OVERVIEW

PHILIPPINES 2013 / TYPHOON HAIYAN

CRISIS

Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 8 November 2013.

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED

1,012,790 houses (518,878 partially damaged and 493,912 totally destroyed).

TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED

3,424,593 households (16,078,181 persons).

RESPONSE OUTPUTS

1. National Housing Authority (NHA)
   - 29,661 houses as of October 2016 (206,488 planned).

2. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
   - 966,341 cash transfers and material vouchers distributed.

3. Humanitarian organizations
   - 551,993 households assisted with emergency shelter.
   - 497,479 NFI packages distributed.
   - 344,853 households assisted with incremental solutions.

SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE

Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) made landfall on 8 November 2013 and was one of the largest typhoons ever recorded. While the main government response consisted of subsidies for housing reconstruction or repair, humanitarian agencies used a range of approaches which included cash- or voucher-based interventions, but also training and construction of transitional, core or permanent shelters. Particular issues in this response included the lack of support for secure tenure, the lifespan of transitional shelter solutions and the poor quality control, particularly in regards to coco-lumber.

For projects in response to Typhoon Haiyan, see:

In Shelter Projects 2013-2014:
A.24, on shelter kits and WASH.
A.25, on cash and vouchers for materials, plus training.

In this edition:
A.9, a multiphase shelter and WASH programme.
A.10, on core shelters with latrines.
A.11, on a large scale programme on recovery shelter kits with reused coco-lumber.
A.12, on emergency and recovery shelter kits within a larger community-driven programme.
A.13, on a multi-sectoral, community-led resilience programme using shelter as an entry point.

3. Sources for these figures are the documents used as references throughout this overview.
**INTRODUCTION**

Overview A.23 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014 should be referred to for information on pre-disaster conditions, the effects of the typhoon, and emergency and early recovery shelter interventions. This edition of Shelter Projects includes projects undertaken in response to Typhoon Haiyan, though the majority were completed or were due to be completed shortly, and describe recovery or multiphase shelter interventions.

**RECOVERY INTERVENTIONS**

In consultation with shelter partners, the Shelter Cluster began work in early 2014 to categorize shelter interventions being implemented by organizations and provide guidance on best practices. The subsequent Recovery Shelter Guidelines were widely distributed by the Cluster beginning in June 2014 and included guidance on supporting households using a range of shelter approaches, from temporary to permanent solutions. There was a particular focus on the inclusion of build back safer outreach and training.

Many humanitarian agencies focused on the following:

- **Repair and retrofit** for damaged but not destroyed houses or retrofit for houses built post-disaster but that did not incorporate build back safer measures.
- **Permanent houses** that include at least one bedroom, one living space, and dedicated WASH and cooking areas.
- **Core shelters** that provide households with the core of their future house; one safe room or the frame of a permanent house.
- **Temporary or transitional shelter.**
- **Training** of carpenters and other skilled construction workers.
- **Build Back Safer awareness** workshops.
- ** Provision of technical assistance.**

The 8 build back safer key messages, a comprehensive set of shelter technical guidelines, was used extensively throughout the recovery phase. This Disaster Risk Reduction Information Education and Communication (IEC) material represented one of the most important outputs for other responses (including in Nepal and Ecuador), and has so far been reused in a number of other responses in the Philippines and the broader Asia-Pacific region.

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**WHAT CAN I USE TO BRACE MY HOUSE?**

- **Strong**
  - Tie thick galvanized steel wire
  - Nail timber

- **Stronger**
  - Tie old rebar
  - Nail galvanized steel straps

- **Strongest**
  - Nail timber and galvanized steel straps

Poster of one of the 8 Key Messages developed for the Haiyan response (Source: Philippines Shelter Cluster and DSWD).

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Many people rapidly started to build shelters after Typhoon Haiyan (here in Tacloban, December 2013).

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See A.3 and A.39, overviews of the Nepal and Ecuador earthquakes responses respectively.

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See A.14 and A.15, overviews of the responses to Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu and Cyclone Winston in Fiji.
CLUSTER TARGETS AND RESPONSE

From the onset of the response, the Cluster strategy was to provide 1) emergency shelter assistance, 2) support for shelter self-recovery, 3) transitional/core shelters, and 4) support to families living in collective centres.

In its strategic framework for transition, the Cluster committed to provide:

- “Immediate life-saving emergency shelter in the form of tarpaulins/plastic sheets (and fixings) and tents with supporting NFI solutions” to 300,000 households; and
- “Support for household self-recovery through incremental housing solutions using consultative, participatory processes” to 500,000 households.

The target for emergency shelter was met – even exceeded – within the first 100 days of the response, with an estimated 500,000 households receiving emergency shelter assistance and 470,000 households receiving NFI packages. As of August 2014, cluster partners expected to support 344,853 households with repair/retrofit and new construction shelter assistance, reaching only 70% of the initial target of incremental housing solutions. While there is limited data on the final number of households assisted by humanitarian organizations after the deactivation of the Cluster at the end of 2014, documentation from organizations suggest that final projections were met within the first three years of recovery.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Government assistance under the “Emergency Shelter Assistance” (ESA) programme consisted of PHP 30,000 (or approx. USD 600) for totally damaged houses and PHP 10,000 (or approx. USD 200) for partially damaged houses. As of August 2016, disbursement to 966,341 households had been undertaken and was still ongoing. Although disbursement of the government funds did not start until late 2014, more than a year after Typhoon Haiyan made landfall, this was still earlier than many recovery shelter programmes commenced and there were reports of beneficiaries withdrawing from agency programmes so that they remained eligible for the ESA funds.

SITUATION IN 2016

The National Housing Authority (NHA) and Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC) continued to undertake significant resettlement construction projects in the regions affected by Haiyan. NHA alone had plans to construct 205,128 houses on relocation sites, however as of November 2016 only 29,661 of these were completed. Construction was slowed down due to regulatory issues, longer-than-expected planning, and difficulty acquiring land. Further, the lack of access to services, such as electricity and water, hindered households’ transition to newly completed housing units.

The Philippines continues to suffer significant typhoon damage, although no typhoons have occurred which have caused damage to the scale of Typhoon Haiyan in recent years. Since the Haiyan response, the government of the Philippines has been wary to call for international assistance, fearing that there would be a large influx of international agencies. This has hampered responses to small typhoons since then. At the close of 2016, there was a low likelihood of international assistance being called for, even in significant disasters, and this will severely hamper agencies’ ability to respond to disasters. Nevertheless, there were signs that the government has streamlined its ability to more rapidly deliver Emergency Shelter Assistance cash support.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE HAIYAN RESPONSE

SUPPORTING SELF-RECOVERY

In comparison to other disasters, recovery following Haiyan progressed rapidly and many households started to take initial steps toward self-recovery within days. A number of organizations used cash transfers, shelter repair kits, and technical training to address this rapid pace of recovery, however many others remained focused on the delivery of products (e.g. transitional or core shelters). The use of cash for work and cash transfer schemes were particularly effective in supporting the rapid pace of reconstruction being pushed by households. These cash-based approaches injected funds into local economies that stimulated recovery, supporting early livelihood restoration. These programmatic efforts highlighted the ability of shelter partners to support the evolving response landscape, as their effectiveness relied on shifting from reactive response to anticipating needs.

HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY ISSUES

Despite these successes, there was largely a missed opportunity for organizations to support Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) rights. Extensive guidelines on HLP were developed by the Shelter Cluster during the first six months\(^1\), but few organizations incorporated this guidance into programming. Most notable was the principle that shelter response should be free from discrimination and ensure rights of the most vulnerable. Many organizations required secure land tenure from households as a requisite for shelter, resulting in the exclusion of marginalized and vulnerable populations within communities. The role of HLP, in particular land security of informal settlers, should be more fully integrated into future shelter interventions in the Philippines and other contexts where land has been identified as an ongoing challenge.

TRANSITIONAL SHELTERS’ LIFESPAN

As with past disasters in the Philippines, temporary or transitional shelters were built by a number of agencies. However, it is not believed that many of the households will progress to more permanent housing within the design life of these shelters (typically less than five years). Although not officially reported, it is known that some “transitional” shelters in the Philippines have failed in subsequent typhoons and many were still in use a number of years after they were built. This has particularly been the case for transitional shelters which used coconut lumber for the main structural elements of the shelter, such as corner posts.

COCO-LUMBER AND QUALITY CONTROL

Most shelter programmes relied on coconut lumber as the predominant building material during recovery, drawing from the large number of trees downed in the typhoon. Many households noted that the quality of lumber produced and distributed during recovery was of mixed quality. Despite distribution of technical guidance on selecting appropriate cuts of coconut lumber by the Cluster, robust quality control was difficult for many organizations. Degradation of poor quality lumber was prevalent in shelters, occurring as soon as one year after construction. In future responses, technical guidance should seek to develop more robust measures for shelter partners to implement quality control measures.

INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION

In addition to technical lessons, there were also gaps in institutional partnerships within the shelter sector. In December 2013, the President created the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) to act as the “overall manager and coordinator of rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction efforts”\(^2\). Under this office, five clusters were established to manage recovery, including infrastructure, resettlement, social services, livelihood, and cluster support. Despite similar objectives, the international clusters and the government office functioned largely in parallel, with limited collaboration. A number of shelter partners noted that earlier, and more integrated, coordination with local governments was needed.

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