Iraq conflict, 2014 onwards

*Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, OCHA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS</th>
<th>Iraq conflict, 2014 onwards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEOPLE</td>
<td>5.62 million affected*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFECTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEOPLE WITH</td>
<td>2.40 million individuals*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER NEEDS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>Jeddah Camps, Nineveh Governorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEOPLE</td>
<td>2,500 HHs supported with tent repairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORTED BY</td>
<td>1,000 HHs supported with financial assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PROJECT</td>
<td>through Cash-for-Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT</td>
<td>2,500 tents repaired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
<td>1,000+ female-headed HHs participated in repair work and received financial assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAININGS</td>
<td>provided along with Cash-for-Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTER SIZE</td>
<td>24 m² (4 x 6m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENSITY</td>
<td>4.8 m² per person (household of 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT COST</td>
<td>USD 286 per tent (excluding steel structure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USD 30 (labor cost + additional materials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT COST</td>
<td>USD 332 per household</td>
</tr>
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PROJECT SUMMARY

The project consisted of the maintenance, repair and replacement of damaged tents in the Jaddah camps located in the Governorate of Nineveh, Iraq. It targeted 2,500 vulnerable households and it involved 1,000+ females in the works through a Cash-for-Work program, enhancing the limited livelihood opportunities for them in the camps. It also enabled the women to engage in communal activities in the camp, which are otherwise restricted because of the cultural context. The project participants were allowed to implement the works by themselves with technical support from the organization and on-the-job training, or could also chose to get the works done by a local contractor.


1 Mar–May 2019: Assessment, planning, preparation of all BoQs, tools, and materials procurement.

2 May 2019: Registration process and informing families of the date of replacing their tents and preparing the schedules.

3 Jun–Oct 2019: Selecting and assigning team for the supervision of the project activities, and engagement of the CFW workers.

4 Jun–Oct 2019: Uploading, offloading, dismantling, and replacing the tents storage processes.

5 Oct 2019: Collecting documents signed by the participants.

6 Oct 2019: Monitoring, evaluation and preparing final reports.
CONFLICT

CONTEXT

The conflict between the Islamic State of Iraq, the Levant (ISIL), and the Iraqi Security Forces began in late 2013 and moved to the country’s core governorates in June 2014. The Ninewa governorate received a portion of the displaced population, and from late 2016 to mid-2017, six camps were set up in its Jeddah-Qayarah district, hosting Yazidi, Sunni, Arab and Kurdish people from urban and rural areas with diverse religious, cultural, political and educational backgrounds. These individuals have resided in the camps since then.

The summer and winter weather conditions in the camps are harsh. Temperatures reach 48°C in the summer, and sandstorms frequently affect the area. During the winter, torrential rains often lead to flash flood episodes. The camps often face sensitive political and security situations and accessing them requires coordination with the military authorities.

In Ninawa governorate, most inhabitants are farmers, shepherds, and government employees. It is common for constructions in the area to use cement blocks and concrete in the urban settlements while in the rural environments, many homes are built with mud walls. Before the conflict, Mosul, the capital of the governorate, was one of the largest and wealthiest cities in Iraq, with a population of almost four million. The city was occupied by ISIS-affiliated armed factions in June 2014, provoking a massive displacement of the civilian population while many others remained and endured the oppressive civil and social rules imposed. The military operation to liberate the city began in December 2016 and lasted until June 2017.

SITUATION AFTER THE CRISIS

The economy of Mosul experienced a significant regression in the period under ISIS control, and the infrastructure of the city suffered major destruction during the liberation campaign, leaving only around 25 percent of the buildings undamaged, and another 22 percent destroyed. After the campaign, no regular electricity or piped water networks were functioning across the city.

NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY

During ISIS’s occupation of Mosul, the government (in cooperation with UN agencies, NGOs, and INGOs) established 22 IDP camps in the north of Iraq to shelter families fleeing violence and oppression. Between these are Al-Jeddah camps in the Qayyarah subdistrict of Ninawa Governorate, where Jeddah 1 camp was established at the end of 2016 with a capacity of 2,500 shelter plots. By mid-2017, five more camps (2–6) were established with the capacity for an additional 15,600 plots to receive displaced people from other governorates.

PROJECT DESIGN

The tents used for those camps were the MoMD (Ministry of Migration and Displacement) tunnel type, with a galvanized steel pipe frame covered by a three-layered canvas and a limited lifespan. Camp residents reported, however, that the tents had not been maintained since 2016 when the camps were constructed. Severe summer conditions over the years rendered nearly all tents unusable.

Upon the area’s liberation from ISIS in late 2017, the government decided to close many of the camps in different governorates. However, the Jeddah ones remained
open due to security, tribal and religious concerns in the areas where their inhabitants would return to. More than a year after the camps were set up, residents reported that tent cover had not been maintained, and the deterioration suffered had left many unusable. The implementing organization was permitted by the Iraqi pool budget to upgrade the tent covers in Jeddah, Qayarah, and Haj Ali camps. Approximately 52 percent of the households living in those camps were female-headed, and their socio-economic situation was particularly vulnerable since the cultural context and security situation would not allow them any income-generation activity.

Through focus group discussions held with the female-headed households in the Jeddah camps, the project team and the community decided to engage women living in damaged shelters through a cash-for-work approach, aiming to generate livelihoods opportunities for them while engaging with others in the community.

**IMPLEMENTATION**

The project organized groups consisting of five workers each – either of three women/two men or three men/two women – to repair ten tents each day of work. Project team engineers supervised each tent repair group. Information management staff built an electronic cash-for-work database to manage the recruitment of the teams, preventing any discrimination in the participant selection. All participants had the right to register in the system – their names were recorded for future action. Each week, the cash focal point selected names based on the predetermined criteria to assess the household vulnerability, and those selected were prepared for on-the-job training and the start of repair work the following day. Training was provided upon check-in on the day of work by technical staff. Using between 12–15 groups per day, an average of 135 tents were replaced daily – with variations due to attendance and working conditions. Teams were replaced weekly, and additional tasks for them included loading tents, supporting offloading processes, lifting tents, or storing used tents.

The construction materials and tools were sourced from local markets near the camp, increasing demand and contributing to the recovery of the local economies. Many of the participants gained experience in the field of electrical repair and other technical works through the project.

A comprehensive assessment of damaged tents was made by a technical team from the implementing agency to indicate the extent of the need to replace damaged pieces of each tent.

**MAIN CHALLENGES**

Because the implementing organization did not manage the Jeddah camps, accessibility challenges were prevalent and resulted in delivery delays. Additionally, access constraints forced the implementation of the project to take place in the summer, when temperatures exceeded 45°C. Because of this, work needed to begin in the early morning and hydration was of increased importance for participant safety. After numerous agreements with the different stakeholders involved, the project team was able to successfully implement the activities, and positive comments were received from the IDPs impacted.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Some households were initially reluctant to repair/replacement work through the project, and others did not approve of the participation of women in cash-for-work activities. However, as the project was being implemented, and participants were sensitized on project activities and benefits — households increasingly accepted the importance of the project, its purpose, methodology, and benefits to both men and women.

WIDER IMPACTS

The direct results of the initiative were the replacement of approximately 2,500 tents, three years after their construction and the inclusion of women in camp activities for the first time. Participants’ (male and female) names were registered in the system for future activities and will be utilized as primary actors after the success of this project and positive government feedback and support. The project intends for upcoming events to provide women with on-the-job training on how to address electricity problems in the camps.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

√ Despite initial delays in procurement and access approvals for transportation and entering the camp—the project was implemented before starting the rainy season.
√ Despite the difficulty of the camp’s religious situation and security concerns, the project succeeded in utilizing women in primary implementation roles.
√ The strategy employed in tent replacement to effectively address special constraints of female-headed households was enhanced by the project’s focus group discussions with women.
√ The success of on-the-job training for women was enhanced by support and cooperation from male participants considering time and working hours.

WEAKNESSES

× A lack of coordination between the implementing organization and MoMD led to overlapping activities which required the repurposing of the tasks and identification of new location sites, causing delays.
× Camp closure and camp consolidation: The Governor of Ninewa took the decision in the latter part of 2019 to close and consolidate camps (including the ones targeted by this reserve allocation), which impacted the scope of this project.

Moreover, the Governor of Ninewa announced the creation of a small committee at the end of June 2019 to oversee the consolidation and closure of camps and return of IDPs to their areas of origin within 3 to 6 months (prioritizing returns for families from other governorates). As a result, Jeddah camp was consolidated, with several sub-camps being closed and Jeddah 5 remaining open. This put the project on hold for some time initially.

In March 2021, it was announced that Jeddah 5 would be closed, this also led to delays in decision making process regarding whether tent replacements would have been viable for these camps.

During this evolving situation, the project team, in close coordination with the CCCM and Shelter Clusters and Camp Management agencies, continued monitoring the situation and continued utilizing the tent items as needed and as appropriate. However, the camp closures meant that there were not enough tents in the camps left in Federal Iraq that required covers replacement.

× Delay in access approvals: Despite access coordination with relevant authorities, delays were experienced in obtaining clearances for the transportation of tent covers from the border with Turkey to Qayyarah sub-district.

× Duration/time of implementation: As implementation extended into the summer season, it was not feasible to implement the scope of work within the original timeline.

LESSONS LEARNED

• Clear communication and collaboration were vital for project success. Government counterparts at various levels should be directly engaged as early as possible to enhance the feasibility and efficiency of project activities.
• It is important to adopt flexible approaches at the project conception stage in terms of both usage and locations in a context where camps can be closed without sufficient notice.
• If similar projects are conceived, it is recommended to have full tents rather than tent covers only, as tent covers are only useful for replacement purposes.
• Enhanced focus is needed on gender-specific involvement. This may have been accomplished by differentiating the tent replacement needs of women and men, addressing the constraints of female-headed households to promote gender equality during implementation and providing women with alternative sources of income.

RECOMMENDATIONS MOVING FORWARD

• The Cash-for-Work database was expanded and improved, and thousands of women registered for future activities, as the tent replacement project had difficulties in identifying enough number of women available to participate. Since CCCM agencies would partner with MoMD in managing Jeddah camps, the collected database was made available for future activities.

FURTHER READING ON SHELTER PROJECTS