the local Chamber of Commerce, and a comprehensive survey of nearly 80 shops in the local retail market was undertaken in order to widen the number of potential suppliers.

**Wider project impacts**

This project was one of the first shelter interventions in the urban areas of Duhok Governorate. The ongoing lessons learned from this project form part of the KR-I-level discussions on approaches to sustainable support for Syrian refugees, particularly in light of the increasingly protracted nature of the conflict.

<table>
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**Iraq 2014-2015 / Refugee Crisis**

**Keywords:** Accessibility, Disabilities, Planned and managed camps, Materials distribution

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<td>Total People Affected</td>
<td>239,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq (as of 2016) 3.1 million IDPs in Iraq (as of 2016) 213,000 Syrian refugees (January 2014) 85,000 IDPs in Iraq (January 2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Locations</td>
<td>Domiz refugee camp, Dohuk Governorate (Project A). Kawergosk, Qushtapa, Darashakran, and Basirma refugee camps, Erbil Governorate (Project B)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Beneficiaries</td>
<td>901 households (including 1,047 individuals with disabilities). 362 HH in Domiz camp, 157 HH in Darashakran camp, 112 HH in Basirma camp, 147 HH in Kawergosk camp, and 123 HH in Qushtapa camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Outputs</td>
<td>901 shelters upgraded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials Cost per Household</td>
<td>USD 350 (average for Project A), USD 500 (average for Project B).</td>
</tr>
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<td>Project Cost per Household</td>
<td>USD 640 (Project A), USD 900 (Project B). Estimated.</td>
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**Project Summary**

The programme was carried out in five refugee camps in Iraq in two separate projects, focusing on shelter-related issues specific to persons with disabilities. The projects upgraded existing shelters and plots and adapted global accessibility standards to the camp context and cultural norms of the Middle East. The programme sought to adopt a holistic approach, through focusing not only on the individuals with disabilities, but also on the needs of the caregivers.

**Strengths**

+ Tailored interventions for persons with disabilities.
+ Addressed a gap in accessibility and quality of life in camps.
+ Provided income to assisted households.
+ Challenged teams to think “outside the box”.
+ Pushed the issue of accessibility and upgrades to the forefront of discussions.

**Weaknesses**

- Tendency for staff to adopt standardized approaches.
- Fencing off household plots further isolated some households.
- Quality of work carried out by paid labourers varied greatly.
- Difficulty in finding balance between the specific needs and the more general household needs.
- Poor communication about targeting and project objectives.
SITUATION IN THE CAMPS

The first camp constructed to host Syrian refugees in the Kurdish Region of Iraq was established in March 2013 in Dohuk Governorate, with a camp population of approximately 55,000. In 2014, four additional camps for refugees were established in neighbouring Erbil Governorate, with a total population of 27,700. In the winter of 2014-2015, 13 camps were established for IDPs escaping conflict in Southern and Central Iraq.

In early phases, households were principally provided with tents as an emergency shelter solution, along with the required basic camp infrastructure. In the later-established camps, there was a greater variety of shelter types, ranging from pre-fab shelters to tents on concrete platforms. Concurrently, an increasing number of camp residents engaged in incremental upgrades, using construction materials from local markets. Local authorities initially restricted the use of "permanent" construction materials (e.g., concrete and blocks), though later opened up to their utilization in a controlled manner. In early 2015, the vast majority of shelter coverings in the camps were still constructed with soft materials. This was even more prevalent amongst households with individuals with disabilities, as they were less likely to have access to resources to improve their shelters.

Prior to implementation, the organization worked with UN agencies, local authorities and the refugee community representatives, to assess the number of households in need, the most common types of disabilities, and the current levels of support from other humanitarian actors. Many of the families with persons with disabilities reported that the organization’s field staff were the first humanitarians to engage with them directly, or that they had received no prior assistance addressing their specific needs. When the organization was funded for the Erbil project, two other organizations also received funding to provide assistance to persons with disabilities. All three organizations worked together in the identification and provision of assistance. Approximately 9% of households in the camps of Erbil were found to have at least one individual with disabilities. Although the types of disability were varied, the most prevalent were physical, sensory and cognitive and, in 30% of the cases, multiple conditions.

SHELTER SECTOR STRATEGY

In camp settings, the shelter strategy principally focused on four points: land allocation for new camps; expansion of existing camps; provision of emergency shelter for new arrivals; and shelter improvements for refugees in camps prior to the influx. The strategy highlighted the general needs of different vulnerable groups, but there was no specific technical guidance on shelter construction or upgrading for persons with disabilities.

PROJECT GOALS

This project aimed at improving accessibility in shelters, shelter plots and surroundings in camps, as well as the quality of life for individuals with disabilities, through different types of upgrades, such as floors, walls, openings and coverings, and including access to nearby water and sanitation facilities. It also intended to provide a starting point for incrementally improving accessibility across the camps.

BENEFICIARY SELECTION

The organization targeted refugee populations in camps in Dohuk and Erbil governorates. Domiz camp was initially selected, following a multisectoral needs assessment carried out by another organization, which identified gaps in specific service provision for households with persons with disabilities. The camps in Erbil were later identified as having similar gaps. IDP camps were not targeted under these projects, though the organization had other projects and funding streams which targeted the shelter needs of IDPs.
Potential individual beneficiaries and households were identified in close coordination with protection agencies, camp management and other actors providing services within the camps. Following the initial pre-identification process, social and technical assessments were carried out at the household level and were scored based on weighted vulnerability (both socio-economic and technical, as well as severity of disability and mobility or quality of life issues). This scoring phase determined which households were to be assisted, in which order, and played a role in defining the unit costs.

**PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

Both skilled and unskilled workers from the camp population were employed to implement the projects. The aim was to include one unskilled labourer from each beneficiary household as a means to provide a source of income. Each project was implemented by a separate team of six to ten individuals, supervised by a project coordinator. Area based teams worked in pairs, with technical staff focusing on technical assessments, design solutions and construction monitoring, while household assessments, outreach and monitoring were covered by non-technical shelter officers or assistants. Materials were delivered to each household and works were carried out by labourers at household plots.

Though the construction time was generally brief, the overall implementation required multiple visits: an initial social and technical assessment, the development of a bill of quantities (sometimes this was carried out more than once due to the movement or modification of the household structure), regular supervision of works and follow-up monitoring visits.

**SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT**

Detailed social and technical assessments were carried out at the household level, focusing on the needs and capacities of the household member(s) with disabilities and technical shelter conditions, as well as general household information. Social and technical field staff worked closely with the individual with disabilities and their primary caregivers, to identify and prioritize specific upgrades to improve mobility and quality of life. The teams continued to engage the households to ensure that upgrades would be used as intended and met the needs of both the individuals and their caregivers. Visits were done jointly with a partner organization carrying out WASH upgrades, in order to ensure complementarity of the interventions.

**MAINTAIN CHALLENGES**

Commonly experienced engagement challenges included:

- Eliciting the priorities of the individual beneficiaries when their disability prevented them from communicating effectively;
- Balancing the expectations and wishes of the families with the issues related specifically to the persons with disabilities;
- Observing the shelter and plot to recognize usage patterns, in addition to listening to expressed needs;
- Time required to elicit information from persons with special needs and their caregivers;
- Dealing with requests to replace mobility items that were outside the project scope and expertise of field staff;
- In Erbil, targeted assistance led to significant pressure from households who did not meet the selection criteria.

**COORDINATION**

The organization closely coordinated with other actors implementing shelter and WASH activities in the targeted camps, to ensure complementarity and higher impact. At the household level, the organization focused its efforts on the plot and the shelter itself, while another organization aimed to address the WASH specific needs. Assessment forms were harmonized, initial planning was done collaboratively, and project managers met regularly to discuss project implementation. Technical teams jointly carried out the technical assessments during implementation, to ensure that all inputs were considered when designing the interventions for each plot. Additionally, a multisectoral Technical Working Group was formed to develop guidelines for accessibility and quality of life upgrades in the camp settings of Iraq. Though the final product was never completed, the working group served as a coordination and communication forum, to address some of the challenges encountered during implementation.

There are a number of guidelines at the global level for the construction of shelter in emergencies for people with disabilities. Although the guidance highlights the need to tailor interventions to each individual’s needs, it includes little regarding how this tailoring can be done practically, and at the same time how such projects can be scaled up, or streamlined, given the time and budget constraints often faced by humanitarian organizations in the field.

Commonly found challenges included:

- Attaching handles to soft tent or plastic sheeting walls and working with non-standard self-built shelters, expansions and plots;
- Support for people (or their caregivers) sitting down and standing up from the floor;
- Extending supports to the outdoor of the shelters;
- Improving accessibility to latrines on public pathways, in between tents in close proximity;
- Improving access points (particularly for tents) for persons with disabilities and their carers;
- Customization versus standardization;
- Redesigning solutions to adapt to new locations, when households moved;

STRENGTHS

+ Tailored interventions were implemented, based on comprehensive consultations, to address specific and self-identified needs of persons with disabilities and their caregivers.

+ The project addressed a significant gap in accessibility and quality of life at the household level, existing since the establishment of the camps.

+ Short-term income was provided to assisted households, and additional short-term employment opportunities to camp residents.

+ Teams were challenged to think “outside the box” and develop innovative solutions to address the specific needs of the individuals assisted.

+ The issue of Accessibility and Quality of Life upgrades was pushed to the forefront of discussions within coordination meetings and amongst shelter partners.

WEAKNESSES

- Tendency for staff to adopt standardized (rather than tailored) approaches led to inconsistent outcomes, principally due to time constraints and the feeling to be bound to the originally developed material lists.

- Fencing off household plots was a frequent request, to keep children with cognitive disabilities from wondering off and potentially endangering themselves and others, but it also potentially further isolated such persons from the community.

- The quality of work carried out by paid labourers varied greatly; supervising a large number of sites spread over numerous camps posed significant challenges for the team.

- The difficulty in finding a balance between the specific needs of individuals with disabilities and the more general needs of the household as a whole.

- Poor communication about targeting and project objectives with the camp community at large. As the project was the first in camps using targeted coverage, the communication could have been improved, in order to reduce requests for assistance by households that were not within selected groups.

LEARNINGS

- Keep the needs of persons with special needs at the forefront of shelter interventions, from the onset of an emergency.

- Standardized items and materials, available through framework agreements, can impair the development of customized solutions to address specific needs, which could instead use items procured outside these agreements.

- The lack of consistent leadership in the Technical Working Group focusing on Shelter and WASH Accessibility, led to the final intended product not coming to fruition.

- Foster and encourage the lateral thinking and observation skills of team members, in order to identify creative solutions for individual needs.

- Provide additional support to staff that are consistently interacting with individuals and households in dire conditions, including early training on engagement with persons with special needs.
Iraq 2017–2018 / Conflict

KEYWORDS: Housing repair, Vouchers, Local private sector engagement

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<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>Iraq conflict, Jan 2014–onwards</th>
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<td>TOTAL PEOPLE DISPLACED(^1)</td>
<td>4.3 million internally displaced, 1.9 million returnees, as of Jan 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSING DAMAGE(^2)</td>
<td>65% damage rate in Ninewa governorate, as of Jan 2018. Additionally, 74% returnee households reported moderate damage and 72% reported insufficient quality of their shelter(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SHELTER NEEDS(^4)</td>
<td>3.9 million individuals at the start of 2017 (1.3 million in Ninewa governorate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT LOCATION</td>
<td>Khorsebat village, Ninewa governorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>873 households (4,387 individuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>650 shelters repaired, 2,383 vouchers distributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER SIZE</td>
<td>Variable following Iraqi minimum standards(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER DENSITY</td>
<td>Variable (min. 5.5m(^2) per person for the first six family members, 3.3m(^2) thereafter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERIALS COST</td>
<td>USD 892 per shelter on average(^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT COST</td>
<td>USD 1,295 per shelter on average(^6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) Ministry of Planning and UN-Habitat (Jan 2018). No data is available for the whole crisis. Initial satellite assessments show the following damage rates: Ninewa 65% / Anbar 20% / Salah al Din 10% / Diyala, Baghdad, Kirkuk 5%.
\(^3\) IOM Iraq Mission (October 2016). Returnee Location Assessment Report.
\(^5\) The Iraqi minimum standards is 33m\(^2\) for a family of six, with an additional 3.3m\(^2\) of covered living space for every additional member. In some cases, where multiple families were in a single structure, efforts were made to maintain 5.5m\(^2\) per person for additional private living space for each family.
\(^6\) Categories of repairs for war damage in Iraq: below USD 500 = Cat 0, USD 500–1,500 = Cat 1, USD 1,500–5,000 = Cat 2, USD 5,000–10,000 = Cat 3, USD 10,000+ = Cat 4 (not humanitarian). https://bit.ly/2Wjri8L.

PROJECT SUMMARY

The project repaired 650 houses in the Ninewa governorate in Iraq, benefiting displaced, returnee and local vulnerable households. It was implemented using a voucher modality. This significantly contributed to increasing livelihood opportunities within the local markets through the engagement of local suppliers. The project used a community-based approach, as beneficiaries could choose between having the organization in charge of carrying out the rehabilitation (through local contractors) or completing the agreed renovations themselves, with supervision and support.

STRENGTHS

+ Customization of assistance at the household level.
+ QR codes concealed prices from vouchers, which helped preventing tensions.
+ Local capacity was built and financial benefits distributed locally.
+ Gender-balanced team.
+ Multisectoral approach.

WEAKNESSES

- Houses with minor damages were targeted, meaning that less resources were available for repairing heavier damage.
- Inaccuracies in the vulnerability scoring.
- Repeated turnover of staff delayed implementation.
- Engineers did not clearly communicate structural issues and risks.
CONTEXT IN NINEWA GOVERNORATE

For more background on the Iraq crisis and shelter response, see overview A.33 in Shelter Projects 2015-2016.

The conflict between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Iraq Security Forces started in late 2013 and spread to central governorates in June 2014. The Ninewa governorate was one of the most impacted by displacement, adding to the impact of previous waves of displacement and returns between 2006 and 2013.7

Although early assessments of the effects of the military operation to retake Mosul in October 2016 pointed towards large numbers of people moving to camps,8 many families chose to either remain in their houses while villages were retaken, or to travel short distances from military operations to return to their villages as soon as possible.9

SITUATION DURING THE CRISIS

The majority of IDPs in Iraq during the crisis resided outside of formal camps. The housing situation of many families – both displaced and non-displaced – deteriorated due to depleting financial resources, rising inflation, limited income-generating opportunities and the continued arrival of newly displaced households.10 The latter caused increased competition over available housing and forcing displaced families to reside in sub-standard conditions. Fifteen per cent of IDPs in northern Iraq lived in “critical” shelters that included public spaces, such as religious centers and schools, unfinished and abandoned buildings. Shelter issues were primarily associated with poor conditions. Nineteen per cent of IDPs were in informal tents, most of which were not suitable for winter.11

NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY

As the humanitarian crisis in Iraq entered a new phase from emergency to early recovery, the national shelter strategy prioritized rehabilitation of existing structures, particularly for returnees. During this project, the Shelter Cluster also formalized five War Damage Categories, and repair cost ranges for each.12 The Shelter Cluster asked partners to prioritize Categories 2 (Major) and 3 (Severe) as those with the greatest need and ability for humanitarian actors to intervene, whereas Categories 0 (No damage) and 1 (Minimal) may be repairable by the households themselves. For Category 4 (Destroyed), the response should most likely come from the government and development partners. Most households targeted by this project fell into damage Categories 1, 2 and 3.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project was part of a larger multisectoral programme including shelter rehabilitation, NFI distribution and WASH infrastructure repair. The shelter component focused on rehabilitating houses in Khorsebat village – which had been damaged by airstrikes, mortars, IEDs and machine-gun fire – to facilitate recovery from the conflict and enable return.
The vouchers used QR codes which were scannable by suppliers to conceal the total monetary value of the rehabilitation. This was important to prevent tensions within the community and to ensure that, while households were able to refuse installation of certain items, there was no financial incentive for them to do so. If there had been any incentive, households may have resorted to hiring untrained young men to do electrical and plumbing work to maximize savings. However in this case, when beneficiaries refused installation, the cost savings were pooled again, and then a second round of vouchers were issued to conduct additional rehabilitation works, targeting particularly vulnerable households.

**TARGETING**

The project area was selected after consultation with Shelter Cluster representatives on underserved areas, following which the project team conducted structural and vulnerability assessments. As this was the first time the project was implemented in the area, the organization prioritized a location where more than 80 per cent of the houses had minor, moderate, or severe damage and many households were particularly vulnerable. Initially, 500 structures were targeted. As the project progressed, more households returned from camps in hopes of participating in the project and the organization secured funds to cover an additional 150 structures. This meant that more than 87 per cent of households with shelter needs in the target location were reached.

**COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT**

The project team continually engaged with the community and the suppliers. During the initial assessment phase, the objectives of the project and the responsibilities of actors involved were shared with the community. The project team worked with the community to facilitate UXO clearance and rubble removal – which were the respective responsibilities of the government and the property owners – and shared the processes for beneficiary and supplier selection. While the construction was underway, project officers were on site every day to supervise work, provide guidance and feedback, and listen to concerns.

To avoid tensions within the community when additional funds were made available, the project team reassured the community that more households would be served and that some households would receive additional assistance, as well as outlined the criteria for selection. Families were selected based on size or other vulnerabilities, and depending on the gaps between the BoQ and what had already been achieved. A feedback mechanism was also used to allow community members to raise any concerns (anonymously, if they wished).

**MAIN CHALLENGES**

**INSECURITY AND INCREASED RETURNS.** During the planning phase, the Kurdish independence referendum and resulting insecurity affected access to the project area for more than a month. Furthermore, increased returns during that time led to an increase in the number of households participating in the project, which required a second round of assessments.

**HOST FAMILIES.** While the households served were primarily owners, there were also many IDP families hosted by local households, increasing the amount of floor space needed to ensure that minimum standards were met. Where possible, the organization rehabilitated additional rooms to create private spaces, or enclosed additional spaces with partitions. When two households within a structure were identified as vulnerable, the organization increased the budget available.
HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY. In areas controlled by ISIL, the militants aggressively confiscated and resold property based on ethnic or religious affiliation. As such, multiple people may have had documentation asserting their right to a property. With guidance from the HLP Sub-Cluster, the organization allowed people to submit property ownership documents or other items which could be verified by the municipality, such as inheritance documents, utilities bills or government-issued documents noting their address. Where people lacked official documentation, their neighbours were required to formally attest that they had the right to occupy the house, and then a committee of elders from the community reviewed the claims. If approved by the community, the document was then filed with the municipality. While this system was not immune to corruption, the nature of the relatively small community meant that there were no competing claims. For areas held for a longer time under ISIL or in larger communities and cities, this problem would have likely been more challenging.

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

Through this project, households learnt about structural safety and how to prioritize technical repairs over beautification, with a strong emphasis on privacy and security (e.g. gates, doors, privacy walls within shared buildings) as a cultural priority. Additionally, through the method of splitting BoQs among suppliers, the project team could spread the financial benefits of the project amongst local businesses, who then hired skilled community workers, restoring supply chains and livelihoods in the communities. As suppliers were paid after the work was completed, they were incentivized to finish major works quickly. This promoted greater employment of labourers and material orders. Suppliers also reported that because of the works they did, they gained a trustworthy reputation in the community, which brought them more contracts for further repairs beyond the scope of the project. In total, nearly USD 580,000 went to 24 local suppliers for materials and labour.

The multisectoral nature of the programme led to the rehabilitation of the pumping station serving the whole project area, as well as repairs to some individual household connections. This supported returns to areas with both adequate shelter and WASH services. Ultimately, the repairs made by this project ended the displacement of households that had been living in nearby camps for months or years. While the project was very small in scale compared to the overall needs in Iraq, its nature helped households to no longer require assistance, therefore contributing to durable solutions.

NEXT STEPS

For the next iteration of the project, the organization intended to focus on Category 2 and 3 structures to ensure that more urgent needs were met effectively. It also planned to work more closely with the HLP Sub-Cluster to further refine its approach to addressing HLP issues. Additionally, the organization conducted focus group discussions in large camps to identify barriers to return and facilitate more safe and voluntary returns. The next iteration of the project, which was in the planning stage, was also going to include WaSH and livelihoods components to help households recover holistically.

ENDNOTES

1 Prior to 2013, the Ninewa governorate had hosted the second largest IDP population post-2006 (158,721 IDPs), as well as 95,000 returnees, plus Syrian refugees and Iraqi returnees from Syria. IOM, Governorate Profile: Ninewa, April 2014, https://bit.ly/2c5sBNJ.
2 See case study A.26 in this edition for a project that set up emergency sites for households displaced by the Mosul operation.
3 IOM Iraq Mission (October 2016), Returnee Location Assessment Report.
4 REACH (June 2016), Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (III) of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps – Iraq, Assessment report.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ **Customization at the household level.** Each BoQ was adapted per individual shelter and developed in consultation with both structural engineers and the households themselves, in order to meet their unique needs and priorities.

+ **Pricing data was concealed by QR codes** on the BoQs, such that suppliers were aware of costs, but households could not easily directly compare the amounts received. This was helpful in preventing potential tensions between targeted households.

+ **The selection of many local suppliers ensured that capacity was built at the local level.** It also meant that the financial benefits were distributed amongst the target community and neighbouring villages (that were not selected), rather than to a larger city like Mosul. This improved community acceptance and allowed suppliers to hire locals, which helped many families regain secondary income.

+ **The gender-balanced team** allowed for engineers to speak at length with female-headed households without any issues and ensured that female family members’ unique needs were considered in the development of the BoQs.

+ **The multisectoral approach** allowed some households with damaged water and sewage connections to have these repaired as part of the WASH component.

WEAKNESSES

- **To mitigate community conflict,** many houses with minor damages were considered for repairs, leading to fewer available funds to repair more badly damaged homes. While this was mitigated with a transfer from another portion of the project, it should be considered for the future.

- **Inaccuracies in the vulnerability scoring.** Certain vulnerability criteria, such as income per family, were taken as reported by the project team. However, more in-depth exposure with the community eventually revealed that some households did in fact have sources of income, affecting their vulnerability scoring.

- **Repeated turnover of staff delayed project implementation.** The project was without a manager for several months at the beginning, and a new project manager came in towards the end of the project. This meant that the majority of the construction works were completed in the summer, when temperatures were hot and staff and beneficiaries were fasting, slowing implementation further.

- **Engineers should clearly communicate structural issues and risks to households.** In some cases, households were concerned about structural integrity of certain shelters and demolished them, even though they were repairable. Having a transparent and effective system to delineate structures as repairable or not would help the community better.

LESSONS LEARNED

- In communities where long-term work is expected, **taking time to familiarize with their customs** from the beginning will improve the targeting and scoring processes.

- **Where possible – and especially in conservative countries – having female technical staff** can ensure that all community and household members’ points of view are considered.

- **Colour coding vouchers can be very helpful** for non-literate populations. **Using images or pictures** is also useful to help colour-blind individuals separate different BoQs.
**A.10 Jordan – 2013 – Syria conflict**

**Case study**

**Keywords:** Emergency shelter; Transitional shelter / T-shelter; Site planning.

**Emergency:** Syria crisis, refugees in Jordan.

**Date:** Conflict begins: March 2011 (ongoing). Refugee numbers increase: December 2011 onwards.

**People affected:** Over 3.1 million refugees from Syria. Around 620,000 in Jordan (October 2014).

**Project location:** Azraq camp, Az Zarqa Governorate.

**Beneficiaries:** Up to 67,000.

**Outputs:** 13,500 T-Shelter units. Over 7,000 completed as of September 2014.

**Camp occupancy rate:** Capacity: 67,000 people. Population September 2014: approx. 13,000.

**Shelter size:** 24m²

**Cost:** Materials per shelter: 900-1,000 Jordanian dinars (US$ 1,270-1,410). Total cost per shelter (including contractor and indirect costs): 1,650 Jordanian dinars (US$ 2,330).

**Project description:**

Azraq camp was constructed with 13,500 T-shelter units to accommodate 67,000 refugees in response to protracted displacement. T-shelters are interlocking steel structures, designed to maximise privacy and protect against severe weather conditions. They can be disassembled, transported and reassembled.

**Strengths**

- The production, manufacture and assembly of the T-shelters is less technically complicated than previous prefab solutions, meaning more contractors are able to produce the units faster and cheaper.
- T-shelters can be dismantled and re-used, making re-siting possible and can potentially be part of a return package.
- Kits can be stored as contingency stock.
- Positive impact on local labour market, with contractors employing more than 400 labourers.
- Though government policy originally opposed semi-permanent solutions, close collaboration on the design and contractor tendering process meant that the T-shelter solution was accepted.

**Weaknesses**

- Despite relatively fast production time, tents are still potentially necessary for response to population spikes until production meets demand.
- Inverted Box Rib (IBR) corrugated sheet, one of few roofing materials available, was hard to seal off against dust, wind and rain and had to be painted white to reduce heat gain.
- Due to time and cost reasons, the construction of a porch had to be cancelled, which caused beneficiaries to complain, particularly in relation to reduced privacy.

**Observations**

- Prefab caravan units have been used in other camps, but have been found to be expensive solutions due to high transport and production costs.

**Emergency timeline:**


**Project timeline (number of months):**

[6-10] Implementation trial phase (1,000 units).
[14] Camp officially opened with 4,200 units completed.
Situation before the crisis

The majority of Syrian refugees lived in urban settings in Syria, particularly in areas such as Daraa and Homs, with a range of different income levels and housing standards.

Situation after the crisis began

Flows of refugees from Syria to other countries began to increase in late 2011. Azraq was chosen as the site for a new camp as it was owned by the state and had previously been developed as a camp for Iraqi refugees in the 1990s (though it was never inhabited). The site was already linked by road to the towns of Azraq and Zara and had previously undergone some drainage work.

Shelter strategy

The Shelter Working Group (SWG) was set-up in October 2012 and co-chaired by a UN agency and an INGO. By December regular meetings were taking place and a shelter strategy began to be developed.

The finalised shelter strategic guidelines were endorsed in September 2013 (updated a year later). A brief summary of the two main strategic objectives is as follows:

- Settlement: Enable refugee communities to access settlements which provide access to services, transportation and economic opportunities.
- Shelter: Increase the availability of adequate shelter solutions.

With the majority of refugees (80%) finding shelter in urban settings, mostly by renting, there has been considerable strain on the affordable housing market, affecting housing costs for both refugees and vulnerable Jordanians.

This has led the government to pursue a policy of developing camps, particularly to provide shelter for those who are priced out of the rental market.

The Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MoPWH) was involved in the planning of shelter solutions for Azraq camp. Despite an original reluctance on the part of the government to permit semi-permanent shelters, the agency advocated for the use of T-shelters in place of tents, emphasizing the kit-nature and the easy disassembling of the structures.

Project implementation

The development of the Azraq camp site was officially approved at the end of March 2013 and opened in April 2014.

The site plan paid careful attention to storm-water flows, and divided the space into “villages” of between 10-15,000 people. At the lowest level, family plots of 12 shelters share four WASH units.

The project was executed by the main organisation along with two implementing partner organisations: an INGO and the MoPWH.

The T-shelter design phase involved multiple stakeholders, including refugee representatives, who gave feedback on proposed designs from different organisations. The winning T-shelter design was endorsed by the SWG and MoPWH.

Once the design had been selected, the partner INGO and MoPWH were then responsible for the tendering process and awarding contracts to contractors, who produced the T-shelter kits to a technical specification provided by the main organisation. The involvement of a government ministry in the process helped.

Contractors produced the kits, which were made up of steel structural pieces manufactured in a factory off-site, aluminum coated foam insulation, IBR metal sheet cladding, steel windows and doors, ventilation pieces, plastic sheeting for roof ceiling works, and steel wires and turnbuckles for temporary room partitioning.

Multiple contractors worked on-site at the same time, constructing the shelters. A team of four people could complete a T-shelter in 12 to 16 hours. With 20 to 50 teams operating at any one time, an average of 60 T-Shelters could be completed in two working days, including the excavation and levelling of foundation trenches.

The T-shelter construction was monitored by two civil engineers on a daily basis.

Beneficiary selection

The camp has a total capacity for 67,000 people and is expected to reach full capacity by February 2015. Space has been identified to potentially increase the total population to 130,000 people.

All families arriving in Azraq are allocated a T-Shelter, with families of more than six members receiving two units. Vulnerable families (female-headed households and households with disabled family members) are sited nearest to camp services.

At time of writing, half the camp population of nearly 13,000 is from...
Daraa and Aleppo, with 50% of the population being children and female-headed households accounting for 40% of families.

**Coordination**

The design was developed within the Shelter Sector Working Group in Jordan, in coordination with other sectors. Design features included:

- Steel wires to allow for partitioning, helping to meet protection/gender privacy concerns.
- The entrance and door were designed in collaboration with disability experts.
- T-shelters can be adapted in the future to include WaSH facilities, with water and waste pipes.

The agency worked closely with the Government of Jordan, which had to approve the T-shelter design. The involvement of the MoPWH in tendering ensured a fast contract-awarding process.

**Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)**

The T-shelters provide protection against the strong winds, dust, and extreme changes in climate. The site itself has some steep slopes and is in a seismic risk area. The T-shelter mitigates against structural weakness by anchoring it to the ground with long re-bar bolts connected to each vertical frame pole.

**Design, production and construction**

The development of steel-frame T-shelters was in part a reaction to issues with the prefab ‘caravans’ used in Zataari camp. Problems with the caravans included:

- Sandwich-panel manufacture required specialist machinery, making caravans costly and limiting the number of producers.
- Slow production rates meant that it was difficult to scale-up.
- There were environmental issues surrounding disposal.
- Caravans were costly to transport, requiring a crane for loading/unloading, and placing heavy stress on roads from large trucks.
- The plywood floors were not durable, and there were water leakages in winter.

The T-shelter design, in contrast, was flexible and simple to produce using local materials. Features include:

- A gable roof, providing better ventilation than a flat roof.
- The kit format means that the shelter is easy to transport, store, and extend or modify.
- The ability to easily dismantle and re-erect means that it could be made part of a return package.
- Leg extenders facilitate the erection of shelters on slopes or uneven land (prefab caravans needed stilts or level foundations, in order to prevent sandwich-panels from twisting and failing).
- More spacious living area.

The first shelters included a porch (side entrance) to increase privacy, as the door does not then open directly onto the living space. This was in direct response to feedback from beneficiaries, who appreciated the modified design. However, the porch was dropped from the design for a number of different reasons, to the dissatisfaction of the refugees.

Some project team members also felt that this was a mistake as porch construction would not have made a significant difference to the construction timetable but would have made a considerable difference to beneficiaries’ sense of privacy.

Competition amongst contractors means that production capacities and efficiencies have increased. Construction contractors developed their own scaffolding methods to increase the...
rate of construction. There is now local, specialist knowledge in the production, construction and dismantling of the T-shelters.

Contractors have ten days after the awarding of the contract to produce the T-Shelter components and mobilise for commencement of work on-site.

Construction involves:

- Shelter positioning on-site with steel pegs and strings.
- Excavation and levelling of foundation trenches.
- Assembling the frame-kit components with interlocking self-drilling screws.
- Fixing windows, door and insulation.
- Covering the frame with external and internal metal cladding, and fixing the ventilation.
- Fixing plastic sheeting to the internal ceiling and adding partition wires.
- Compacting and adding the base course for the reinforced concrete floor.

### Wider impacts

Alternative uses for the design are being looked at, and market stalls have been built in the camp based on the same inter-locking design of the T-shelter.

The design assumes ad-hoc extensions/adaptations will be made by beneficiaries and aims to facilitate these additions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items for a single unit</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Steel structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel tubes for walls, rafters, purlins</td>
<td>77 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6cm diam., various lengths 1-3 m)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafter tie beam</td>
<td>8 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel joints</td>
<td>132 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting steel angle at the gable</td>
<td>6 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation base plate</td>
<td>1 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welded steel tube leg (30 cm long)</td>
<td>14 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel anchor pegs</td>
<td>28 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Walls and roof</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insulation (15 mm aluminum foam)</td>
<td>70m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cladding (0.35 mm IBR sheeting)</td>
<td>131 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel flashing for gable, ridge etc.</td>
<td>15 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ceiling and partitioning</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnbuckles and angle holders for fixing steel wires</td>
<td>9 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galvanized wires for fixing plastic sheeting / partitioning</td>
<td>34 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic sheeting (4m x 5m) for ceiling cladding</td>
<td>2 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVC ventilation pipes</td>
<td>4 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Floor and other</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement for reinforced floor (covers 24m²)</td>
<td>625 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel for reinforced floor</td>
<td>40 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel door</td>
<td>1 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel window</td>
<td>1 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-drilling screws: (6.3mm x 30mm)</td>
<td>600 pcs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.11 Jordan – 2013 – Syria conflict

Case study

Keywords: Rental support; Housing repair and retrofitting; Cash / vouchers; Advocacy / legal.

Emergency: Syria crisis, refugees in Jordan
Date: Conflict begins: March 2011 (ongoing).
People affected: Over 3.1 million refugees from Syria. Around 620,000 in Jordan, 10% of population (October 2014).
Project location: Irbid and Jerash Governorates.
Beneficiaries: Approximately 12,250 Syrian refugees.
Outputs: 4,000 housing units. 2,000 completed (August 2014).
Occupancy rate: Around 97%.
Shelter size: Units vary in size, but meet Sphere standards.
Cost: Grant depends on period of rent waived by landlord e.g. 12 months = 1,000 Jordanian dinars (US$ 1,400). Total costs per unit = US$ 2,500.

Project description:
The upgrading programme is made up of several projects, financed by different donors, aiming to increase the number of rental properties available to refugees by supporting landlords to complete unfinished housing units. Landlords are given a conditional cash grant to pay for the construction, paid in advance, which covers a rental period for 12-18 months for a refugee family.

Strengths
✓ Shelter was identified as the highest priority need.
✓ Unlike a simple cash-for-rent intervention, the project created additional housing units, contributing to a more sustainable solution.
✓ Easing the pressure on the rental market should benefit both the refugee and host community, though the scale is currently too small to have a major impact.
✓ The project created income-generation opportunities.
✓ The organisation’s legal staff are able to monitor evictions, and mediate disputes between beneficiary tenants and their landlords.

Wekanesses
× The implementation is labour-intensive and difficult to scale-up in order to significantly contribute to the control of inflation of rents. Interventions in sectors of the market such as access to mortgages for refugees, might have a greater impact.
× A small number of landlords have cancelled their involvement after receiving their payment(s) towards the construction work.

Observations
- It is essential to monitor for signs or threats of eviction.
- It is important to ensure that landlords understand their contractual obligations, and to develop a mechanism for resolving disputes with the organisation or tenants.
- Transparency regarding criteria for both beneficiary and property selection is extremely important, given the fact that the waiting list is so long and frustration levels are high.

Emergency timeline:

Project timeline (number of months):
[2] Implementation begins. Turn-around time from identification of property to beneficiary family moving in is around 3 months.
[14] 2,000 properties completed, 1,000 under construction.
[15-ongoing] Project has funding to continue to July 2015.
Situation before the crisis

In the seven years before the Syrian refugee crisis, the Jordanian housing market faced an annual shortfall of around 3,400 housing units per year. The shortage of affordable housing has been compounded by the rising number of Syrian refugees, which has increased significantly from December 2012 onwards.

Situation after the crisis began

According to an INGO assessment, shelter was the single most pressing need for refugees. The conflict in Syria has resulted in a need for an additional 120,000 housing units to accommodate an estimated 600,000 Syrian refugees. While more than 100,000 refugees are sheltered in camps, around 80% of families have found shelter in rental accommodation.

It has been estimated that more than 75% of the refugees living in host communities are extremely vulnerable, living in rudimentary shelters or tents, abandoned or partially constructed buildings, or in flats that are often overcrowded and poorly maintained.

Syrian families tend to pay higher rents than Jordanians and contracts are typically insecure, with many families worried about eviction. High rents and limited employment opportunities mean many families find themselves in increasing debt and are unable to access basic services.

A recent report looking at community tensions found that 83% of Jordanians and 77% of Syrians identified access to housing as a cause of tension.

Shelter strategy

The Government of Jordan’s National Resilience Plan 2014-2016 reports that the Syrian crisis has exacerbated the shortage of affordable housing in Jordan, raised rental prices, increased social tension, and strained urban infrastructure.

The report recommends bringing new residential units onto the market and implementing a large-scale affordable housing programme to assist refugees and low-income Jordanian families.

In Jordan the humanitarian shelter response is coordinated through a Shelter Working Group, rather than a Cluster, which divides its work into two broad objectives:

- Strategic objective in camps: Enable access to settlements with access to services and transport networks, aiming to reduce the underlying causes of socio-economic vulnerabilities.
- Strategic objective in non-camp areas: Increase the number of adequate shelter solutions available to families (through construction and rehabilitation).

Project implementation

The programme is funded by five different donors, each with their own project start and end dates, and the timeplan is ongoing.

The programme staff number around 60 (not including support departments). Teams of engineers assess properties and monitor implementation. Project support staff control the contract and payment process. Outreach teams with legal knowledge identify beneficiaries and monitor their security of tenure once they move in.

Identifying unfinished housing units is done through a communications strategy which includes disseminating leaflets, conducting meetings with local communities and local authorities and through word-of-mouth. Interested property owners then get in touch with the organisation. The properties must be within a reasonable distance of basic services in order to be selected.

An initial assessment is made by the technical team which leads to a Bill of Quantities (BoQ) to provide a Sphere-standards housing unit for a single family. This BoQ becomes part of the contract between the organisation and the landlord.

The contract specifies that once the property has been completed to the agreed standards, the refugee family will be allowed to live in the unit rent-free for a specified period. The landlord receives a conditional grant to make the repairs, the value of which depends on the agreed period of waived rent. For example, 12 months of waived rent corresponds to a grant value of 1,000 JOD (US$1,400); 18 months corresponds to 1,400 JOD (US$1,960).
Each beneficiary family receives a one-off resettlement grant of 100 JOD (US$ 140).

The construction contracts and rental leases are witnessed and signed-off by community-based organisations and local authorities, in order to reinforce the compliance and accountability of all parties. Property owners contract their own labourers and procure their own materials.

Regular site visits (around ten in total) are made by engineers from the organisation, to monitor and advise on construction works. Payments are made against construction progress. The first instalment of 35% of the grant is paid in advance; the next 30% of the grant is made once 60% of the works are complete, and the balance is paid once the works are completed and the keys have been given to the beneficiary family.

Rehabilitation works often exceed the anticipated duration of 6 weeks, lasting up to 8-10 weeks. The organisation conducted a survey to identify the reasons for the delays, and the most common were labour shortages, financial problems, and delays in connecting water and electricity. Consequently the organisation revised the payment plan from an advance of 25% to an advance of 35%, and is providing support to identify labourers and is also working with the utility companies.

In a limited number of cases it has not been possible to enforce the contract between landlords and the organisation, and in one instance a property owner took the first instalment without completing the project or returning the funding. The organisation relies on the goodwill of the community to ensure contracts are honoured, as it is reluctant to take these cases to court.

Another sensitive issue is the suitability of property owners to act as landlords for refugees. Applications by landlords are rejected if it is felt that they are hostile to refugees or are known to be aggressive or dangerous.

**Beneficiary selection**

The organisation’s vulnerability criteria are based on UN standard operating procedures for cash assistance. However, a new Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) is being finalised by the Inter-Sector Working Group.

The vulnerability criteria for beneficiary selection includes prioritising families who are homeless, living in overcrowded and substandard accommodation, or facing imminent eviction due to an inability to pay arrears.

Other priority families are female-headed households, families of more than ten members, and/or families with disabled or severely ill family members.

Beneficiaries are finally selected following a home visit by an outreach team. The beneficiary assessments are completed using a mobile phone application (which can be used on basic handsets as well as smartphones), with the data later downloaded to a database. Outreach teams work with CBOs for lists of refugees, through word-of-mouth and, most recently, through a new organisational drop-in centre in Irbid, which is visited by up to 100 refugees daily.

**Coordination**

The organisation is the only organisation currently implementing this shelter methodology in Jordan, but the hope is that other organisations will copy the model.

The project approach is in line with recommendations from the Syria Crisis Regional Response Plan (RRP6), the ECHO Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) 2014 and the government’s National Resilience Plan 2014-2016.

**Wider project impacts**

A survey of participating landlords found that the majority would not have developed their properties for another 15-20 months without the organisation’s financing. Around two-thirds had planned for the housing developments to be for their personal housing, the other third had planned to let the units for rent.

Landlords contributed on average 29% of the total costs of construction with the organisation providing the rest.

In terms of impact, landlords considered the scheme to be overwhelmingly positive in terms of investment in the local community. All but one of the 61 landlords interviewed said that they would recommend participation in the project to others.
A.12  Jordan – 2014 – Syria conflict

Case study

Keywords: Emergency shelter.


People affected: Over 3.1 million refugees from Syria. Around 620,000 in Jordan (October 2014).

Project location: Zaatari camp, Mafraq Governorate.

Beneficiaries: 20,000

Outputs: 5,000 recycled tents, repackaged and redistributed to new arrivals

Shelter size: Standard humanitarian family tents (23m²)

Cost: 2.1 Jordanian dinars (US$ 2.94) per tent, including collection from camp, assessing the tent, repair materials, mending, and repacking.

Project description:

When families in Zaatari refugee camp started to receive pre-fabricated container shelters, a stockpile of used tents began to build up. A tent-recycling project was developed to repair and repackaging used tents for new arrivals. Recycling, instead of destroying or giving away the used tents, generated an estimated saving of around US$ 3,000,000 (US$ 600 per tent). Tent components that are too damaged to be re-used for shelters have been used for other purposes.

Strengths

✓ Around 90% of the materials used by the project came from the used tents themselves.
✓ The project required only basic skills and could be set-up easily, moving from planning to implementation phase in less than a month.
✓ Low implementation costs have resulted in large financial savings.

Weaknesses

✗ Considerable storage and dry warehousing areas are required.

Observations

- The success of the project depended on the specific context where tents were replaced by containers whilst they were still functional. Replicating the project would rely on similar circumstances.

Emergency timeline:


Project timeline (number of months):

[1] Used tent collection begins at the start of April 2014, with the first repaired tents distributed by end of that month.
[2-ongoing] Project likely to continue to end of 2014.
Project implementation

Zaatari refugee camp opened in July 2012, with family tents distributed to all new arrivals. Around eight months later, pre-fabricated containers were rolled out as a new shelter solution to replace the tents, providing better protection from the weather, and greater privacy and dignity for the refugees. The containers are standard 20-foot (6-metre) sandwich-panel containers, similar to those used as offices across humanitarian operations.

As the families moved into the new shelters, tents were collected and stockpiled by the organisation. The organisation quickly found itself with thousands of used tents, many of which were still in good condition. Given the donor logo on the tent canvas, only limited options were available for reusing the tents. It was therefore decided that all efforts would be made to recycle tents wherever possible, reuse whatever other material remained for non-shelter projects, and send the rest for disposal.

After a very short planning period in April 2014, the recycling project was rolled out in the same month. The project consisted of three phases:

Phase 1 – tent collection

Tents vacated by families moving in to the new shelter were collected and taken to the warehouse for first assessment.

Phase 2 – validity check

A visual check was made to make sure that all tent components were in good condition. The spare parts (tent pegs, poles, ropes etc.) were sorted in a separate warehouse. The tents themselves were allocated to different warehouses following their categorisation through a visual assessment:

- Useful category – tent canvases were moved to a separate Rub-hall where they have been repackaged with all other needed items (poles, pegs, ropes etc.), before being re-distributed to new arrivals.
- Damaged category – tent materials were used for spare parts. Some parts, such as damaged canvas, were used as additional roofing protection for container shelters, or as patches for tents needing repair. Other damaged spare parts were recycled for use as non-shelter items.
- Repairable category – these tents were in reasonable condition but required patches or the repair of holes. Repairs were made with sewing equipment or glue, using salvaged canvas for patches.

Phase 3 – distribution

Re-usable and repaired tents were sent back to the camp set-up area for distribution to new arrivals.

Some missing parts, such as pegs and poles, were fabricated in a local workshop and then purchased by the organisation to complete tent sets that were missing certain items. A dedicated team repaired pegs and poles on-site as many of them only required basic work such as re-straightening.

The recycling rate for the project has depended upon the number of prefab containers arriving each day and the number of tents collected (between 20 and 200 per day). To date, from more than 11,000 tents collected, the organisation has been able to recover and re-distribute 40% of them – around 4,500 tents.

Non-shelter uses for salvaged materials

Metal poles have been re-used to build frames for beds or other furniture items and even umbrellas.

Other than as an additional roofing material, damaged canvas can be re-used in many different ways, such as a fencing material or for making bags, clothes or children’s toys.

The organisation’s Youth programme is using the cleaned, left-over canvas as textile material for vocational training courses offered in the camp. Students are trained to make various items from the canvas and the sewing course has expanded into an independent workshop.

The items are made as part of the Youth course and are not for resale. However, they have proved very popular with donors as souvenirs of the project.

The children’s play equipment that has been made from left-over tent parts are used in the children’s play areas in the camp.
Examples of furniture, play equipment, and disability aids made out of left-over materials from the tent recycling project.

Photo: Fadi Al Masarweh/NRC
**A.16 Lebanon – 2007 – Conflict**

**Update:**

**Keywords:** Unplanned camps, Planned and managed camps, Urban neighbourhoods, Housing repair and retrofitting, Cash, Structural assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project location:</strong></td>
<td>Palestinian “gatherings” in and around Saida, southern Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict:</strong></td>
<td>Palestinian refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Displacement date:</strong></td>
<td>1948 to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of people displaced:</strong></td>
<td>40,000 Palestinian refugees in gatherings (2009), 450,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project outputs:</strong></td>
<td>Repairs of 557 shelters, including 412 roof repairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupancy rate on handover:</strong></td>
<td>Close to 100 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shelter size:</strong></td>
<td>40m²-60m², Average 50m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Materials cost per shelter:</strong></td>
<td>US$ 600 – US$ 2,500: Roof only US$ 5,500: Full rehabilitation with services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project cost per shelter:</strong></td>
<td>US$ 2,300: roof only US$ 7,800 full rehabilitation with services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project timeline**

- Project ongoing
- 557 shelters rehabilitated since 2005.
- Completion of 160 rehabilitation in buildings from the 17th and 18th century in the historical centre of Saida
- First rehabilitations without using a contractor
- Introduction of a new “complex” roofing solution
- 250 shelters rehabilitated
- Project start date
- 2005
- Conflict date
- 1948

**Project description**

The organisation ran a series of projects since 2005 to improve the shelter standards of Palestinian refugees living in “gatherings”. Structured repairs focusing on roofs were conducted with associated water and sanitation improvements. Eight gatherings in the Saida area were targeted with around 25 per cent of the shelters repaired. The organisation also carried out other rehabilitations in other parts of Lebanon during the same period. Many of the initial lessons learnt were adopted by other organisations in subsequent responses.

**Strengths and weaknesses**

- ✓ The project built on its own experiences in different implementation methods. As it progressed it reduced reliance on contractors, resulting in significant efficiency and quality gains.
- ✓ Effective new technical solutions for roofing were used.
- ✓ The organisation worked hard with multiple stakeholders to negotiate access to gatherings where civil works were previously forbidden due to land tenure, political or conservation reasons.
- ✓ Introduction of beneficiary participation in the form of unskilled labour was a success.
- ✗ There were protection issues with some renters being evicted from properties following rehabilitation.

This could be mitigated against through improved social analysis and involvement of local leaders.

- ✗ Community participation and support for the project could have been improved through greater community mobilisation. Greater inputs from beneficiaries in terms of labour would also have helped to bring down relatively high unit costs.
- ✗ Construction contractors performed poorly, leading to programme delays and poor quality construction. To remedy this, the organisation was forced to directly implement the construction.
- - The relatively small scale of interventions and the significant costs per household reflect the complex operating environment and the nature of the works required.
Background

The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 displaced thousands of Palestinians, with thousands seeking shelter in camps in Lebanon. There is still no political solution to the displacement, and many refugees experience very poor living conditions.

The largest Palestinian refugee camp, Ein El Hilwe, is in Saida. The gatherings in the Saida area are found in three types of location:

- within Ein El Hilwe camp itself
- between Mieh Mieh and Saida city
- within the old city of Saida in urban Lebanese communities

A survey of all Palestinian gatherings in 2009 concluded that around 30 per cent of the housing in Palestinian gatherings had shelter rehabilitation needs. Gatherings within the urban Lebanese communities in Saida tended to have less urgent needs compared to those gatherings located in Ein El Hilwe camp. The majority of gatherings in Saida had high or moderate shelter needs, often with leaking zinc roofs, water-damaged concrete block walls, and serious structural problems.

Water and sanitation problems were also identified, mostly due to poor chlorination practices and poorly-maintained water networks.

Land ownership in Saida gatherings ranges from public land, which is illegally occupied but tolerated by the municipality, to illegally occupied private land where evictions are being sought by landlords.

Shelter types included:

- multi-storey buildings with concrete roofs, converted from barracks built for the Lebanese families displaced by the 1956 earthquake which were then later sold or rented out
- multi-storey buildings with zinc roofs and very limited space between buildings
- single-storey concrete housing, often low quality with zinc roofs
- new apartment buildings with concrete roofs in good condition.

The most dangerous housing was often found in the areas where land-use was disputed.

Selection of beneficiaries

The organisation’s social team made home visits in the target areas, filling in questionnaires with both technical and social data. This was followed by a technical team mapping housing with “highly urgent shelter needs”. This beneficiary list was submitted to the gathering’s local committee.

After the committee made additions to the list, the organisation made a final decision based on overall social and technical criteria, including household income, age structure, and whether members of the household were disabled.

The social team also communicated with the local population throughout the project to minimise potential conflicts and encourage participation.

The gathering’s local committee was involved in the identification of people who would be involved in the cash-for-work part of the construction. The organisation reserved the right to make a final decision over who would work in order to ensure fair selection.

Implementation

As a number of shelters were found to be structurally unsafe, stabilisation works needed to be conducted with care. Inhabitants were advised to evacuate until repairs had been completed.

By repairing the shelter the organisation was effectively guaranteeing its safety to the inhabitants and therefore taking on considerable responsibility for the quality of the work.

The organisation made a transition from contractor-led rehabilitation to direct-build. This decision was taken following concerns over the quality of contractor’s work. Those contractors that were able or willing to work in the gatherings often used unskilled labour and amateur equipment.

The organisation found that it could ensure better quality work, and improve structural safety by implementing directly. It was also able to carry out the work cheaper.

By implementing direct-build projects the organisation was also able to select community participants to receive cash-for-work and to provide basic construction training for beneficiaries during the repairs.

Rehabilitation followed a five-step process:

1. Information of stakeholders and selection of beneficiaries
2. Bill of Quantities (BoQ) and plans of selected shelters
3. Purchase of materials and equipment, preparation of workers contracts
4. Implementation of works
5. Handover.
A specific bill of quantities had to be drawn up for each household and each household had to sign an agreement before work could start.

The organisation spent considerable time and effort to negotiate with authorities for permission to repair shelters in illegal gatherings. A good relationship with the influential Members of Parliament from all political sides was developed and they became keen to take partial credit for the assistance projects. The organisation also required specific authorisation from the Lebanese army for the transport of building materials to the shelters.

Once the materials were purchased, meetings were held to provide households with a complete overview of what work would (and wouldn’t) be done.

Shelters were divided into groups and work was carried out on 8 to 12 shelters at a time. An expatriate project manager was supported by a local engineer and foreman for daily site supervision.

A maximum of seven weeks to complete a shelter was set as a target.

**DRR components**

Where possible, the organisation reinforced the structure of shelters in order to improve their earthquake resistance. This included improved foundations, lintels, ring beams, reinforced slabs, and in some cases, additional steel girders supported with steel columns.

**Technical solutions**

Working on multi-storey buildings required special considerations. Repairs often involved the use of large amounts of sand, cement and tiles, creating potentially dangerous loads on weak, elevated structures. Floor loads were reduced by up to 50 per cent by:

- cutting the amount of sand used for flooring which increased the strength of the concrete mix
- reducing the thickness (with some resulting loss in levelness of the floor);
- reducing the amount of mortar for tiling;
- using lightweight tiles in place of traditional tiles.

Following experience from previous projects, three key technical approaches were adopted by the organisation from 2008:

1) **Reinforced concrete ring beams**

To support rehabilitated roofs, concrete ring beams were introduced. These would reinforce the structure, add a slope for the roofs and provide connections to support the roofing girders.

Steel reinforcement was used in the corners to connect walls together and make the structure more earthquake resistant.

2) **New, insulated roofs**

A French roofing product, made of zinc sheet, insulation material and a bitumen was introduced. The small panels made the roof easier to repair which is useful in conflict areas where localised roof damage is common. However, skilled workers were required to lay it, and therefore greater management by the organisation was required.

3) **Structural reinforcements**

Concrete roof/floor slabs in multi-storey buildings were often poorly supported. Steel beams were installed, supported at both ends by reinforced concrete lintels or by a steel column fixed on an isolated reinforced concrete foundation. During the rehabilitation the steel beams were supported by metal props.

A number of walls were found to be unable to bear the loads placed on them and new reinforced concrete columns were built to make the shelters safer.

**Impacts**

An independent assessment at the end of 2008 concluded that family relations, decreased tensions within the households, reductions in infectious diseases and improved personal hygiene practices were a direct result of the project.

The assessment noted that poor housing conditions tended to have a disproportionately large negative impact on young women and girls. The impact of small things such as rehabilitated bathrooms with lockable doors made important positive impacts on girls’ and women’s privacy.
A.13 Lebanon – 2012 – Syria conflict

Case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keywords:</th>
<th>Construction materials; Tools; Emergency shelter.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Emergency:** Syria crisis, refugees in Lebanon.

**Date:** Conflict begins: March 2011 (ongoing). December 2012: over 100,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

**People affected:** Total: over 3.1 million refugees.

**Project location:** Saida and Chouf districts (Mt Lebanon Governorate) and Akkar district (North Governorate).

**Beneficiaries:** 38,000.

**Outputs:** 4,000 Sealing-off Kits (SOK) for unfinished buildings (SOK1) and self-made shelters/tents (SOK2).

**Ocupancy rate:** 100%

**Shelter size:** Self-made shelters (tents) ranged from 15m² to 20m². Unfinished buildings (either single shelters or rooms in buildings) ranged from 25m² to 35m².


**Project description:**

After carrying out minor rehabilitation activities in 2012, the organisation decided to respond to a huge increase in shelter needs, by developing a Sealing-off Kit (SOK) for distribution.

The kits enabled beneficiaries to make rapid, emergency improvements to their shelters, such as adding missing doors and windows, whilst waiting for more substantial assistance. The organisation distributed up to 500 kits (for 3,000 people) per week.

**Strengths**

- Large number of shelters can be upgraded in a short period of time. The majority of beneficiaries reported using the kit in full within 72 hours of distribution.
- Beneficiaries can choose how to use the materials to best improve their shelters, with a high satisfaction rate amongst beneficiaries.
- The unit cost is relatively low (around US$ 50 per person). Unlike projects that use contractors to install kits, there are no labour costs. Unlike some voucher-based projects, there are cost benefits due to the economies of scale of centralised purchasing.
- Contingency stock allows organisations to scale-up response quickly.
- The SOK’s composition is flexible, made up of the most commonly required materials, and can be easily modified to adapt to changing needs.

**Weaknesses**

- The SOK has to be delivered at the shelter but sometimes larger trucks were unable to access remote areas. The organisation modified the transport fleet accordingly or, in a few cases, had to use centralised distributions.
- The availability of large quantities of materials wasn’t always guaranteed, and in a few cases, had to use centralised distributions.
- The SOK could only support emergency or temporary repairs.

Observations

- The project requires very good logistics for transportation, storage and distribution (each SOK weighs around 170kg).
Situation before the crisis

Syrian refugees in Lebanon have a mix of backgrounds. Some come from urban areas with experience of living in good quality accommodation, others from rural areas or from areas with poor-quality housing.

Situation after the crisis began

Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon rent rooms or shelters, with rents increasing dramatically since the Syrian crisis began. A shortage of affordable housing in Lebanon before the conflict has been exacerbated by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and people are prepared to take any shelter available, even if it is sub-standard.

Shelter strategy

The national shelter strategy of the Shelter Sector Working Group is to provide an adequate shelter (according to Sphere standards) to the most vulnerable Syrian refugees in Lebanon, while avoiding using camps as a solution. Activities are divided into three main groups:

• Providing a SOK in order to repair the most urgent shelter needs (missing windows, doors, walls).
• Minor rehabilitation in small shelter units or collective shelter, including sanitation facilities.
• Cash-for-rent assistance.

Project implementation

By selecting a methodology where kits were distributed to beneficiaries in order for them to make their own repairs, it was possible to meet the most urgent needs very quickly in comparison to the organisation running its own repair project. Speed of response was a priority as the winter had already arrived before the first distribution.

A needs assessment showed that many shelters lacked doors, windows and partitions for toilets. To meet these needs, a SOK for unfinished buildings was designed, using materials to be found in local markets that beneficiaries were familiar with. The organisation’s long experience in the area enabled it to make rapid decisions regarding the contents of the SOK, and it then approached suppliers who could provide the items packaged and ready to be distributed.

Two suppliers delivered the kits, one providing timber and the other providing plastic sheet and fixings, to the organisation’s warehouse in preparation for distribution by the project teams.

A distribution plan was made once a group of between 20 and 80 beneficiary families had been identified for support.

The SOKs were loaded on to small trucks and delivered to the beneficiaries’ shelters by staff of the organisation. The beneficiaries then signed for receipt of the materials.

The project undertook post-distribution monitoring, which involved interviewing households, and focusing upon the use of the kit rather than the quality of construction. This information was then fed back into revisions of the contents of the SOK.

Before the start of the project, the main risk identified was that beneficiaries would either sell the kits or make poor-quality repairs. However, following an evaluation of 100 households following the distribution of the first 500 kits, the results were much better than expected. More than 90% of beneficiaries reported significant improvement of living conditions due to provision of the kit, and the majority of beneficiaries had used all the items for repair or upgrading of their shelters.

In terms of speed of implementation, around three quarters of the beneficiaries participating in one evaluation reported that they had used the entire contents of the kit within three days of receiving it.

Beneficiary selection

Beneficiaries were selected following house-to-house assessments made by project teams made up of around six people.

The criteria to receive a SOK, developed by the organisation and based on Sphere standards, were that the shelter was without one or more of the following:

• external doors and windows,
• internal walls,
• partition between the toilet and living area,
• partition in collective rooms, occupied by two or more families.

Coordination

The organisation presented the SOK project to the Shelter Sector Working Group in Lebanon in February 2013 (five months after the project started). Following this,
several other humanitarian organisations have implemented similar distributions of SOKs.

**Technical solutions**

As the SOK does not contain any building material facilitating permanent construction, there were no problems gaining approval from local authorities regarding its distribution.

The kit was designed to be as flexible as possible, allowing beneficiaries to use the materials in a way that would best improve their shelters. The kit contained 22 different items. Plastic sheets, tarpaulin and plywood could be used for multiple purposes such as improving walls, ceilings or door panels, or for sealing windows and holes, while timber could be used for walls, doors, and window frames.

The SOK1 is designed for a small shelter unit such as an unfinished house, garage or shop. It included items such as foam filler, which is very useful for blocking small holes or gaps between the roof and walls and is much cheaper and easier to use than mortar.

The SOK2 is designed for self-made shelters built by the beneficiaries, and contains more timber and plastic sheeting, in order to reinforce the structure.

**Materials**

All the kit items were well known to beneficiaries as construction materials, and have been available locally in both Lebanon and Syria.

Requests to suppliers were made several weeks before distributions, to prevent bottlenecks or shortages in the local market.

**Use and adaptations**

Some beneficiaries built entirely new extensions to their shelters with the kits. Wooden and plastic partitions were used for separating sanitation facilities or providing privacy, with plywood, tarpaulin or plastic sheets sometimes employed as false ceilings. Internal and external doors were built from different wood components.

Plastic sheeting was often used to seal windows, but was also used for walling or for protecting brick walls from the weather during construction.

Left-over sections from timber and plywood were used for building furniture – everything from shelves and cupboards to bed frames.

Post-distribution monitoring surveys showed that around 13% of the beneficiaries sold some of the SOK contents, overwhelmingly in order to pay rent. Around 6% of households swapped and shared items in order to meet their specific needs.

**Wider project impacts**

The SOK design was approved by a large number of aid agencies and donors. It has been distributed by several organisations since winter 2012.

**Simplified kit contents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>SOK1 (qty)</th>
<th>SOK2 (qty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transparent Sheet 20m x 2m / Plastic Film</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic Sheet (heavy duty Tarpaulin) 4m x 6m</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic Sheet (medium quality Tarpaulin) 4m x 6m</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails for wood</td>
<td>1.5kg</td>
<td>2.5kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails for concrete</td>
<td>3 boxes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood screws (box) and washers (1kg)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium wire mesh</td>
<td>4 m²</td>
<td>4 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding foam filler</td>
<td>1kg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galvanised hinges and connectors</td>
<td>42 pcs</td>
<td>8 hinges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padlock and latch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhesive tape</td>
<td>3 rolls</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toolkit: hammer, screw driver, saw, cutter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plywood sheets 244cm x 122cm</td>
<td>5 x 4mm, 1 x 18mm</td>
<td>15 x 4mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood various thicknesses and 3-4 metre lengths</td>
<td>15 pcs</td>
<td>33 pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rope (6mm thick)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2kg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A.14 Lebanon – 2012 – Syria conflict

**Case study**

**Emergency:** Syria crisis, refugees in Lebanon.

**Date:** Conflict begins: March 2011 (ongoing). December 2012: over 100,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

**People affected:** Total: over 3.1 million refugees. Lebanon: over 1.1 million (Oct. 2014)

**Project location:** Parts of Bekaa (Beqaa) and North Governorates.

**Beneficiaries:** 20,000 families (over 100,000 individuals) as of September 2014.

**Outputs:** 20,000 families supported through a combination of weatherproofing kits, vouchers, cash-for-rehabilitation and site improvements.

**Occupancy rate:** 100% (inhabited shelters targeted)

**Shelter size:** Variable.

**Cost:** Range of assistance packages e.g:
- Emergency assistance: US$ 250 per family (US$ 100 project costs, US$ 150 direct assistance)
- Building rehabilitation: US$ 2,350 per family (US$ 850 project costs, US$ 1,500 direct assistance)

**Project description:**

Several different assistance packages made up a larger programme, aimed at improving the living conditions of the most vulnerable Syrian and Lebanese families living in poorest quality shelter. The programme was a multi-sector response, integrating WASH and Child Protection, using multiple modalities, such as NFI distribution, cash and vouchers.

**Strengths**

- Successfully scaling-up in a complex, dynamic context to meet needs of the beneficiaries before winter.
- Different types of assistance were provided for different needs. Low-cost, high volume interventions ran in parallel with more complex rehabilitation.
- A door-to-door approach to assessment, technical support and multi-sector follow-up increased staff costs but enhanced impact and community trust.
- Field teams were made up of a mix of technical and outreach staff, helping to see the bigger picture and to respond to non-shelter needs.
- Rehabilitating the existing, inhabited shelters reduced dealings with complex regulations relating to new construction and the rental market.

**Weaknesses**

- Security issues caused delays to direct implementation by the organisation. A shift to a mix of implementing directly and through partners increased access.
- The organisation’s initial technical WASH capacity required more support. This was provided once donors saw the benefits of multi-sector intervention.
- The initial staffing structure lacked the flexibility to adjust to rapid changes in needs. Field-teams were re-structured to overcome this.

**Observations**

- The concentration of refugees in dispersed urban and peri-urban rental situations complicates a humanitarian response. The context can be extremely challenging and the usual “minimum” standards may not be achievable or appropriate.

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**Emergency timeline:**


**Project timeline (number of months):**

[1] Nov. 2012: Staff recruited to meet escalating need.


[14] Programme reaches 50,000 people.

[20] June 2014: Programme reaches 100,000 people and is due to continue throughout 2014 and into 2015.

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**Keywords:** Household items; Construction materials; Emergency shelter; Rental support; Housing repair and retrofitting; Cash / vouchers; Site planning.
Situation before the crisis
Lebanon is considered an upper middle income country with a highly privatised economy. The population is concentrated in Beirut and its suburbs, with the vast majority of residences being owner-occupied. Prior to the Syrian crisis, Lebanon already suffered from a lack of affordable housing, with no significant policy in place to mitigate this.

Situation after the crisis began
The Lebanese government normally has not formally sanctioned camps. Instead, refugees are dispersed across more than 1,700 different host communities.

The large influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon (rising six-fold during 2013 to over a million today, making up around 25% of Lebanon’s population), has resulted in further pressure on the rental market, inflating prices.

Recent assessments by international organisations note that the lack of an adequate and safe supply of shelter has pushed many of the poorest Syrian and Lebanese families into sub-standard shelters, with the situation worsening. In March 2014 a shelter survey indicated that:

- 57% of Syrian refugee families live in finished apartments or houses.
- 25% live in sub-standard buildings (such as unfinished houses or non-residential buildings).
- 15% live in informal settlements (i.e. ad-hoc, self-settled camps made up of improvised temporary shelters or tents).
- Less than 3% live in collective centres.

New-arrival refugees are increasingly vulnerable, obliged to accept evermore inadequate and overcrowded accommodation.

Many refugee households have covered the cost of their rent through diminishing savings, cash assistance and increasing debt levels, as well as other forms of negative coping mechanisms such as withdrawing children from school and engaging them in work.

Shelter strategy
With the Lebanese government generally unwilling to consider the option of camps, the vast majority of families are dispersed through hundreds of communities.

The Shelter Sector Working Group in Lebanon focuses on the following:

- Providing safe and dignified emergency shelter to new arrivals and to the most vulnerable.
- Improving sub-standard shelters, including through the upgrading of local properties.
- Advocating for larger formal settlements.

The organisation’s own strategy is built on the working group’s strategy with additional areas of focus:

- Child focus: addressing the basic needs of children and their families can reduce negative coping mechanisms (such as child labour and early marriage) and increase investment in human capital such as education and healthcare.
- An integrated approach: Shelter, NFI and WASH assistance were provided together where required, with staff also trained in identifying child protection vulnerabilities and key messaging.
- Occupied shelters: the vast majority of refugees access shelter through informal market channels and the number of homeless refugees is very low. Consequently, the focus is on
upgrading existing, but sub-
standard, occupied shelters.

- Community outreach: shelter
  programming is delivered at the
  household-level, which allows
  for direct targeting of the most
  at-risk families and helps to build
  trust in communities. Shelter
  and WASH field teams are an
  important source of referrals
  to the organisation’s Child
  Protection Case Management
  team.

- Emergency and long-term
  solutions are implemented in
  parallel, by offering a range of
  Shelter and WASH assistance
  packages for differing levels of
  needs.

**Project implementation**

To respond to the different living
conditions of beneficiaries, the
organisation developed five different
interventions to be employed in order
to support families living in two types
of situation:

- Informal settlements: self-
  settled sites with families living
  in tents or makeshift shelters.

- Sub-standard buildings:
  unfinished housing or converted
  non-residential structures such as
  garages or shops.

The five types of intervention, providing different types of assistance
using different modalities, were:

- A: Weatherproofing in informal
  settlements – following
government stipulations, this
  assistance was provided as direct
distribution of a kit of materials.

- B: Temporary Emergency
  Shelter – only a small caseload
  required a full shelter kit, but the
  families were some of the most
  vulnerable.

- C: Site improvements –
  informal settlements suffered
  from ad-hoc layouts and
  rapid growth, resulting in
  risks for flooding and fire.
  Improvements were made
to drainage and layouts to
  improve living conditions.
  This was implemented using
  a casual labour initiative in
  order to create an income for
  participants.

- D: Emergency Shelter/WASH
  in sub-standard buildings
  – a rapid, relatively cheap
  intervention using vouchers to
  provide flexible solutions for the
  upgrading of shelters. Technical
  staff from the organisation were
  present on suppliers’ premises
  on voucher redemption days to
  ensure quality control.

- E: Rehabilitation of sub-standard
  buildings – permanent upgrades
  were funded in exchange for
  a 12-month period of secure
  tenure and a rental reduction
  equivalent to the value of the
  work carried out. Money was
  transferred in three tranches
  (20%, 40% and 40%) via
  an ATM card which could
  be used in all major banks in
  Lebanon. The transfer of cash
  was conditional on technical
  monitoring and achieving pre-
  agreed work stages.

The programme was supported
financially with multiple funding
streams, with different donors sup-
porting activities most relevant to
their mandate. As the programme
developed, a multi-sector approach
was taken, integrating Shelter,
WASH, NFI, Child Protection, Cash,
and Livelihoods components.

Direct implementation was used
for the majority of locations. Local
partners were used to increase access
in more insecure areas.

Household-level door-to-door dis-
tributions were more resource-inten-
sive. However, this allowed tailored
solutions, the identification of non-
shelter needs, and the building of
trust and relationships.

**Beneficiary selection**

Geographic areas of intervention
were selected based on needs and
Table of intervention types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>A: Weather-proofing</th>
<th>B: Temporary Emergency Shelter</th>
<th>C: Site Improvements</th>
<th>D: Emergency Shelter and WASH</th>
<th>E: Rehabilitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelter type</td>
<td>Informal settlements</td>
<td>Informal settlements</td>
<td>Informal settlements</td>
<td>Unfinished houses and converted garages</td>
<td>Unfinished houses and converted garages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Families received a shelter kit (plastic sheeting, timber, tools, etc.) to repair, reinforce or extend their existing shelter.</td>
<td>Families with no shelter received a full kit in order to build a tent in an informal settlement.</td>
<td>Communities implemented semi-permanent site improvements to informal settlements, reducing health and safety risks.</td>
<td>Families received a voucher that could be redeemed for Shelter and WASH materials to address their individual immediate needs.</td>
<td>Families received a conditional cash grant for upgrading. The landlord gave a year's secure tenure and reduced rent in exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH component</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>In-kind kit</td>
<td>In-kind kit</td>
<td>In-kind and casual labour</td>
<td>Voucher</td>
<td>Conditional cash grant (3 tranches)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit cost per household</td>
<td>US$ 150 direct (US$ 250 total)</td>
<td>US$ 400 direct (US$ 600 total)</td>
<td>US$ 150 direct (US$ 250 total)</td>
<td>US$ 250 direct (US$ 450 total)</td>
<td>US$ 1,500 direct (US$ 2,350 total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifespan</td>
<td>6-12 months</td>
<td>2+ years</td>
<td>2+ years</td>
<td>2+ years</td>
<td>5+ years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery time</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>5 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantages</td>
<td>Relatively cheap and quick. No formal approval required.</td>
<td>Relatively cheap and quick. Highly visible and significant improvements in living conditions.</td>
<td>Relatively cheap and quick. No formal approval required.</td>
<td>'Permanent' improvement in living conditions. Investment in infrastructure. Secure tenure for family Rental reduction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
<td>'Temporary'. Not all core needs met.</td>
<td>'Temporary'. Not all core needs met.</td>
<td>'Temporary'. Not all core needs met.</td>
<td>'Temporary'. Not all core needs met.</td>
<td>Relatively expensive and slow. Formal approval required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gaps as identified by the coordination mechanisms. Initial caseload estimates were verified through a rapid mapping assessment.

The beneficiaries were targeted based on vulnerability, rather than refugee status, which meant Lebanese families also qualified.

Detailed household-level technical and socio-economic surveys were carried out by teams of both men and women consisting of both technical shelter experts and staff with interviewing skills. The household survey data was indexed according to a vulnerability scale agreed on by several organisations.

Independent teams then conducted Post Distribution Monitoring in order to avoid conflict of interests.

Analysis of the available data showed that sub-standard shelters hosted on average larger families compared to refugees living in the formal rental market. Proportionally, there were more children in sub-standard shelters and recent evaluations concluded that assistance to cover basic needs has improved nutrition, raised school attendance and has reduced child labour.

**Coordination**

The organisation is an active member of the joint UN-government-led Shelter Sector Working Group at both national and local level, and took the lead in several technical working groups, including those for weatherproofing and for informal settlements.

All activities were in line with the inter-organisational agreed Shelter strategy and with all relevant Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), such as guidelines for rehabilitating sub-standard buildings or weatherproofing kit contents.

**Materials**

The vast majority of materials were available locally. The one major exception to this was humanitarian plastic sheeting, which was not available in either sufficient quantity or quality. Half the required amount of plastic sheeting was imported.

The organisation's technical staff conducted regular market assessments to track labour and material costs in order to identify if the project was inflating prices.

**Wider project impacts**

A follow-up of the rehabilitation project showed that the vast majority of families remained in their accommodation for the full year. The rent reduction has enabled families to increase their human capital investment in education and healthcare.

**Future challenges**

The Syria conflict has become a protracted crisis and rents are continuing to rise while the shelter situation for many vulnerable Syrian and Lebanese families deteriorates.

Forced evictions are increasingly an issue which could be mitigated by projects helping to formalise tenancy agreements.

Community acceptance of such a large influx of people is critical to minimise insecurity, evictions and further displacement. The organisation has completed a research project to see how livelihood interventions can be integrated to strengthen social cohesion.
A.15 Lebanon – 2013 – Syria conflict

Case study

Keywords: Emergency shelter; Housing repair and retrofitting.

Emergency: Syria crisis, refugees in Lebanon.
Date: Conflict begins: March 2011 (ongoing). December 2012: over 100,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
People affected: Total: over 3.1 million refugees. Lebanon: over 1.1 million (Oct. 2014)
Project location: Governorate.
Beneficiaries: 1,987 individuals (398 units).
Outputs: 10 collective centres.
Occupancy rate: Each centre is fully occupied.
Shelter size: Buildings are 1-3 storeys high and the average partitioned room varies from 20m² to 25m². The average number of rooms per floor is 20.
Cost: Conversion costs between US$ 1,500-3,000 per unit. Running costs (utilities) approx. US$ 70 per unit/month, plus 7% organisational overheads.

Project description:

The main organisation aimed to increase overall shelter capacity by paying for the conversion of large buildings into collective centres, some of which were already being squatted by refugee families. Since the buildings had been used previously as chicken farms, they had to be disinfected and re-developed to meet minimum shelter standards. Landlords waived rent to the value of the conversion costs, and contracts will be renegotiated once the period of free rent comes to an end.

Strengths

✓ An innovative approach to increasing emergency capacity when camps not an option.
✓ Management of rental contracts by the implementing partner ensured refugees were protected and local authorities were involved in the process.
✓ The project worked in parallel with an organisation developing agricultural livelihoods to benefit both host and refugee communities.
✓ The living conditions of families already squatting in the farm buildings were greatly improved.
✓ The project injected funds into the local economy.

Weaknesses

✗ Beneficiaries expressed initial reluctance to live in converted chicken farm buildings, stating a preference for cash-for-rent solutions.
✗ There was a low risk that disinfection was not always completely effective, though no traces of post-rehabilitation infections have been found to date.
✗ Rehabilitation is relatively expensive and, due to high maintenance costs, these types of collective centres are only cost-effective if they last for at least three years.
✗ A high-density living arrangement has potential to give rise to conflicts or disputes. The project will require strong ongoing management to deal with emerging issues.
✗ There have been limited livelihood opportunities in the project locations.

Observations

- In Kherbet Daoud, the local village population was concerned about the impact of large numbers of refugees on public services and jobs.

Emergency timeline:


Project timeline (number of months):

[9] Phase 1 - buildings identified and disinfected, beginning of conversion.
[18] Phase 2 - continued conversion.
Situation before the crisis

Public housing in Lebanon is limited, and there have been few significant housing policies to support affordable housing for low-income groups.

Many low-income families live in the peri-urban areas of large cities, where housing quality is low and construction often involves circumventing building regulations. Buy-to-let is common, and real estate speculation is a major market.

Scarcity of land approved for building has led developers to select unregulated areas. The rental market in these areas offers little protection for tenants. Wealthy families buy supplementary water and electricity services from private operators; those relying on state services often face blackouts or shortages.

Situation after the crisis

By October 2014, registered Syrian refugees made up 25% of Lebanon’s population. This has had a dramatic impact on the overall demand for housing in the country.

While around 80% of refugees continue to rent, the pressure on the rental market, coupled with refugees’ diminishing resources, means that increasing numbers of refugees are resorting to insecure dwellings; for instance, the number of refugees living in unfinished houses and garages increased from 29% to 40% between August 2013 and March 2014. Furthermore, the majority of Syrian refugees lack security of tenure in their housing arrangements and are facing an increased risk of forced evictions as the crisis wears on.

Shelter strategy

The Government of Lebanon has not normally sanctioned the development of refugee camps, partly due to the experience of refugee camps established in Lebanon following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war becoming permanent settlements.

Consequently, the rehabilitation of houses and collective shelters remains a priority intervention in the absence of other solutions.

Priority is given to shelter interventions categorized as life-saving (around 55% of the Syrian refugee population meet this criteria). Types of interventions include:

- Rehabilitating apartments and houses to raise shelter standards.
- Cash-for-rent and cash for host families to offset financial burdens on refugees.
- Weather-proofing of informal settlements and unfinished houses.
- Site improvements in informal settlements, mainly to improve drainage in flood-prone areas.
- Pending support from government and local municipalities, establishment of formal settlements of approximately 20 families.

The strategy for collective centres includes:

- Continued rehabilitation of public and private buildings. With limited availability of public buildings, greater emphasis is placed on rehabilitating privately-owned buildings.
- Collective centre management to address problems such as solid waste management and electric power consumption, as well as to intervene when conflicts or disputes arise.

Shelter interventions have been designed in consultation with beneficiaries, especially women (a quarter of refugee families are female-headed households) and should contribute to the development of the local economy.

Project implementation

In assessing the potential for the conversion of buildings into collective centres, the agency found a number of refugees living in disused chicken farms paying around US$ 67 per month per household.

In total, 10 empty or disused chicken farms were identified for rehabilitation. The cost of rehabilitation plus paying rent for each family for three-to-five years was found to be significantly cheaper than the current market rate offered by many landlords for normal rental accommodation.

There were several advantages to rehabilitating the farms, including:

- Accessibility from key border crossings, facilitating any influx of refugees.
- The potential for associating several buildings together to be used as a transit centre.
• Structures which allowed for an easy partitioning process.

• A good mix of private and communal space.

• Ground-floor access for the disabled.

The main organisation covered the costs of the rehabilitation. A contract was drawn up with the landlord, who agreed to waive the rent for refugees at a rate of US$ 150 per household per month for a defined period, usually 12 months. The total value of the waived rent was equivalent to the rehabilitation costs.

For example, if the rehabilitation of a 40-unit building cost US$ 72,000 then the landlord would agree to waive the rent for 40 families for 12 months at US$ 150 per month (40 x 12 x 150 = 72,000).

The disinfection process was executed by a Lebanese company with international experience in industrial cleaning.

Rehabilitation, including partitioning into family-sized apartments, was then executed by local entrepreneurs or the landlords themselves, under the supervision and monitoring of the implementing partners and the agency.

The project budget included the management and running costs of the collective centres for one year. After the main agency had managed the conversion process, the implementing partners took over the day-to-day management of the centres.

Shelter management committees were formed in each of the collective centres and their membership ensured representation of women and minority groups.

Once the period of waived rent is over, a new contract can be negotiated, with several possible scenarios:

• The building is returned to the landlord and refugees are relocated.

• The landlord agrees to further improvement of the building. The agency covers the additional costs and a new period of waived-rent, equivalent to the value of the works is agreed to.

• The landlord rents directly to the refugees, and the implementing partners are no longer responsible for management or maintenance.

• A new contract is agreed between the landlord and the implementing partner. The main agency and implementing partner remain responsible for maintenance, management and subsidising rent.

**Beneficiary selection**

Beneficiary selection criteria were developed by shelter organisations involved in the response. Priority was given to the most vulnerable families. A socioeconomic vulnerability assessment included assessment of living conditions, protection risks and other specific needs.

**Coordination**

The main agency and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) regularly coordinated regarding shelter strategy in Lebanon and served as co-leads of the Shelter Sector Working Group.

The conversion of the chicken farm buildings required additional coordination with the Ministry of Public Health, due to the potential health risk, and this approval process took some time.

**Technical solutions**

The structures of all of the chicken farms were similar, and ranged from one- to three-storeys. They were built from reinforced concrete (columns and beams) with floors of concrete blocks covered by screed. There were equal distances between the columns, and walls were made of concrete blocks without plaster, with large windows to facilitate ventilation and natural lighting. This meant that each floor could be easily partitioned into shelter units.

The disinfection required technical expertise to ensure that the buildings would meet national regulatory requirements and a specialist company with worldwide experience was identified to carry out the work. The disinfection process involves several stages:

• Dry-cleaning stage, where all organic material such as feed and manure was removed.

• Wet-cleaning stage, where pressure washers were used.

• Drying stage, where the building had to be dried quickly to prevent the growth of bacteria.

• Disinfection stage using chemicals.

Finally, for waste-water management, the project will, in the future, introduce biogas digesters in place of septic tanks.

**Materials**

Materials for conversion of the buildings were sourced locally. Partition walls are made of concrete blocks plastered with cement plaster with the option of prefabricated wall panels. Each living apartment was equipped with a fuel stove.

**Wider project impacts**

The project is being evaluated and there is potential for its duplication in other regions in Lebanon.
CASE STUDY  
LEBANON  2015-2016 / REFUGEE CRISIS

KEYWORDS: Urban, Housing repair / retrofitting, Cash / vouchers, Advocacy / Legal, Training, Guidelines / Mass communications, Community participation

CRISIS
Syrian Refugee crisis in Lebanon, 2011-ongoing

TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED
1.04 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Source: Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017)

PROJECT LOCATIONS
Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates

BENEFICIARIES
706 households (3,751 individuals) assisted with shelter repairs (Including Lebanese and Syrian families, with a minority of Palestinian and other minorities).
2,745 households attended hygiene promotion sessions (Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian households).
35,700 individuals attended HLP awareness sessions.

PROJECT OUTPUTS
499 shelter upgrades
207 shelter rehabilitations
Other outputs: 25 Focal Points and Committee Members trained; Establishment of a roster of 14 skilled workers; 1,222 man-days of construction activities.

MATERIALS COST PER HOUSEHOLD
Upgrades: USD 636 - Rehabilitations: USD 1570. As per sector standards, upgrades are minor works up to USD 700 and rehabilitations are major works up to USD 1,500.

PROJECT COST PER HOUSEHOLD
USD 1,731 on average.

PROJECT SUMMARY
The organization used a holistic, neighbourhood, approach across delineated zones in dense urban areas. Shelter re-habilitations and upgrades were provided to 207 and 499 households respectively, along with improvements to water and sanitation facilities. Campaigns on hygiene promotion and housing, land and property rights were also conducted. Community-wide projects were implemented to improve service delivery, such as water and solid waste management.

STRENGTHS
+ Enhanced local technical skills and sense of ownership.
+ Raised awareness about HLP rights and obligations, and improved landlord-tenant relationships.
+ Served as a platform for information sharing between community members and municipalities.

WEAKNESSES
- Strategy had to be adapted due to a lack of empty units available.
- Information flow and community participation could have been improved.
- Recruitment of staff/labour from within the community, quality control and flexibility in specifications could have been stronger.

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CONTEXT

For more background information on the situation and shelter response in Lebanon, see overview A.29.

Lebanon suffered from structural inefficiencies even prior to the Syrian conflict. In 2015, an estimated 87.7% of the population was urban, and there was a significant heterogeneity between rural, urban and peri-urban areas, in terms of institutional service delivery and governance. This was further exacerbated by the conflict in Lebanon (lasting over two decades) and the political fractionalization that brought the country to a standstill.

The influx of Syrian refugees into such a context dramatically deteriorated the living conditions for both refugees and host populations. The crisis increased population density in Lebanon from 400 to 520 persons per km², especially in urban areas, leading to urban congestion, competition over housing, increasing pressures on existing resources and tensions between host populations and refugees. This situation was particularly constrained in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, with only a limited number of informal settlements in the area. Most refugees in Beirut and Mount Lebanon (92%) resided in rented apartments or houses, although the comparatively high cost of living meant that many refugee families were only able to afford substandard or overcrowded accommodation. An assessment by the organization in the target areas showed that 23% of households in Beirut and 59% in Mount Lebanon lacked basic facilities and were in need of urgent rehabilitations.

PROJECT GOAL AND TEAM STRUCTURE

The objective of this project was to provide immediate community-driven WASH and Shelter support to the most vulnerable Syrian populations and their host communities in Beirut and Mount Lebanon.

The organization had been registered in the country since 2006 and had an established country office in Beirut, as well as a field office in Akkar, with established links with local authorities and civil society stakeholders. The team for this project included one project manager, two team leaders, nine field staff and four technical staff, in addition to support staff.

LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION

Firstly, target communities were identified based on 1) refugee concentration; 2) socio-economic vulnerability; 3) access to basic services; 4) willingness of local stakeholders to host refugees and collaborate; and 5) interventions by humanitarian actors. This selection was informed by Key Informant Interviews and inter-agency rankings. Based on the knowledge of the target areas, the organization provisionally identified clusters from which target communities were selected.

Secondly, the priority in target neighbourhoods was to gain a thorough understanding of local community dynamics, including mapping key stakeholders from relevant demographic groups (Syrian and Lebanese), inter-community dynamics and current WASH and shelter conditions. This included an overview of main shelter types, the state of landlord-tenant relationships, and any issues which could impact the prioritization and implementation of shelter activities. In order to do this, a social-mapping process was conducted, which involved semi-structured interviews and focus-group discussions with immediately identifiable local key informants, including municipal authorities and local NGOs or community-based organizations. Within target areas, vulnerable households were targeted irrespective of shelter type or nationality.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

The neighbourhood approach used to implement this project relied on beneficiary involvement in the development and delivery of all activities, at both the community and household levels. Following the mapping of local stakeholders and identification of community representatives, consultations were held to review the proposed selection criteria (for household-level assistance) and identify key challenges of the target communities, to be addressed through small-scale emergency projects. Following consultations, the organization established a network of community focal points, committed to improving their neighbourhoods. These assisted in identifying shelter units in need of rehabilitation, and in liaising with landlords.

1 CIA World Factbook, [Accessed 6 August 2015].
3 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, 2016, pp. 16.
The organization shifted to a beneficiary-led model of rehabilitation or upgrading of their own properties. Through this, beneficiaries received the main inputs with a voucher scheme, and were paid for fittings and installation on cash-per-task basis. Apart from providing livelihood opportunities to some beneficiaries, this modality also helped the organization to overcome the issue of having limited access to the sites.

Agreements were signed with local suppliers for material procurement, and vouchers provided to each family in one installment. The value was based on a bill of quantities that covered the repairs specific to each household. The beneficiaries redeemed their vouchers through one purchase and were given ownership over their own installations. In addition, the organization closely monitored the distribution of materials, to ensure high quality.

In order to support vulnerable populations without formal rental contracts, landlords and tenants were asked to sign a lease agreement in order to participate in the project. The organization also provided sessions on hygiene promotion and legal advice on Housing, Land and Property (HLP) issues through this intervention. This included training for local committee members, as well as campaigns in targeted neighbourhoods. Participants of these campaigns received information on how to obtain a lease agreement, obligations of each party and how to avoid legal trouble. This included advice on handling over of the rented premises, guaranteeing against hidden defects upon move-out and against eviction following end of lease, and advice on conducting major repairs and maintenance, to avoid unexpected costs upon lease termination.

COORDINATION

In addition to conducting coordination through the Sector Working Group meetings in Beirut, the organization liaised with local NGOs conducting other shelter projects by sharing beneficiary lists to avoid overlaps, as well as by referring cases between agencies to avoid gaps in coverage. The organization also liaised with NGOs conducting other protection and WASH projects in the target area, to share ideas on the neighbourhood approach used and, in some cases, other INGOs attended the organization’s forums to learn more about this approach.

MATERIAL PROCUREMENT

The organization conducted detailed market assessments and selected local suppliers for materials to be procured locally. This reduced operational costs and increased support for the local businesses, thereby contributing to the area’s economic development, and reduced tensions with host communities over limited resources and jobs.

For larger rehabilitations, the organization signed contracts that included material specifications and prices with local contractors. Sourcing the materials from within the neighbourhood or district was key to reduce transportation costs and contribute to the local economy. Moreover, it was important to rely on materials that were accessible and affordable to all beneficiaries. Finally, cash was provided for transport in cases where a large volume of materials had to be shipped to the beneficiary’s house.

MAIN CHALLENGES

SECURITY ISSUES IN ACCESSING CERTAIN AREAS. Such risks imposed restrictions on the selection of target communities. The rapidly evolving security context in Lebanon required the organization to increase engagement with neighbourhood focal points and local municipalities. Daily monitoring of shelter activities also contributed to stronger relationships with beneficiaries. However, in many other vulnerable areas where other INGOs faced difficulties for gaining access (due to socio-political issues), the organization was able to successfully implement the project, through its engagement with local authorities.

LOW QUALITY MATERIALS. Due to complaints of low quality materials being used for rehabilitations and upgrades, the organization instituted a new process, in which a follow-up agreement was signed with the supplier, specifically on material quality. In some cases, low quality items were replaced, in order to address beneficiaries’ complaints. The quality of materials was continuously assessed by the project engineers during the distributions. In any event where materials were considered substandard, they were returned and the distribution was delayed.

MANAGING BENEFICIARIES’ EXPECTATIONS. Some complaints on the quality were also due to high expectations that were unrealistic, given the project budget. To avoid this challenge, the organization ensured that each household received complete information on the quality of work that would be provided. Agreements were signed with one local supplier per target area, which beneficiaries could select to complete the works if they desired. Beneficiaries were informed of their ability to register complaints at fora and via the organization’s local hotline, and these were followed up by the project engineer after implementation.

LAND OWNERSHIP ISSUES AND INSECURE TENURE AGREEMENTS. Some of the targeted households had no proof of ownership, which is a widespread issue, given the complex context in Lebanon. Close collaboration with the municipality was needed for verifications of ownership. Additionally, very often only verbal agreements existed between landlord and tenants, without any rental contract. This was tackled through prolonged negotiations between both parties, to clarify the terms of the housing arrangement and to sign a lease agreement.

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

At the community level, the project provided a catalyst for change, combined with continued community engagement and capacity-building activities, to highlight needs such as HLP, protection, hygiene promotion, conflict resolution, participatory planning and community-based solutions. The project also helped to identify engagement opportunities for better responses in the future. For example, the committee in one of the neighbourhoods was able to solve a ten-year problem related to solid waste management, by relying on the initiative of the community and planning opportunities that were generated during this project.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ The cash-for-task concept allowed beneficiaries to contribute in their own communities and enhanced their technical skills. While all supplies were made available before the works, cash was given following the completion of activities.

+ The project improved the organization’s visibility and credibility. Community engagement activities, conducted throughout the course of the project, led to a widespread acceptance of the organization for future interventions.

+ HLP considerations and significant improvement in tenant-landlord relationships, as both parties became more aware of their rights and responsibilities.

+ Served as a platform for information sharing between the community members and the municipalities, and responded to the urgent needs of both parties.

WEAKNESSES

- The organization could not identify sufficient empty shelters in the target communities to be rehabilitated and, for the small number identified, landlords refused to sign rental agreements (binding them to keep the shelters empty until potential evictions occurred). Given such a context, the organization modified its strategy, and capacitated the focal points to rapidly respond to evictions, by providing housing to beneficiaries in alternative houses within the same neighbourhood, as well as conducting emergency referrals to other agencies working in the areas, until a more permanent housing solution could be identified.

- Community engagement could have been improved. Better information flow and participation of affected communities in the identification of activities and target areas, as well as in the discussion of gaps and challenges, could have ensured a more tailored and effective assistance.

- Recruitment of staff/labour from within the communities (by the organization and contractors), quality control of materials, stricter procedures in signing changes in BoQs and flexibility in specifications could have been stronger.

LEARNINGS

- Stimulating local livelihoods. The beneficiary-led approach was largely successful in stimulating the local economy and empowering beneficiaries in implementing their own rehabilitations. The final assessment found that the target of 490 man-days of labour was greatly surpassed, with 1,222 man-days created through these works.

- The organization was aware that not all target households would have sufficient technical skills to conduct such upgrades. As a result, the team identified skilled workers from the neighbourhoods, and households were able to utilize these workers to complete their upgrades. In addition, 30% of beneficiaries were found to have conducted further home improvements at their own expense.

- Maintaining community ties and livelihoods. One of the key learnings from previous programming was that geographically spread-out shelter works, especially for empty shelters, created a problem for evicted beneficiaries by forcing them to move to a new neighbourhood, severing ties with their communities and threatening their livelihoods. The neighbourhood approach was specifically designed to overcome this.
A.6 Gaza, Palestine - 2009 - Conflict

Country: Gaza, Palestine
Disaster: Conflict – “Operation Cast Lead” the war on Gaza.
Disaster date: December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009,
Number of houses damaged: 60,000 shelters
Project target population: Over 12,000 assessments were conducted and 8,947 houses were real cases.
5,039 cases were deemed to be eligible for the grant.
29,420 persons had applied for cash assistance.
Occupancy rate on handover: Not applicable as there is no handover
Shelter size: Variable cost paid per shelter - Average of 68,000USD per house paid for destroyed houses, 14,750 for damaged houses and 1,800 for minor damage to houses.

Summary
The organisation implementing this project advised on the allocation of grants from families whose houses had been damaged or destroyed by the invasion of Gaza. 12,000 assessments were carried out with 5,000 found to be eligible from 29,000 applications. However, the blockade on Gaza meant that materials were not available for families to rebuild their homes.

Strengths and weaknesses
✓ Programmes were able to adapt to the changing context.
✓ Detailed assessments of 12,000 houses were conducted in Gaza. There is now detailed damage assessment on the basis of which future payments can be made.
✓ By assessing apartments separately from the main structure of a building, those renting would also be supported by future cash payments.
✓ All houses were assessed, including houses occupied the poorest families.
✗ Because much of the support early in the response had gone to families in collective centres and camps early, it was difficult to encourage return.
✗ No housing repairs were made as a result of this program. This was due to an Israeli blockade on construction.
- Due to lack of construction materials, the project had to be stopped after finishing the cost assessment.
- The cash component of the project that was planned, was intended for the purpose of building repair and construction. As construction could not happen, no payments could be made.
Before the conflict

The Gaza strip is very densely populated. Its current population is 1.5 million with over 4000 people per square kilometre. It has a high rate of unemployment and as a result poverty is pervasive. This was exacerbated by the blockade on Gaza, which started in June 2007. This blockade prohibits many items including building materials from entering Gaza.

In 2008, over 5,000 houses were under construction through internationally supported projects. Projects in the housing estates for refugees from 1948 were not complete, and an estimated 20,000 new housing units were needed in Gaza each year to accommodate natural growth. Additionally there were refugees living in unsanitary conditions in camps.

After the conflict

For 23 days starting on 27 December 2008, the Israeli Army carried out a major military operation in the Gaza Strip which they called “Operation Cast Lead”. The military incursion led to high levels of damage to shelter, public services as well as economic infrastructure. Blockades on goods, including cement, timber, steel, glass, and other construction materials were still in place one year after the military action.

The conflict damaged or destroyed 60,188 shelters of which 10% (6,000 shelters) were destroyed or required major repair. 600,000MT of rubble needed to be dealt with.

The response

The emergency response was to distribute relief items. These included plastic sheeting to cover windows and damaged walls, kitchen sets, mattresses, blankets and hygiene items. Cash was also distributed to families, although a physical shortage of money in Gaza slowed down initial distributions.

Cash assistance was the major element of the response to the disaster. The de-facto government in Gaza handed out 4,000 Euro to each family who had their homes destroyed, and The Palestinian National Authority through the United Nations Development Programme handed out 5,000 USD to each family with a destroyed home and 3,000 USD to each family with major damage. People with less than 3,000 USD worth of damage received full compensation.

The same process was carried out for the refugees through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. by the end of the conflict, over 50,000 people had found refuge in over 50 collective centres, many more had moved in with host families. Following the end of conflict, the number of families in collective centres rapidly fell as people moved in with host families.

After the invasion, the Palestinian National Authority initiated a housing rehabilitation and reconstruction program for all residents affected by the war on the Gaza Strip. This included both those displaced and those living on their original tract of land. The funding would be issued to home owners by grants through Palestinian banks which operate in the Gaza Strip.

Families had to apply to the banks to receive an amount of money that could be dedicated to rebuilding homes, or to constructing new residences on legally owned lands.

Implementation

The organisation in this case study had a technical advisory role. The ultimate authority for allocation of grants was held by a committee. This committee included the Palestinian National Authority, the Palestinian Monetary Authority and the participating banks. The project was planned in two phases:

- Phase 1: The compensation value would be calculated which would be issued to home owners in the form of grants through Palestinian banks which operate in the Gaza Strip.
- Phase 2: To monitor the distribution of cash and serve as an advisor to the banks, authorising payments to beneficiaries. This phase did not happen as the blockade prevented construction materials from entering the Gaza strip.

The organisation reviewed approximately 29,000 grant applications and assessed the homes of 12,000 people. Assessment forms were entered into a database with linked GPS data, and an overall cost for required repairs was computed for each home.
Repair costs for each home were calculated through an agreed and transparent method. This was based upon an estimate for the cost to replace or repair each type of damaged building element (such as column, footing, slab, floor or even a whole building). During assessments, detailed information such as the volume of concrete, excavations, backfilling and steel required was recorded according to pre-agreed reference tables.

**Categories of damage**
- Category 4 - totally destroyed, or more than 70% of the home is damaged
- Category 3 - value of destruction greater than 5,000 USD
- Category 1 or 2 - minor damage and the value of the destruction is below 5,000 USD.

Damage was further categorised into apartment damage and damage to the common parts of a building. This was to enable tenants of multi-storey structures to qualify for assistance.

**Selection of beneficiaries**
Families had to apply through the banks. Eligible families included:
- Non-refugee Palestinian citizens in Gaza Strip whose buildings were completely destroyed or who suffered from major damage that made the house unsuitable for living in, and who had a house in category 4 and 3
- Palestinian refugees living outside the refugee camps in Gaza Strip. As of June 2010, the selection of these refugees outside the camps and the value of their grants needed to be discussed between the Palestinian National Authority and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

Buildings had to have been occupied before the war.

Surveyor Teams were established, each one including two site engineers with a target of assessing 3 to 5 housing units each day. Every Site Supervisor was responsible for 3 surveyor teams.

Each Chief Engineer had between 3 and 5 Site Supervisors reporting to them. This meant that they reviewed between 45 and 75 data collection sheets per day. Chief Engineers took a random sample of 5 data collection sheets from each Site Supervisor for review each day.

Finally the data was approved by the Programme Manager and Programme Deputy Director and handed to the banks.

**Payment**

The intention was that once the payment phase of the programme had started, the owner of each property would conduct their own reconstruction. For this, they would be paid a cash grant in installments.

However, after one year, construction still could not take place due to the blockade on construction materials into Gaza by the Israeli authorities.

**NOTE:** One year later, the money pledged at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip had not been handed over to the Palestinian National Authority. There needed to be a political resolution between the two different governments in Palestine and an end to the siege by Israel before the donors would hand over the pledged money.
**CASE STUDY**

**SYRIAN ARAB REP.** 2017–2018 / CONFLICT

**KEYWORDS:** Shelter rehabilitation, Remote management, Security of tenure / HLP

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**PROJECT LOCATIONS**

Dara and Quneitra governorates

**PROJECT BENEFICIARIES**

124 households (629 individuals, 43% host community)

**PROJECT OUTPUTS**

124 housing units rehabilitated

**OUTCOME INDICATORS**

- 81% of housing units occupied
- 83% satisfaction rate
- 100% reported improved privacy and security

**SHELTER SIZE**

52.5m²

**SHELTER DENSITY**

6.3m² per person

**MATERIALS COST**

USD 1,550 per household

**PROJECT COST**

USD 1,716 per household

**PROJECT SUMMARY**

This project provided shelter, WASH and HLP rights assistance to rehabilitate 124 housing units, targeting both long-term displaced and host community members in urban and peri-urban areas. Through a process of verification of ownership and usage rights, all tenants signed a certificate of occupancy for a 12-month rent-free period, while owners signed a donation certificate. The project team was involved in managing and resolving any potential disputes. Owing to access constraints, the project was managed remotely from Amman.

**STRENGTHS**

- Local labour and materials supported the local economy.
- Solar panels helped reduce households’ expenditure.
- Protection mainstreaming and disability inclusion.
- HLP issues were addressed and local stakeholders strengthened.
- The hotline was effective in obtaining regular feedback.
- The project improved living conditions.

**WEAKNESSES**

- Limited engagement and cooperation with the local council.
- Low construction quality.
- The HLP due diligence process was time consuming.
- Households that did not meet HLP requirements were not assisted.
- Information flows between different project teams were not smooth.
- The project had a very small scale.
- Some families decided to leave the house or the area.

**TIMELINE**

- Jul 2017: Signing of project implementation agreements with local partners.
- Oct 2017: MoUs signed between the local partner and landlords.
- Nov–Dec 2017: Rehabilitation of the housing units.
- Jan 2018: Verification and monitoring.
- Jun 2018: A shift in control of project locations affects the access of both the organization and the implementing partner.
- Nov 2018: Planned discussion of potential future hosting arrangements after the rent-free period cannot take place due to access constraints.
- Jan 2019: End of rent-free period. Loss of access to project areas does not allow to monitor any further.

*Figures as of December 2017. Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018.*
**CONTEXT**

For more information on the crisis and regional response, see A.29 in Shelter Projects 2015-2016.

Prior to the crisis, the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) was witnessing a trend of urbanization and a growth of informal settlements in major cities. This increased after the start of the crisis, due to the escalation in violence and the subsequent displacement of populations from rural to urban areas, ultimately weakening urban infrastructure.

As of 2018, about 4.2 million individuals required shelter assistance across Syria. Shelter options were mostly inadequate and lacked access to livelihoods, education and health services. Host communities were the primary provider of shelter for displaced populations. Rent was a major component of households’ expenditure and, with rental prices escalating since the beginning of the crisis, the inability to pay rent was often the cause of multiple displacement. Housing Land and Property (HLP) issues were very common, such as disputes over ownership, rental and hosting arrangements.1

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1 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) 2017 and 2018.

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**HLP CHALLENGES IN SYRIA**

1. Lack of tenure security is one of the many reasons for displacement. Multiple waves of displacement involve different claimants of the same plot of land;

2. Destruction of land registries means that reliable land records are often unavailable;

3. Most landlords do not want to enter into formal rental agreements. Preference to verbal arrangements was also common prior to the crisis;

4. Many HLP transactions are not recorded in the statutory system, and there are often overlapping claims;

5. Disputes around rent, payment of utilities and property occupied by armed groups are very common;

6. Women face additional challenges, as their access to HLP is usually linked to their relationship with a man. Inheritance disputes are also very common, which are exacerbated by the lack of necessary documents;

7. HLP documents are often destroyed, lost, left behind or confiscated at checkpoints. Many existing documents are incomplete, inaccurate or of uncertain legal standing.

Adapted from “HLP in the Syrian Arab Republic”, NRC, May 2016.

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**PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

The project was managed from Amman and implemented by a local partner in southern Syria in areas not controlled by the Syrian government. The project team was composed of nine staff of the international organization and 22 of the local partner. Both organizations had two main teams working in synergy (shelter/WASH and legal assistance), plus support staff.

The programming was an extension of a set of procedures – integrating shelter and HLP throughout the programme cycle – which was already well established by the organization and had supported thousands of households in other parts of the region. Tools and implementation modalities were adapted to this project, taking into account that it was managed remotely.

The project aim was to provide non-structural rehabilitation of occupied, sub-standard shelters to improve climatic protection, physical safety and privacy for vulnerable households.

The project targeted conflict-damaged buildings with light rehabititations or upgrades, depending on the technical assessments conducted by the local partner’s field engineers. Both beneficiaries and property owners were consulted about their needs and shelter priorities, against the minimum standards defined by Shelter Technical Working Group and the scope of the intervention. Where required, rehabilitations included household-level water and sanitation facilities. Local contractors conducted the works, which included maintenance and installation of doors and windows, treatment of mould, tiling, repairing WASH facilities, installation of solar panels, etc.

Third-party monitors conducted regular visits to all rehabilitated properties to assess progress, submitting narrative reports, verified Bills of Quantities, photographs and videos.

Post-implementation monitoring was carried out through household visits by local partner staff immediately and three months after handover, as well as remotely, via WhatsApp and phone calls.

**TARGETING**

This project targeted vulnerable conflict-affected households living in substandard conditions in urban and peri-urban areas, regardless of displacement status. Households were selected based on two sets of criteria: socio-economic vulnerabilities and housing conditions (both technical and HLP-related).

Project locations were identified in collaboration with the local partner’s field staff, based on a combination of access, context and security risk analysis, and severity and scale of needs. Following the pre-identification of potential communities, the local partner’s legal team conducted a community-level assessment that looked at safety, accessibility and number of IDPs in the community, along with the HLP due diligence process outlined below. Approval from both the shelter and legal teams was required to confirm the communities’ eligibility for the project. To avoid any social tensions, the organization chose villages where all houses could be assessed.

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The project integrated a due diligence approach (at community and household levels) to uncover HLP issues, which are common in Syria (photo: Damascus).

The legal team assessed each building and confirmed if works could be conducted. While this ensured HLP issues were mitigated, it also meant that some households had to be left without assistance.
HLP DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS

An HLP due diligence process was followed to inform decisions and reduce the risk of doing harm to either members of the displaced or host community. The process aimed to achieve as much certainty as possible about the ownership and usage rights of targeted buildings, given time and resource constraints. It included two main steps:

First, a community-level process was designed to understand the highly varied HLP situation and stakeholder dynamics within the target locations and decide whether to move forward with the intervention. In areas outside the control of the Syrian government, the de-facto authorities had taken up normal governance roles. This stage looked at which law was applied in the area; how HLP rights were acquired; which HLP documentation was available; whether HLP disputes were prevalent; and whether and how these were resolved.

Secondly, a household-level exercise was carried out for each selected building or shelter unit, to verify ownership and usage rights, in order to reduce the risk of eviction and disputes. This included identifying the lawful person who owned the property and could authorize the use of the building, understanding the history of the building’s ownership and use, and determining whether the building had been, was or was likely to be involved in any dispute. The process comprised interviews with the landlords or property owners and with the tenants or users of the property. The data collected was evaluated by the legal team, who then gave their recommendation whether there was enough certainty to proceed.

Many landowners were not able to provide documented proof of ownership of their property. However, the organization managed to apply community verification mechanisms to ensure that vulnerable individuals, including those without HLP documents, were included in the project.

For tenants, the rehabilitation works were completed in exchange for a 12-month rent-free period. Where the landlord threatened to end the tenancy during the lease agreement, the organization examined the case and resolved it – for example, through mediation between the household and the landlord, or by identifying an alternative shelter within the same sub-district.

COORDINATION AND REMOTE MANAGEMENT

As gaining acceptance from the local community was difficult working remotely, it was essential to build good relations with the local authorities through the local partner. In opposition-controlled areas, the local councils had overall responsibility for the humanitarian response, but did not have the required skills and experience, nor an understanding of key principles such as impartiality. They often tried to interfere with the beneficiary selection and other phases of the project. Therefore, the selection criteria and project steps and goals had to be clearly explained to the community and its leaders.

As the organization did not have direct access to the project locations, there were monitoring, logistics and communication issues. Good relations with the local partner and remote feedback mechanisms were essential to mitigate the impact of these challenges. To support remote implementation, a mobile application was downloaded on staff’s phones to collect data from the field digitally and allow the organization to access and analyse it throughout the implementation process. A WhatsApp feedback mechanism was established to supplement other systems (e.g. phone calls), based on a study of available communication options.

PROTECTION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Selection criteria were explained to the communities to reduce the likelihood of complaints during implementation.

The specific priorities, needs and concerns relating to age, gender or disability were considered through vulnerability-based targeting, community consultation, tailored interventions based on beneficiaries’ inputs, mixed-gender teams with technical and social skillsets, regular monitoring and feedback mechanisms. Additional items such as disabled-friendly toilets, ramps and handles were included in the assistance package, to help address specific mobility issues within the shelter.

The legal team provided collaborative dispute resolution services on a case-by-case basis, when conflicts between property owners and the tenants arose.

SECURITY CHALLENGES

Apart from remote management challenges, the project had to adapt to a highly dynamic and unpredictable environment, where operational plans were based on most-likely scenarios and continuously updated based on context analysis. Additionally, working in southern Syria had exceptionally high risks. For this reason, the organization worked with the local partner to insure local staff through third parties and to establish duty-of-care policies and procedures.

MATERIALS AND SUPPLY

All materials and labour were sourced locally by the implementing partner. The material supplier was selected using a closed tender process (owing to visibility restrictions in southern Syria), with three quotations sought from different suppliers. The supplier was selected based on a combination of unit costs, quality, vetting, proximity to targeted communities and stock-levels.

HANDOVER PHASE

After the rehabilitation works were completed, a handover certificate was signed with the property owner and an occupancy certificate was signed between the property owner and the tenant. This occupancy certificate outlined the responsibilities and obligations of both parties.

WIDER IMPACTS

The project represented a step towards durable solutions and allowed the organization to scale up its response in various locations across Syria. Despite the enormous challenge of working remotely in such a volatile context, the organization successfully recruited, trained and provided the local partner staff with the necessary tools and methodologies required throughout the project cycle. This built their capacity to implement additional projects in the future.

Rehabilitation works were conducted using local labour and materials.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ Using locally available labour and materials helped support the local economy in the project area through providing new income opportunities and improving the status of local vendors.

+ Installing solar panels for households with no electrical connection helped reduce their expenditure and provided a constant source of electricity in areas with very limited power supply.

+ The specific needs of persons with disabilities and elderly were considered in the intervention, by ensuring protection mainstreaming throughout the activities and enhancing the accessibility within the shelters.

+ HLP issues were considered and addressed, reducing the threat of eviction. The project uncovered important information about the power dynamics in the targeted villages and strengthened the role of local stakeholders, such as councils and community leaders in dealing with HLP issues, including dispute resolution. This was particularly relevant as the areas were outside of the Syrian government control.

+ The hotline mechanism was effective in obtaining regular feedback from the beneficiaries, which led to improvements in the project.

+ The project improved living conditions by increasing protection from harsh weather conditions, enhancing physical security and overall privacy of affected households, as confirmed by the post-implementation monitoring.

WEAKNESSES

- Limited engagement and cooperation with the local council (specially in handing over the beneficiary list), and capacity and understanding of humanitarian principles. This should have been anticipated and addressed from the outset.

- Low construction quality. Managing the project remotely made it more difficult to conduct proper monitoring and inspection of the quality of the works carried out by the local partner. Seventeen per cent of surveyed households were not satisfied with the assistance, and 78 per cent stated that their properties needed further rehabilitation.

- The HLP due diligence process was time-consuming, particularly for the complexity of understanding HLP rights in a conflict zone and the lack of ownership documents.

- Households that did not meet the requirements of the HLP due diligence process were not compensated with another form of assistance, although their needs were high. Most of the shelters assessed were in poor conditions and needed rehabilitation, but the organization could not proceed in cases where the owners were not identified.

- Information flows between the shelter/WASH and the legal teams were challenging at the beginning, causing confusion during the implementation. In addition, for most households the two teams conducted separate visits as part of the selection and due diligence processes. Instead, all assessments should have been undertaken at once, to save time and avoid multiple visits to the same family.

- The project was very small in scale compared to the needs in the country, as well as in the target areas.

- Some families decided to leave the house or the area, which resulted in about 19 per cent rehabilitated houses not being used (14.6% empty, 4.2% occupied by other families). This should have been identified in the selection process – to avoid wasting time – by asking more detailed questions about the intention of the family to relocate, or the risk of eviction.

LESSONS LEARNED

- Registration should have occurred directly through the organization’s staff, without any interference from the local council or local partner. This would have been possible remotely via calling the organization’s hotline or filling a survey via WhatsApp.

- Only a few households did not meet the requirements of the due diligence process, which shows that the team was able to balance the need for legal certainty with the situation on the ground and the lack of HLP documents.

- Developing a database between Shelter/WASH and HLP assessment teams would have improved the communication flow and documentation.

- A community verification mechanism should be developed for households without any documentation to prove HLP rights (i.e. a landlord who does not have any property document).
**CASE STUDY**

**SYRIAN ARAB REP. 2017–2018 / CONFLICT**

**KEYWORDS:** Collective centres upgrade, Protection mainstreaming, Remote management

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**PROJECT LOCATIONS**

Dara and Quneitra governorates

**PROJECT BENEFICIARIES**

58 households (259 people: 126 male, 133 female; incl. 123 minors under 18)

**PROJECT OUTPUTS**

5 collective centres rehabilitated

**SHELTER SIZE**

Approx. 50m² per household

**SHELTER DENSITY**

Approx. 10m² per person

**MATERIALS COST**

USD 2,000 per household

**PROJECT COST**

USD 3,700 per household


**PROJECT SUMMARY**

The organization rehabilitated five collective shelters, with integrated WASH and protection assistance, through the establishment of voluntary community committees. The project was based on a shelter assessment conducted earlier by the organization with the aim of improving and harmonizing the humanitarian shelter interventions in the southern parts of the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria). Building on this, the organization also developed guidance notes for shelter interventions in collective centres, host families and informal tented settlements. Due to an escalation in conflict, the project failed to scale up and could only assist 58 households.

**STRENGTHS**

+ Effective selection approach for the implementing partner.
+ Households’ participation in project design and implementation.
+ Harmonized rehabilitation guidelines were developed.
+ Good coordination with local councils and protection committees.
+ Integration of protection into shelter.

**WEAKNESSES**

- Women’s engagement was very limited.
- Limited sustainability of the committees beyond project completion.
- Direct feedback from residents was limited.
- Loss of access meant that the project could not scale up.

**TIMELINE**

May 2017: Collective shelter and informal tented settlements mapping conducted and analysis report released.


Nov 2017: Selection of collective centres.

Dec 2017: Launch of bidding process for selecting a contractor.

Jan 2018: Contractors due diligence and selection process.

Mar 2018: Commencement of rehabilitation works and signing MoUs with local councils.

Apr 2018: Formation of shelter/protection committees.

Jul 2018: Project closing and evaluation.

Before (above) and after (right) rehabilitation works in one collective centre.
**CONTEXT**

For more information on the crisis and regional response, see A.29 in Shelter Projects 2015-2016.

Despite the formal cessation of hostilities established in February 2016, sporadic clashes in Dara and Quneitra continued to provoke displacement. Vulnerable conflict-affected populations including displaced, non-displaced, returnees and host communities lived in substandard, overcrowded and unsafe shelters and settlements, including collective centres (such as public, unfinished and abandoned buildings) and private accommodation (renting or hosted). Families experienced multiple displacements, and in many areas IDPs made up nearly a third of the population.

Family separation was a direct consequence (e.g. men away fighting, or detained) as well as a coping mechanism (women, girls and boys are more likely to be hosted). With prolonged displacement and a continued influx of IDPs, the capacity of host communities to provide adequate shelter diminished and, as resources become scarce, risks of abuse and eviction also increased. Women and girls living in substandard and overcrowded shelters were particularly exposed to risks (gender-based violence, theft, trauma, exploitation and abuse).

Families in the targeted collective shelters had been displaced for up to three years. Prolonged and repeated displacement often resulted in emotional distress.

**NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY**

The Shelter/NfI Cluster strategy in 2018 aimed to address life-saving and life-sustaining shelter interventions, prioritizing those most in need with emphasis on protection mainstreaming. Rehabilitation of collective centres was an important part of the Cluster strategy.

Prior to implementing the project, the organization conducted a comprehensive assessment in collective centres and informal tented settlements, aiming to harmonize and strategize humanitarian shelter interventions in southern Syria. Based on the assessments, guidance notes for rehabilitation of collective centres were developed for all Sector partners. The project aimed to apply these guidelines for the first time, with the intention of being the start of a longer-term approach.

**PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

The project rehabilitated five collective centres in southern Syria, including four schools and a public housing complex. Conditions in the centres prior to rehabilitation posed physical safety and protection risks to the residents. The rehabilitation works included climate protection, securing partitions, water, sanitation and cooking facilities, according to standards developed collectively by shelter actors in southern Syria.

Due to lack of direct access to the area, the project was implemented by a local partner and remotely managed from Jordan. Through a competitive selection process, a local organization was chosen to coordinate with local councils and residents and carry out the rehabilitation works. Another local organization was selected to provide protection services. Independent monitors were contracted to verify the implementation and conducted site visits throughout the duration of the project.

Since the facilities and infrastructure within and surrounding the collective centres were not functioning, the organization coordinated with other WASH actors in the area. For water provision, the only option was to provide water trucking. For sanitation, the works included the construction of cesspools and wastewater disposal systems.

Works were completed in July 2018, while the areas faced a major military offensive, which temporarily displaced over 300,000 people. Local partners lost access to the centres immediately after completion, which did not allow evaluations or satisfaction surveys to be conducted. At the time of writing, access had not been regained, so longer-term recovery pathways could not be assessed. Although the plan was to continue the interventions and scale up, this could not happen due to the shift in control in the area.

**SHELTER/PROTECTION COMMITTEES**

In addition to the physical rehabilitation, the project integrated protection considerations into the planning, implementation and management of the collective centres. In accordance to camp management principles, project partners put in place self-managed, community-based, shelter and protection committees (known as Faza’a Committees) in three of the five collective centres. The committees were comprised of five members per location (one manager, two administrators and two protection coordinators) and received training, guidance and coaching from protection teams who operated in mobile units and static centres. The Faza’a committees’ primary function was to enhance community-based protection. They were responsible for liaising between residents and humanitarian service providers, ensuring effective information sharing among site residents, supporting the process of establishing communal rules for the collective centre, mediating disputes and ensuring equitable access to communal areas and services for all the residents.

1 These are available at https://bit.ly/2S5bXtX.
2 Faza’a refers to community support mobilized when a house is damaged. For instance, when a new IDP family arrives and community members bring them water and food and support them in registration with the local councils.
TARGETING

An initial assessment of 100 collective centres was conducted in February 2017 and 12 centres were preselected for a more in-depth assessment, based on the following selection criteria: safety and security of the sites (e.g. number of airstrikes nearby the site for the past 90 days, armed groups presence, etc.), Housing, Land and Property due diligence, accessibility, financial feasibility, type of structure, use, functionality, structural integrity, level of damage and stakeholder engagement. The centre’s proximity to the psychosocial support centres established by the protection partner was also a strong consideration for the final selection. Five centres were finally selected.

To select where to pilot the Faza’a committees, the organization considered the population size, experience with self-established management committees and the willingness and capacity to participate. The committees were composed of 16 members (nine males and seven females).

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

The assessment process included engagement with local councils, host communities and IDPs in collective centres. The latter were consulted prior to beginning project activities. A suggested scope of works was drafted based on a technical assessment and adapted, as needed, to meet their preferences. Because of the public nature of the sites selected, local councils were also involved in this process.

During implementation, men and women were consulted regarding their availability, interest and area of strength to support the rehabilitation works. A number of male and female beneficiaries were contracted as either skilled or unskilled labour, material guardians or cleaners.

Throughout the project implementation, residents had the opportunity to provide feedback and this resulted in adaptations, such as agreeing on the location and arrangement of facilities. For example, some kitchens were moved to more suitable locations within the buildings, toilets were separated by family rather than sex for increased privacy, the location of opaque lockable partitions was agreed, as well as the location of lighting for communal spaces.

One of the main purposes of forming the Faza’a committees was to increase the effectiveness of communication with and participation of the IDPs in the rehabilitation works. This was done through weekly reports, monitoring notes and suggestions, and direct feedback to independent monitors. The committees registered new residents, coordinated cleaning of communal areas, led community sensitization activities and other specific protection mainstreaming responsibilities, like raising awareness for protection issues and referring any special cases to the available service providers, with the support of the local partner.

Doors and windows were repaired or replaced to increase security and privacy.

Upgrade works were designed in consultation with collective centre residents and monitored by independents.

Extra rooms were added to allow for greater privacy where needed.
MAIN CHALLENGES

Despite extensive consultations, two of the local councils initially refused to sign MoUs with the organization and expressed disagreement with the selected locations or scope of work. Local acceptance of the implementing partner and some resistance to the improvement of residential conditions of those in collective centres were contributing factors to these blockages. Through engagement with residents and local councils, the local partner resolved the issues.

The project was implemented remotely and thus it required independent verification of the activities implemented by the local partner. This included third-party monitoring agencies and the organization’s monitoring consultants who visited the sites and gathered feedback from residents. The flow of information between the two partners (protection and shelter), independent monitors and the organization was a challenge. Information did not always reach parties on time or was outdated. These systems posed a significant burden on all actors and sometimes caused delays, as information had to be triangulated and verified remotely before actions could be taken.

Significant investment of time and resources was required to build the capacity of committees to fulfill their duties, particularly protection support. One-to-one sessions with each member was favored over collective trainings, which required a lot of time from the local protection partner. Similarly, committee members who volunteered their time requested that financial incentives be provided.

Limited funding and space in the collective centres represented a challenge to meeting minimum standards. In one location where there was no space to separate two families, a temporary sleeping room was built outside the building.

RISK MITIGATION

Prior to the project implementation, a risk management plan was developed. Many risks, such as the lack of cooperation from the local authorities, limited availability of or poor-quality supplies, aid diversion, etc. could be mitigated by community engagement and close independent monitoring. In the event of a threat of loss of access to project areas, the organization intended to reach out to other actors who would be able to maintain access. When the government advanced into southern Syria, work in the collective centres was in its last stages. As the scale of the displacement was unprecedented, the organization focused on delivering humanitarian assistance to the newly displaced. Access was fully lost before any other agency could reach the project sites.

WIDER IMPACTS

The formation of voluntary committees supported protection mainstreaming in shelter interventions. In addition, trained committee members were able to provide referrals and support residents with dispute resolution and accessing services.

The development of the guidance on collective centre rehabilitation was an important step in harmonizing shelter actors’ approaches in southern Syria. The guidelines were shared at the global level and used to inform programming in other countries in the region.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ The high quality of the intervention was ensured through the selection of a competent implementing partner via a transparent and competitive merit-based selection approach.

+ Households’ participation in project design and during implementation, which resulted in modifications based on people’s preferences.

+ The definition of a common standard for rehabilitation works (BoQs and technical specification) with response actors within the Shelter/NFI Working Group helped harmonize interventions, providing more equitable support of standard quality to affected populations.

+ Good coordination with the local council and the protection committees ensured accurate selection and verification of targeted households, reduced safety and security risks for staff members and helped resolving any issues that arose during the intervention.

+ Integration of protection activities into the shelter project encouraged participation of collective centre residents in decision-making processes and made protection services – such as risk awareness, psychological first aid and referrals – available to project participants and the larger community.

WEAKNESSES

- Women’s engagement in project implementation was very limited, due to the low interest and the cultural barriers that limited women’s participation in social spheres. Although women were engaged in the protection committees, social norms made their participation in decision-making structures difficult.

- As committee members were not compensated for their work, it was difficult to foresee the functioning of committees beyond project completion, without the continued support and encouragement of the protection partner.

- Direct feedback from residents was limited, despite having independent monitors and feedback mechanism in place. On one hand, communities may have perceived a risk of not receiving assistance if providing feedback. On the other, monitoring visits were limited to once or twice a week and, although awareness campaigns on the mechanisms were conducted via phone calls, monitoring capacities were not sufficient. A more diverse and proactive approach in seeking feedback should have been considered.

- Although outside of the organization’s control, losing access to the implementation areas at the late stages of implementation resulted in the partner’s inability to engage with residents beyond the completion of works and provide longer-term support to the protection committees. It also meant that the project could not scale up.

LESSONS LEARNED

- The integration of the protection committees into the implementation of activities provided an opportunity for IDPs to be part of the implementation process and make the project activities more responsive to the community needs.

- It is always difficult to find technical partners who are able to take into account all the non-physical aspects of shelter interventions (such as dignity, equitable access and do no harm). The use of the Faza’a committees added a protection lens which was valuable to the shelter partner, while conversely shelter was used as an entry point to provide protection services and address gender norms.

- Remote management requires very clear information management systems and lines of communication. Even so, triangulating information and verifying programme quality takes a lot of efforts and time. More resources should be made available to the monitoring and verification of activities.

- More emphasis on real-time evaluation approaches should be considered in unstable environments, where it is not always possible to complete all planned activities – particularly those related to follow-up of the action with evaluations, satisfaction or occupancy surveys.

- Incentives for the work that committee members perform should be carefully considered. Although there is a clear rationale for compensating, this would not be sustainable. More work needs to be done on balancing the time these initiatives require for participants. For example, agreeing ahead of time what is a reasonable amount of time members can dedicate without compensation (e.g. two hours a week), setting up an initial compensation when the time investment is greater than that (training, consultations, etc.), followed by a gradual reduction of incentives as time commitments are lowered.
**SYRIAN ARAB REP. 2018 / CONFLICT**

**KEYWORDS:** Collective centre rehabilitation, Integrated programming, Timeliness, Scale and coverage

**CRISIS**  
Syrian conflict, 2011–onwards

**TOTAL PEOPLE IN NEED***  
13.1 million (5.6 million in acute need)

**TOTAL PEOPLE DISPLACED**  
6.1 million internally displaced in total*  
Over 100,000 people displaced in East Ghouta after February 2018 hostilities

**TOTAL SHELTER NEEDS***  
4.2 million individuals within the country

**PROJECT LOCATIONS**  
10 collective centres in East Ghouta, Rural Damascus governorate

**PROJECT BENEFICIARIES**  
11,500 households (65,000 individuals) received multisectoral assistance (Over 7,800 households or 44,492 individuals received shelter assistance)

**PROJECT OUTPUTS**  
10 collective centres rehabilitated (incl. shelter, water supply, sanitation, hygiene, health and maintenance activities)  
Shelter outputs: 1,500 shelter kits installed, 125 family tents erected, 5 rub halls erected as multi-family shelters, 550 doors, 700 windows, internal partitions

**SHELTER SIZE**  
13m² (using the shelter kits of 3.6x3.6m)

**SHELTER DENSITY**  
2.3m² per person on average (acute phase)

**MATERIALS COST**  
USD 77 per household (USD 78,600 per centre on average)

**PROJECT COST**  
USD 87 per household

**PROJECT SUMMARY**

This multisectoral project targeted 10 collective centres in Rural Damascus hosting displaced people fleeing from hostilities in East Ghouta through humanitarian corridors. It supported 65,000 people in a very limited timeframe, conducting rehabilitation works in 45 days and then following with maintenance activities. Interventions included shelter, water and sanitation, hygiene promotion, waste disposal and maintenance of the facilities. Prefabricated shelter kits and tents were used in and around buildings to set-up shelters or privacy partitions.

**STRENGTHS**

+ Gender and protection mainstreaming.
+ Collaboration across departments of the organization.
+ Social customs and minimum standards were met.
+ Targeting areas of origin supported early return and recovery.
+ Holistic approach through the integration of complementary sectors.
+ Speed and scale of the response.

**WEAKNESSES**

- Lack of feedback and complaints mechanisms.
- Poor communication with the affected community.
- Delays due to access constraints.
- Limited planning and coordination.
- The post-implementation survey was not representative and needed fine-tuning.

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Over 100,000 people were displaced in less than two months from East Ghouta.

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**TIMELINE**

1. Early-Feb 2018: East Ghouta hostilities begin.
2. 01 Mar 2018: Two collective centres are prepared upon request of the national partner before the start of the crisis.
3. 16 Mar 2018: Start of the emergency interventions in four collective centres, after the sudden influx of 20,000 IDPs.
5. 19 Mar 2018: Rehabilitation of two new collective centres.
7. 20 Apr 2018: Hygiene promotion campaign conducted. Additionally, maintenance activities, waste disposal and vector-control measures are carried out.
8. 01 Jul 2018: Post-implementation monitoring survey conducted.

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CONTEXT

For more information on the crisis and regional response, see A.29 in Shelter Projects 2015-2016.

SITUATION IN EAST GHOUTA

East Ghouta was considered the largest besieged area in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), with an estimated population of 400,000 people. The area was under siege since April 2013. Hostilities escalated in late 2017 and first targeted rural areas, forcing people to flee to other locations within the besieged areas. To allow humanitarian convoys to access and evacuate medical cases, in January 2018 a ceasefire agreement was announced but failed to come into effect. Hostilities resumed in February, with air strikes and a ground offensive in densely populated areas, causing massive destruction of infrastructure and civilian deaths. To allow the evacuation of civilians, humanitarian corridors were established and, between March and April, over 100,000 people were displaced.

RESPONSE TO THE 2018 EMERGENCY

To respond to the massive displacement, the authorities started identifying evacuation sites. However, the movements were too rapid to keep the pace, especially since there were no preparedness plans in place. Thousands of people were moving on a daily basis, requiring additional sites to be identified and the response plans to be continuously adjusted.

A total of 12 collective centres were identified by the Ministry of Local Affairs. These included hangars, industrial buildings, schools and other public buildings. Most were partially damaged or had been looted and were not prepared to host high numbers of people, lacking basic water, sanitation and waste disposal systems. Although nearly half of the total caseload left these sites for other locations, the number of people remaining still outstripped the capacities by over 200 per cent.

At first, little coordination was in place and only a few humanitarian actors were active in the area. All activities within the sites had to be approved by the authorities.

PROJECT LOCATIONS

10 different collective centres were supported by this project. These were allocated by the authorities, often after IDPs had started moving in. As sites were not known in advance, little to no planning and preparation could be conducted. This meant that works had to be done as quickly as possible, often in already overcrowded conditions.

All sites were owned by the government and structural safety was checked by accredited engineers upon request of the authorities.

Prior to the East Ghouta offensive, the organization had also supported preparation works to increase the capacity of two collective centres within the besieged area, which were already hosting 1,500 people from other locations. However, in the event, people fleeing from the offensive were not directed to these sites.

PROJECT COMPONENTS

The main objective was to rehabilitate and adapt collective centres to increase their hosting capacity and improve living conditions for the IDPs. The project included activities spanning shelter, non-food items, water supply, sanitation and hygiene, health and site maintenance. A collective kitchen was also rehabilitated.

SHELTER COMPONENT

The shelter interventions consisted in light upgrades of walls and floors, installation or repair of doors and windows, erection of emergency shelters outside the buildings, and indoor partitioning to provide privacy to families. A total of 125 family tents were also erected and five large multipurpose tents used as collective shelters. Most of the shelter activities were conducted using over 1,500 standard shelter kits prefabricated by the organization and designed to be flexible enough to be used either as stand-alone or as components of partitions or walls. The standard unit that could be erected with a kit was of approximately 13m². Site levelling and preparation around the buildings were essential prior to the installation of shelters or tents, as well as water tanks, latrines and showers. Lighting (e.g. installation of lights and floodlights) and electrical works (e.g. sockets and generators) were complementary activities.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project was implemented jointly by an international organization and a national partner who could count on hundreds of volunteers.

According to security procedures, access had to be requested one month in advance, so the international staff were not present during preparations and assessments, slightly slowing down the initial activities. Assessment and reporting were conducted using mobile technologies, which made the process more effective but were not always used adequately.

All works were implemented by contractors, partly due to the time available, partly as a decision not to engage families who had suffered years under siege and had recently fled a war zone. Because of the urgency, standard tendering and contracting procedures could not be followed. Contractors started work before signing agreements and worked around the clock to deliver the works as quickly as possible. Within each collective centre, activities took as little as 10 to 15 days. To speed up the delivery further, multiple contractors were employed at the same time. Some skilled IDPs were also hired during implementation.

In the span of 45 days, over 65,000 people were supported across all the targeted sites.

Continuous changes in context and requests from the authorities required constant adaptation of work plans after activities had already started. For example, one site was expanded three times due to the growing number of new arrivals.

As people started to return to their areas of origin soon after the acute phase of the offensive ended, the organization also targeted the water infrastructure in those areas, to support longer-term recovery.

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Additional contractors were hired after the implementation phase to de-sludge latrines, maintain and clean the facilities and dispose of the waste, with the main aim of avoiding vector-borne disease outbreaks. Teams with shoulder sprayers were responsible of cleaning the latrines. There was no formal handover nor site management. The organization chose not to engage the IDPs for the operation and maintenance, either, due to their distressed conditions. Maintenance services and further assistance were provided throughout the existence of the centres, which by early 2019 were hosting only a few families. The plan was to phase out as soon as all the IDPs had voluntarily returned.

POST-IMPLEMENTATION FINDINGS

A survey was conducted in July 2018 to measure the impact of the project and the level of community engagement and accountability. As this survey was a pilot for the organization, only few questionnaires were carried out. The survey included questions on accessibility, quality and quantity of water, sanitation and hygiene, pest-control, shelter conditions, ventilation and lighting. In terms of shelter, it was found that only 38 per cent of respondents considered their living space as both adequate and comfortable, while the rest either considered it insufficient (25%) or adequate but not comfortable (37%). Lighting and ventilation was not available for 11 per cent of respondents, and only partially available for 52 per cent. IDPs suggested to install fans to improve ventilation and to increase the use of pesticides and the distribution of mosquito nets for pest-control.

PREPAREDNESS PHASE AFTER THE PROJECT

Based on the lessons from this project – where the lack of preparedness meant that thousands of people arrived daily to unprepared facilities – a contingency plan was developed to host over 40,000 IDPs from another area. The organization improved its preparedness activities, putting in place procedures and pre-positioning items to allow for a quicker response in future unforeseen events of this scale.
**STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED**

**STRENGTHS**

+ Gender and protection were mainstreamed in the intervention. For example, protection cases were referred, lighting was installed in common WASH facilities, latrines were segregated by sex and designed to mitigate GBV risks.

+ The collaboration across departments of the organization was effective and allowed the post-implementation survey to be conducted for the first time in Syria.

+ Social customs on shelter and bathroom design were respected and minimum standards were met (e.g. distance between shelters and latrines).

+ Links with recovery. The project maintained the established collective centres but also targeted the areas of origin of IDPs with ad hoc interventions, to guarantee water supply and encourage safe return as soon as possible.

+ The project integrated several complementary sectors to enhance living conditions in the collective centres in a more holistic way.

+ Speed and scale. Over 65,000 people were assisted across multiple sites in a very short timeframe, covering almost the entire caseload in collective centres after the East Ghouta offensive.

**WEAKNESSES**

- Lack of feedback and complaints mechanisms. IDPs were often unable to convey their views to the implementing organizations. This meant that the organizations could not always address issues in a timely fashion.

- Poor communication with the affected community. Beyond awareness sessions, more efforts should have been made by the organizations to communicate with the IDPs, for instance on the issue of water consumption.

- Delays were generated as the international partner was not able to access the sites for the first few weeks due to security regulations.

- Limited planning and coordination. The organizations could not plan in advance of the influx, mainly due to not knowing where and when IDPs would arrive. This was caused, to a certain extent, by limited communication with the authorities. Coordination with other humanitarian actors should have also been improved.

- The post-implementation survey was not representative as it was conducted on a very small sample. Additionally, many questions needed fine-tuning, as it was not tested before implementation and this was the first time it was used.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

- Affected populations should be better engaged both in the implementation and in communication activities.

- Contingency planning and preparedness procedures are essential. Based on lessons learned from this project, the organizations developed a contingency plan that built in risk assessments, stocks pre-positioning and high flexibility to adapt to constantly changing scenarios.

- Pre-agreed and simplified assessment forms would help reducing delays and issues during site assessments.

- The adoption of mobile technologies (i.e. online spreadsheets) made the reporting easier. However, staff should have been trained on their use directly on their phones, as these are time effective, reduce the risk of mistakes and provide readily available data.
**CASE STUDY**

**TURKEY 2017–2018 / SYRIA CRISIS**

**KEYWORDS:** Housing repair, Security of tenure, Social cohesion, Local private sector engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey, 2011–onwards</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PEOPLE DISPLACED</td>
<td>3.5 million Syrians under temporary protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHELTER TARGETS</td>
<td>49,050 people in 2017 (87,198 reached) 175,070 people in 2018 (15,218 reached)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT LOCATIONS</td>
<td>Hatay and Sanliurfa Provinces, south-east Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT BENEFICIARIES</td>
<td>1,300 households (6,951 individuals. 26% host community. 18% headed by women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT OUTPUTS</td>
<td>1,200 houses rehabilitated (contractors) 100 houses repaired (cash modality) 100 shelter construction material kits provided 100 individuals trained on repair skills and received cash for work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME INDICATOR</td>
<td>81% of beneficiaries satisfied with the assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER SIZE</td>
<td>50m² on average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER DENSITY</td>
<td>4.5m² of living area per person on average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERIALS COST PER SHELTER</td>
<td>USD 800 for the contractor-led modality USD 150 for the cash-based modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT COST</td>
<td>USD 800 per household on average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**PROJECT SUMMARY**

The project assisted Syrian tenants and local host community households in south-east Turkey with rehabilitation and upgrade works and written landlord agreements. It was one of the first shelter interventions in the area and was mainly implemented via contractors, with only a small conditional cash component for lighter repairs. Upgrades included the installation of walled partitions with locks, improved lighting, repairs of water and sanitation facilities, sealing of exposed roofs and walls, and thermal insulation. The project also provided training, tools and job opportunities for refugees and host community members.

**STRENGTHS**

- Coordination and effective communication with local authorities.
- Rental agreements improved households’ tenure security.
- Clear vulnerability criteria and effective selection process.
- Targeting both refugees and host community members.
- Flexibility to adapt and include a cash-based modality.
- The use of local labour and materials.

**WEAKNESSES**

- Limited resources to cover the intended targets.
- Mismatch between targets and people in need in some districts led to challenges and delays.
- The cash-based modality had limitations in the type of work that could be conducted.
- Delays in identifying contractors.
- Lack of technical personnel in the procurement unit.
- Unplanned visits to the households caused fatigue.

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1 UNHCR Turkey: Key Facts and Figures July 2018.
2 The Basic Needs Sector in Turkey focused on provision of cash-based interventions (CBI), NFI, WASH, infrastructure and shelter solutions. In 2017, 1,739,441 people benefited from CBI and 593,616 people from NFI.
SITUATION IN TURKEY IN 2017

For more information on the situation and shelter response in Turkey, see overview A.29 in Shelter Projects 2015-2016.

In 2017, Turkey remained home to the largest refugee population in the world, hosting over 3.4 million Syrians under temporary protection. The majority lived in host communities (93%), often with insecure tenure arrangements, while only seven per cent lived in the 21 official temporary accommodation centres (TACs). Given the protracted nature of the crisis, Syrians largely exhausted their savings, therefore requiring continued support to meet their basic needs. Over 64 per cent of refugee households outside of TACs lived below the poverty line.

In a joint inter-agency assessment conducted in five provinces of south-east Turkey in mid-2017, refugees reported inadequate shelter and WASH conditions, poor hygiene (28%), lack of protection from the weather (19%), and lack of privacy (10%).

60 per cent shared accommodation and 10 per cent lived in informal tented settlements, unfinished buildings, barns, shops and factories.

Within the provinces of Hatay and Sanliurfa (targeted by this project), Syrian refugees totalled 28 and 24 per cent of the overall population respectively, increasing population density, waste volumes and water consumption. Prior to the crisis, some of the rural areas already had low access to infrastructure services, and many low-income families lived in the peri-urban areas of large cities, where housing quality was poor. In the seventh year of the Syria Crisis, municipalities were providing an ever-growing share of services to Turkish residents and Syrian refugees, stretching public funding, infrastructure and operational capacity. Competition for services, such as education and health, had an increasing potential to fuel social tensions between host communities and refugees.

NATIONAL RESPONSE

The Turkish government led the delivery of assistance within the TACs, with the support of humanitarian partners. In host communities it was more challenging to identify and assess the needs of refugees. Shelter activities were coordinated under the Basic Needs Sector, including core relief items, water, sanitation and hygiene, and infrastructure services. Most interventions were conducted through cash-based modalities, particularly multipurpose cash.

LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION

The targeted provinces hosted large refugee populations due to their proximity to the border. Districts were selected based on the shelter conditions and number of refugees hosted, after coordination with local authorities. Only three major international partners were active in shelter interventions in the project areas at that time.

Refugees were supported to register with the relevant Turkish authorities. Initially, only refugee households were targeted for this project. However, after realizing that this was causing significant tensions within the local communities, 25 per cent of host community members were also added. Households were targeted from two main groups, namely refugees tenants and local Turkish owners and tenants.

A careful selection process was designed to prioritize households, using a combination of socio-economic vulnerabilities and shelter and WASH conditions:

- First, a list of damaged houses was collected from the local municipalities;
- Then, field engineers conducted house-to-house shelter and WASH assessments, categorizing the house according to three levels of damage.
- Protection considerations were also applied, by looking at lighting, locks, doors and windows conditions;
- 10 vulnerability indicators were also assessed, according to a list prepared by the organization. Each indicator was assigned a score of one, and a minimum of four points was the threshold for selection;
- A database was established with the results of the assessment, containing both household and landlord information, as well as pictures of the house;
- A basic ownership verification was conducted;
- The final list of eligible households was shared with the municipalities for validation.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project was one of the first shelter interventions in the area and was based, in part, on the lessons and implementation modalities of a previous project conducted by the organization in Iraq. One of the main differences was that refugee tenants were targeted, which meant that security of tenure was a more pressing issue, and that an indirect benefit also reached the local landlords. This project also aimed at increasing social cohesion, by targeting host community households.
The organization had offices in both targeted governorates and was implementing shelter projects in south-east Turkey since mid-2016, with a total of 15 dedicated shelter staff, including 5 female and 8 male engineers. The project was part of a wider multisectoral refugee programme. With its wide footprint, the organization had direct access to remote areas, where many people in need were residing.

The project was implemented mainly through local contractors (1,200 houses). A cash-based modality was also used for a small portion of the targeted households (100 houses), after discussion with the local authorities. This was added for houses in the first damage category, after assessments showed that refugees and host community members had construction skills and were looking for employment opportunities.

Before the start of the rehabilitation activities, project staff conducted half-day induction sessions explaining project objectives, process and steps, including works schedules and landlord agreements.

**CONTRACTOR MODALITY.** After the assessments, field engineers prepared individual Bills of Quantities for the contractors and oversaw the signature of rental agreements between households and landlords. Works included roofing insulation; electrical repair; internal and external rehabilitation of roof and walls, including of washrooms; floors; plumbing for kitchen and washrooms; waste water system; and replacement of doors and windows. A special BoQ for accessible toilets for people with disabilities was also prepared. Contractors were selected with an open tender advertised through newspapers, social media and the organization’s website. During the works, refugees would either stay in other rooms of the same house, or transfer to relatives in the same area for a few days.

**CASH-BASED MODALITY.** For this portion of the project, standardized raw materials and construction tools were procured and distributed by the organization, while works were conducted by groups of workers from the refugee community, including some of the targeted households. Ten groups of 10 workers each (both skilled and unskilled) were identified by the organization and represented by one focal point. The organization conducted an induction training to the groups, after which tools were distributed. Cash for work was paid as a lump sum to the groups after completion of repair works in one house.

For both modalities, field engineers monitored the implementation through house-to-house visits, about three times a week. After completion of the works, quality control reports were prepared by the engineers, landlords and households filled a form to approve the works, and the houses were handed over to the beneficiaries. In a post-implementation survey conducted by the monitoring and evaluation unit, it was found that 81 per cent of the households were satisfied with the assistance, while 13 per cent were dissatisfied. The main problems faced were that the repairs had not been completed (17%), the roof had not been properly repaired (9%), or there were issues with the paint, doors and windows installed.

**PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY**
All technical specifications were prepared by the organization’s engineers to ensure quality. To support the local economy, all materials and tools were procured from local markets. Local contractors were also encouraged and prioritized during the selection process.

**COORDINATION**
The organization worked closely with governors, subgovernors and local organizations during the project, to select locations, prioritize needs and define the implementation process. At times, local organizations in the area were also identified to complete some rehabilitation works. Inter-agency coordination was important in joint needs assessments and for referrals between agencies.

**SECURITY OF TENURE**
As many refugees did not have any legal or written rental agreements with the landlords, they were exposed to risks of eviction or sudden increase of rents. Firstly, the organization assessed the tenure situation by including HLP criteria during the beneficiary selection process. These included whether the household was a tenant or owner, if and what type of ownership or rental documents were available and, if any rental agreements existed, what was their duration and if rehabilitation works were allowed by the owner. Local authorities, established community representatives and neighbours were approached to verify ownership claims made by beneficiaries and landlords.

Repairs included roofing insulation, walls rehabilitation, electrical works, floor repairs, plumbing and replacement of doors and windows.
To improve households’ tenure security, rental agreements were signed between the landlords, the households and the organization. The agreements contained the following provisions:

- Identification of land/property (location and boundaries);
- Parties to the agreement and proof of their identity;
- Acknowledgement of ownership status of land/property;
- The shelter intervention does not legitimize or confer ownership rights over the property in question;
- Roles and responsibilities of each party;
- Process in the event of breach of agreement – which should reflect what is most suitable to the parties in the local context. The final resolution could be facilitated by the de facto local authorities, village chief or other actor trusted by both parties;
- Conditions and process for termination of agreement.

The agreement bound landlords to continue hosting the households for a minimum of 12 months, with the following three options:

1. Rental freeze for at least 12 months (53% of the cases chose this option);
2. Free rent, duration depending on the negotiation (33%);
3. Rental discount for 12 months (14%).

A copy in Turkish, Arabic and English was prepared and signed by the three parties. In case of violation of the agreement, the landlord would be responsible for paying all expenses to the organization. While this in the beginning caused landlords to complain, project staff organized meetings with them to explain and discuss the terms and agree on a rent amount, based on the approximate cost of repairs from the initial BoQ.

MAIN CHALLENGES

Security concerns along the border caused the suspension of project activities in some districts. To meet project targets, the caseload was shifted to safer districts. However, the shift in locations caused additional delays, for instance in the selection of contractors.

Challenges were also faced with the chosen contractors, as in some cases these (or their subcontractors) were unqualified to do the works. After the quality control visits showed such issues, the contracts were suspended and new contractors selected, which led to delays in the implementation.

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

Given the scale of the refugee population and the small number of actors engaging in shelter activities, the shelter coverage was very limited in Turkey. This project was considered as a first step to facilitate the involvement of local authorities in housing rehabilitation, as well as to highlight the role of shelter as a key factor to improve health, hygiene and living conditions of the refugees and host communities alike. In some districts, works were referred to local government organizations.

Besides, the project contributed to the local economies through procurement of materials and creation of job opportunities, as well as supporting social cohesion by reducing the tensions between refugees and host communities. After the project, the number of complaints received by the local authority in the target locations decreased.

The project also provided rehabilitation of water supply and sanitation facilities. Beneficiaries were selected in coordination with the municipalities through a combination of technical assessments, vulnerability criteria and ownership verifications.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ Coordination and effective communication with local authorities, village leaders and local organizations granted easy access to locations and information, such as households lists.

+ The notarized agreement improved households' tenure security to protect them from eviction or exploitation, as well as giving them more stability in their current residence.

+ Clear vulnerability criteria and effective selection process, allowing the prioritization of the most vulnerable households.

+ Targeting both refugees and host community members fostered social cohesion.

+ Flexibility to adapt and include a cash-based modality, although for a limited caseload, which enabled households to build their capacities and earn an income, while choosing how to conduct the repairs based on their needs.

+ The use of local labour and materials which supported local markets.

WEAKNESSES

- Resources were limited to cover the intended targets, resulting in lower impact and effectiveness (especially for rehabilitation of roofs). Due to the currency inflation, which was not adequately anticipated, labour markets were affected and the high labour costs impacted on the extent of works that could be covered under the contractor-led modality.

- Mismatch between targets and people in need led to challenges. Because of security concerns in some districts, the organization shifted target locations hurriedly, selecting houses far from each other, which then caused challenges in selecting contractors and further implementation delays.

- The cash-based modality had limitations, as households often did not have skills to conduct heavier repairs (i.e. for damage category 2) and some works were dangerous.

- The identification of potential contractors in the targeted areas took a long time at project inception.

- Continuous delays in the procurement of items with technical specifications, due to the absence of technical personnel in the procurement unit.

- Unplanned visits to the households sometimes caused fatigue and were perceived as intrusions. Stronger field-level coordination would have mitigated this.

LESSONS LEARNED

• A more organized, phased approach to the contractor-led modality would have been more effective. For example, the organization could have maintained a database to organize houses in batches, depending on whether technical assessments had been conducted or not; thereby allowing the implementation of works to start at different times. Using an electronic portal would have also helped in producing BoQs, reports and all other project documents more quickly and in digital form.

• Quality control systems should be in place from project inception, to enable the timely identification and resolution of problems. This could have been achieved by a better collaboration between programme and monitoring and evaluation units.

• Donor visibility can create tensions and should be carefully considered, in consultation with local authorities. For example, the donor flag was displayed during project activities, which was not well received by some members of the host communities, due to the political tensions between the countries.

• Stronger community engagement and more freedom for the households to choose their priorities would have led to higher satisfaction. For example, it was found that beneficiaries in many cases would have focused more on lighting and sanitation facilities. The cash-based modality was more successful, as it enabled a certain degree of customization. The organization was planning to expand it for future projects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverables</th>
<th>Social Safety Net</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Water and Sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeted cash transfer</td>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>Water purification systems</td>
<td>Nutrition assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-cash benefits</td>
<td>Housing repair</td>
<td>Sanitation facilities</td>
<td>Food distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional support</td>
<td>Microfinance</td>
<td>Public health campaigns</td>
<td>Nutrition education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit strategy</td>
<td>Labor market integration</td>
<td>Social protection programs</td>
<td>Community development projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Exhibit:** Selected case studies from the Middle East

- **Case Study 1:** Displaced families in Syria
  - **Interventions:** Cash transfer, housing rehabilitation, health services
  - **Outcomes:** Improved living conditions, reduced vulnerability

- **Case Study 2:** Afghan refugees in Jordan
  - **Interventions:** Microfinance, educational support, health services
  - **Outcomes:** Increased income, better educational opportunities

- **Case Study 3:** Syrian refugees in Lebanon
  - **Interventions:** cash transfer, housing rehabilitation, health services
  - **Outcomes:** Improved living conditions, reduced vulnerability

**Key Findings**

- **Economic Inclusivity:** Cash transfer programs effectively support displacement-affected populations.
- **Health Services:** Access to healthcare services improves health outcomes for displaced populations.
- **Water and Sanitation:** Improved water and sanitation facilities contribute to improved living conditions.

**Conclusion**

- Continued efforts are needed to address the needs of displacement-affected populations, particularly in terms of economic inclusion and health services.
تنفيذ المشروع

لاستجابة لاختلاف الظروف المشتركة للمستفيدين، وضع المنظمة خمسة تدخلات مختلفة لاستخدامها في دعم الأسر التي تعيش في نوعين من الحالات: كالتالي:

- المستوطنات غير الرسمية: مواقع أنشئت تلقائياً بأساليب مختلفة، حيث قام مالكون مختلفون بتقديم الظروف الأكثر ملاءمة لإنقاذهم. وتتنوع الأساليب بتنوع الظروف الاجتماعية، حيث تم إعطاء هيكلة المكاسب المتغيرة، وأماكن الحرفية، والمكاتب غير الفائقة، ومصايد الطف، والمطر وأسن، وسهل كسب العيش.

- ويتم استخدام التنفيذ المباشر في غالبية المواقع، واستخدام الشروط المحلية لزيادة الوصول إلى المناطق الأقل أماناً. وكانت عمليات التوزيع من الحب إلى الحب على مستوى الأمر أكثر كفاءة، من حيث المواقف. لكن ذلك قد سمح بزيادة الخدمات المتغيرة جسيماً، وتجميع الاحتياجات من غير المأوى، وبناء الثقة والعلاقات.

- كانت أنواع التدخل الخمسة، التي تقدم أنواع مختلفة من المساعدة، باستخدام أساليب مختلفة، كالتالي:

  - ألف: مأوى مقاوم لأحوال الطقس في المستوطنات العشوائية - حسب الظروف المعيشية، تم تقديم هذه الخدمات مباشرةً بطرق متغيرة، ومجموعة من الموارد.

  - وبناء: مأوى مقاومة لأحوال الطقس في المستوطنات العشوائية - حسب الظروف المعيشية، تم تقديم هذه الخدمات مباشرةً بطرق متغيرة، ومجموعة من الموارد.

  - جيم: تنفيذ المشاريع - وبناء المستوطنات غير الرسمية من مخططات مخصصة، وهو في سياق التدريبي. وتقوم الأعمال بتحقيق الظروف المعيشية، وتستند ذلك باستخدام الخطة العصرية من أجل توقيع دبل الأطراف.

  - دال: المأوى - وبناء المأوى استناداً إلى استخدام القاموس، وهو في سياق التدريبي، وهو يوفر دبل مرة من أجل رفع مستوى الأسر. ويكون المدفوع القابلة للتثبيت بالمقابلة، وهي في سياق المدفوع في أيام إعداد القاموس لمساواة مواجهة الجودة.

  - هان: إعادة تأهيل البياء دون المستوى - يتم توفير الخدمات القابلة للمقابلة في حياة الأسرة، وخفض الإيجار بما يعادل...

- توزيع أطقم منّة على مستوطنة غير رسمية في حي عكار، الصورة: أحمد عودة/ مؤسسة إنقاذ الطفل، لبنان
الوضع قبل الأزمة

يعتبر لبنان دولة ذات دخل متوسط تمتد علاجات الخصخصة. ويتركز السكان في بيروت وضواحيها، حيّث يشغّلون المالكين غالبية المساحات. وقبل الأزمة السورية، كان لبنان يعاني فعلاً من نقص في المساحات الميسورة التكلفة، مع عدم وجود سياسة ذات أهمية للتخفيض من ذلك.

الوضع بعد اندلاع الأزمة

لم تُجز الحكومة اللبنانية عادةً المخيّمات رسمياً، وبدلاً من ذلك، ينتشر اللاجئون في مجتمع مضيف مختلف. أكثر من 1700000 من اللاجئين السوريين إلى لبنان (الذي ارتفع حجمه ستة في المائة من 2500000، وإلى أكثر من مليون يوم، أي ما يعادل 2013 أضعاف خلال عام 2013)، إلى مزيد من الضغوط على سوق الإيجار، مما أسفر على تضخم في الأسعار.

وتشير التقييمات الأخيرة التي أجرتها المنظمات الدولية إلى أن الافتقار إلى إمدادات كافية وآمنة من المأوى دفع الكثير من أفقر الأسر السورية واللبنانية إلى مآوي تلقائي تتألف من ملاجئ مؤقتة أو خيام. في المائة من عائلات اللاجئين يعيشون في شقق أو بيوت غير هماية في مكان تُعتبر جاهزة في المائة منهم في مبانٍ دون المستوى (مثل المنازل غير المكتملة أو المباني غير السكنية). في المائة في مستوطنات غير رسمية (أي مخيمات مخصصة، يعيش في المائة في مستوطنات غير رسمية (أي مخيمات مخصصة، تتألف من ملاجئ مؤقتة أو خيام). في المائة في مراكز جماعية.

استراتيجية الإيواء

إذ لا ترغب الحكومة اللبنانية بشكل عام في النظر في مسألة المخيمات، فإن القالية المعنية من العائلات تتشر عبر موانع المجتمعات المحلية، ويتركز الفريق العمل المعني بقطاع المأوى في لبنان على ما يلي:

• توفير مأوى آمنة وكرمّة لحالات الطوارئ القادمين الجدد والنازلين إلى المودة دون المستوى، بما في ذلك من خلال الازدراء بالمملكتات المحلية.
• الدعوة إلى إنشاء مستوطنات رسمية أوسع نطاقاً.
• تستند استراتيجية المنظمة الخاصة على استراتيجية الفريق العامل والمملكة العربية.
• التحسيس بالأمن والسلامة والتنافسية والسلامة المهنية والصحة العامة، مع تدريب الموظفين على تحديد نقاط ضعف حماية الأطفال والسراي الرئيسية.
• التوعية المجتمعة: تشمل المخادعة العظمى من اللاجئين على المدى من خلال قنوات السوق غير الرسمية. وبعد عدد اللاجئين الذين ذهب إلى هذه الأخبار، بدأوا في الوصول والمملكة العربية.
• التوعية المجتمعية: يتم توفير برامج المأوى على مستوى المدينة، بما يشمل الاستعداد للمتدربين لأكثر الأطرار هشاشة، والسلطات المحلية، وشركات الأمان والأمان، والصرف الصحي، والصحة العامة، من أجل إدارة حالة حماية الطفل في المنظمات المحلية.
• يتم تنفيذ حلول طويلة الأمد بالتعاون من خلال تقديم مجموعة من خدمات المدفوعة بالرأسي، ومواد التربوية والصحة، وخدمات المرافق، وغيرها.

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مَواطن القوة
تمّ توسيع نطاق المشروع بنجاح في سياق ديناميكي معقد لتلبية احتياجات المستفيدين قبل حلول فصل الشتاء. تم توفير أنواع مختلفة من المساعدة لمختلف الاحتياجات. وجرت تدخلات منخفضة التكلفة وعالية الحجم بالتوازي مع إعادة تأهيل أكثر تعقيدًا. أدّى اتّباع مقاربة من الباب إلى الباب في التقييم والدعم التقني والمتابعة متعددة القطاعات إلى زيادة تكاليف الموظفين، لكن أيضاً إلى تعزيز الأثر وثقة المجتمع.

تم تشكيل أفرقة ميدانية من مزيج من الموظفين التقنيين ومطلقي التوعية، ممّا ساعد على رؤية الصورة الأكبر والاستجابة لاحتياجات أخرى من غير المأوى. أدّى إعادة تأهيل المآوى القائمة و غير المأهولة إلى الحدّ من التعامل مع القوانين المعدلة المتعلقة بالبناء الجديد وسوق الإيجار.

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الملاحظات
• يؤدّي تكرّس اللاجئين في مساكن مستأجرة في المناطق الحضرية والمناطق الحضرية المتفرقة إلى تعقيد الاستجابة الإنسانية. فقد يكون السياق صعبًا للغاية.
• ضعف النشاط في صناعة الاستجابة الإنسانية لتجارب اللاجئين في مساكن مستأجرة في المناطق الحضرية والمناطق الحضرية المتفرقة.
• ضعف النشاط في صناعة الاستجابة الإنسانية لتجارب اللاجئين في مساكن مستأجرة في المناطق الحضرية والمناطق الحضرية المتفرقة.

دراسة حالة

النزاع – النزاع في سوريا

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النزاع – النزاع في سوريا
تشمل المعايير درجة الضعف من الأصول الأولى في اختيار المستفيدين للعائلات المشردة، والتي تعيش في مساكن مكثفة أو دون المستوى، أو تلك التي تعاني من خطر الطرد أو نزاع بسبب العجز عن دفع المراكز.
وتتطلب منظمة المجتمع المحلي والسلطة المحلية شهادة على إبرام عقود الإيجار، والإيصال وتوفيرها وذلك لتفعيل التشريعات والتشريعات، والمعاهدات المتعلقة، وتوفير الدعم من الأطراف، ويدعو إلى إعداد معلومات تتعلق بخدمات العائلة، ويتم زيارات ميدانية للمساعدة في الحفاظ على الامتثال والمساءلة، وتساعد الشركات الخاصة على تقديم الدعم.
وتشمل اختيار المستفيدين أسرة بعد زيادة مالية تقوم بها فريق التحالف ويتم تجديد المستفيدين باستخدام تطبيق على الهاتف المحمول (والذي يشمل استخدام الهاتف السيارة، مما قد يثير الانتباه إلى حالة فرقة البيانات، وتعمل في مواجهة مستوى المجموعة المحلية على أداء فريق العمل، حيث يمكن استخدام الموبايلات للفصل بين البيانات، وتدعم المفاهيم التي يتناولها الناس، وموخرا، من خلال مركز جديد، منظمة في إربد، يوفر ما يصل إلى 100 ليرة يوميا.

التنسيق

تعد المنظمة الدولية للهجرة منظمة، تحتفل في اسمها الوحيد في الأردن، ولكن المأمور الأول أن تقوم منظمات أخرى بإتباع هذا النموذج، وتوافق نهج المشروع مع مبادئ التشريعات الاجتماعية، وتقديم الخدمات الإقليمية للمركبات الإقليمية، وخدمة النزاعات الناجمة، حيث المؤسسة الإدارية التابعة لمنظمة الأمم المتحدة للسلام الإنسانية، وجمعية العدالة المدنية.

تأثر المشروع على نطاق أوسع

بين دعوات الامتحان الأول، حيث تمثل القطاعات الأولى، من قبل المنظمة، ومن أبرزها، عندما قامت منظمات أخرى بإتباع هذا النموذج، وتوافق نهج المشروع مع مبادئ التشريعات الاجتماعية، وتقديم الخدمات الإقليمية للمركبات الإقليمية، وخدمة النزاعات الناجمة، حيث المؤسسة الإدارية التابعة لمنظمة الأمم المتحدة للسلام الإنسانية، وجمعية العدالة المدنية.

اختيار المستفيدين

تستند المعايير على درجة الضعف الخاصة بالمنظمة، إلى إجراء التشغيل الموارد للأعمال المعنوية فيما يتعلق بالموضوع المعنوي، لكن الفرض الجامل بين النظامين، قد قام بوضع اللمسات الأخيرة على إطار جديد لتقييم درجة الضعف.
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<tr>
<td>كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2011</td>
<td>الصراع في آذار/مارس 2012</td>
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</table>

الطلبة:

- بدأ الصراع في آذار/مارس 2011 (مستمر)
- أكثر من 3.1 مليون لاجئ من سوريا. حوالي 420 ألف في الأردن.

الأشخاص المتضررون:

- المحافظة أردت ورش حيوي
- المستفيدين:

المواقع المتضررة:

- حيوي
- الثالث
- الثاني
- الأول

الملاحظات:

- يجب أن يستفيد من تخفيف الضغط على سوق الإيجار كلاً من اللاجئين والمجتمعات المضيفة، رغم أن المشاريع تتأثر بشكل محدود.
- يمكن للمشروع توفير فرص توليد الدخل.
- من الموظفين القانونيين في منظمة مراقبة عمليات الإجلاء، والتوسيع في النزاعات بين المستفيدين المستأجرين والمالي القطر.

الكلمات المفتاحية:

- أزمة سوريا والإجئون في الأردن
- الدولة الإيجارية
- الدعم المالي لدفع الإيجار
- إصلاح المساكن وإعادة التجهيز
- النقد/القسائم
- الدعوة/المشكلات القانونية

الملاحظات:

- من الضروري مراقبة علامات الإجلاء أو التهديدات بالإجلاء.
- من المهم فهم المالك يتعين على المالك إكمال الوحدات السكنية غير المكتملة. في بعض الأحيان تتم تكلفة البناء، تُدفَع شهرًا لعائلة لاجئة. 18-12 مقدمًا، وتغطي فترة الإيجار لمدة 18-12 شهرًا لعائلة لاجئة.

الملاحظات:

- يتطلب التنفيذ عمالة مكثّفة ويصعب توسيعه لكي يسهم إسهاماً كبيراً في التحكم في تضخم أسعار الإيجار. وقد يكون للتدخلات في قطاعات السوق مثل البناء أو التصميم أو التدريج في المساكن لاستيعاب الإجئون في المنتجات الإيجارية تأثير أكبر.
- قام عدد قليل من أصحاب العقارات بإلغاء مشاركتهم بعد استلامهم مكافأة (المكافآت الدائمة) مقابل أعمال البناء.

الملاحظات:

- من الضروري مراقبة عمليات الإجلاء أو التهديدات بالإجلاء.
- من المهم أن يكون للمدفوعات (المكافآت الدائمة) مطلقًا، وتعتبر أجائر إيجارية في خدمة المناطق أو المستأجرين.

الملاحظات:

- نظرًا لأن قائمة الانتظار طويلة جدًا ودرجة الإحباط مرتفعة.
ملاحظات بشأن المصطلحات

لقد جرت مناقشات كثيرة على الصعيدين الأكاديمي والعملي بشأن المصطلحات المستخدمة في قطاع المأوى. وساهمت عمليات الترجمة في تعزيز الإلمام بالCEFAS في التعريفات المختلفة المستخدمة في مختلف مراحل المساعدة الإنسانية. استخدمت مصطلحات خاصة بثقافة اللغة العربية، فقامت قسم الترجمة بالمنظمة الدولية للهجرة باعتماد مصطلحات ذات صبغة عامة.

مالكانا الذين يعيشون في مخيم

«المأوى شبه الدائم» و«المأوى المؤقت» و«الملاجئ الانتقالية» و«الملاجئ الدائمة» و«الملاجئ المؤقتة»، جميعها أثناء الاستجابات لتحديات مختلف مراحل المساعدة والعمليات المستخدمة في الوقت نفسه. في حين أن هناك من تجدر الإشارة إلى أن الكلمات القليلة في كل بلد الحق في أن يستخدم مصطلحات خاصة بهما. بهذا، تساهم عملية الفهم عبر الدول الناطقة باللغة العربية، فقامت قسم الترجمة بالمنظمة الدولية بالهجرة باعتماد مصطلحات ذات صبغة عامة.
This booklet is a compilation of case studies of humanitarian shelter responses in the Middle East, compiled across the seven past editions of the interagency publication *Shelter Projects*.

The projects described in the case studies contained in this booklet represent responses to conflict and complex crises, implemented by national and international organizations, as well as host governments, and demonstrating some of the implementation and response options available.

The publication is intended to support learning by highlighting the strengths, weaknesses and some of the lessons that can be learned from different projects, which try to maximize emergency funds to safeguard the health, security and dignity of affected people, whilst – wherever possible – supporting longer-term shelter needs and sustainable recovery.

The target audience is humanitarian managers and shelter programme staff from local, national and international organizations at all levels of experience. *Shelter Projects* is also a useful resource for advocacy purposes, showcasing the work done by the sector, as well as for research and capacity-building activities.

All case studies and overviews contained in this booklet, as well as from all editions of *Shelter Projects*, can be found online at:

www.shelterprojects.org