


CASE STUDY SOMALIA 2011-2013 / DROUGHT + CONFLICT


KEYWORDS: Permanent housing, Resettlement, Advocacy, Infrastructure, Community participation, Land tenure

CRISIS	Complex: Drought (July 2011 - June 2012) and armed conflict. The project started at the peak of the drought in the Horn of Africa.	
TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED	3.7 million people affected by drought and famine crisis (Source: OCHA, 2011). 1.4 million internally displaced people (ibid.).	
PROJECT LOCATIONS	Garowe and Burtinle, Puntland region, Somalia.	
BENEFICIARIES	1,200 households (8,400 individuals).	
PROJECT OUTPUTS	1,200 permanent shelters built 1,800 individuals benefitting from cash for work (masons, unskilled labourers and carpenters). Other outputs include: access road, one health centre and one borehole in Garowe, water systems in both sites, child-friendly space, public area and police post in Garowe, 14 sex segregated toilet blocks.	
SHELTER SIZE	16m² (4x4m) one room shelters (10x10m plot).	
SHELTER DENSITY	2.7m² / person (average household size of 5.9 persons).	
MATERIALS COST PER SHELTER	USD 1,693 including labour.	PROJECT COST PER HOUSEHOLD USD 3,493 including site works, WASH facilities and organizational overheads.
OUTCOME INDICATORS	100% occupancy rate of shelters in both sites. Secure land tenure obtained in both sites.	



PROJECT SUMMARY

This was a two-year, multidonor, multisectoral, project aimed at providing a sustainable shelter solution by building 1,200 permanent houses for IDP households in two relocation sites. The shelter programme was linked to Livelihoods, WASH, Health, and Education. The project adopted holistic settlement as well as community-led construction approaches. The organization managed to secure the land and receive additional funding for complementary activities, including infrastructure, facilities and common spaces.



- 1 Jan 2012: Beneficiary selection and verification.
- 2 Feb 2012: Recruitment of staff completed.
- 3 Apr 2012: Typology design agreed and start of land titles negotiations.
- 4 Apr 2012: 45 pilot houses completed in Burtinle.
- 5 Jun 2012: Land acquisition granted from local administration and Ministry of Interior.
- 6 Oct 2012: 80 pilot houses completed in Garowe (delayed by resolving land issues).
- 7 May 2013: All 1,200 shelters and related facilities constructed, land titles processing completed.
- 8 Jun 2013: Commissioning of settlements and start of handover of houses and land titles.

STRENGTHS

- + Achievement of tenure security and establishment of durable sites.
- + Continuous engagement of all stakeholders.
- + The selection criteria were established and agreed upon by all.
- + Owner-driven approach, transparent and accountable systems.
- + Settlement approach, linkages with vocational training and savings groups.

WEAKNESSES

- Staff turnover and lack of flexibility of internal systems.
- Limited female participation and lack of gender analysis.
- The project provided only one-room shelters, that were too small to meet cultural needs.
- Beneficiaries had to be incentivized to participate in the construction.



The project built 1,200 permanent houses with accompanying infrastructure across two new sites (here, the site in Garowe).

CONTEXT

Food security in Somalia had been deteriorating since 2010, with almost all southern regions being affected; famine was declared in the Bay region, for a total of 6.4 million affected people (more than half of the Somali population). Due to this, and the instability and fighting within the country, the number of IDPs in Somalia was estimated to be 1.4 million¹. The project areas were hosting the majority of IDPs in the Puntland region, which is primarily inhabited by people from the Somali ethnic group (and of Muslim faith). Despite its relative stability, the region had also endured armed conflict.

SITUATION DURING THE CRISIS

In the wake of a severe drought and the resulting famine in 2011, the population density in Puntland further swelled, due to the influx of IDPs who were fleeing violence in South-Central Somalia, concentrating around Garowe and Burtinle, and some of the long-term IDPs who had settled in Garowe. Displaced people were searching for life-saving assistance, due to limited access to water, food, health care services, and adequate shelter. **The influx of IDPs led to increased tensions between the host community and the new arrivals**, as they competed for limited employment, access to state services and scarce resources. In Garowe, there was insufficient or substandard shelter to meet their needs¹. Additionally, **the IDP settlements were unplanned and congested**, due to the influx caused by the ongoing drought. In Burtinle, all respondents from a rapid assessment (conducted in two IDP camps) reported that the shelters were inadequate to protect from the weather. The houses were primarily *buuls* (huts made from sticks, cardboard, old rugs and tents), offering little security.

SHELTER CLUSTER STRATEGY

The Cluster response strategy in 2012 contained three pillars: 1) Emergency response, 2) Transitional shelter, and 3) Durable solutions. For the emergency response, the Cluster designed

¹ Humanitarian gaps assessment coordinated by OCHA, 2011


a minimum kit, that would be locally procured and stockpiled by Cluster partners in strategic points in Somalia and Kenya. Transitional shelter was provided to stabilized IDP settlements (in Puntland and Somaliland). Interventions ranged from shelter kits, to houses with corrugated iron roof sheets. The third pillar supported voluntary relocation, or return to the place of origin. Due to the presence of returnees from Yemen and Kenya, **the Cluster adopted an equality approach**, wherein IDPs, returnees and urban poor groups could be integrated. Although this project was initially conceived to fit under the second pillar, it ended up providing permanent shelters with secured land tenure, due to its longer engagement process.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project was implemented by a contracted team (Finance officer, Accountability officer, Supply chain officer, Project engineers) and with additional staff, brought in on a need basis, including shelter engineers and humanitarian accountability facilitators. A **community-based construction approach** was adopted, whereby beneficiaries received construction materials and technical support to build their houses. They were likewise responsible for identifying the skilled labour and providing the unskilled labour. Each shelter unit was constructed by an average of five labourers (two masons and three unskilled workers).

BENEFICIARY SELECTION

The project aimed to provide shelter to people displaced from their homes due to conflict and drought, as well as the urban homeless from host communities. **The organization engaged all stakeholders** (regional government, elders, religious leaders, community members) **in the selection of beneficiaries**. The Accountability Officer invited committee representatives from more than 15 IDP settlements in Garowe, explaining the shelter and vulnerability criteria, as well as the selection process. The local authorities were tasked to work with settlement leaders in identifying the most vulnerable residents, based on agreed-upon criteria. Leaflets and posters were distributed in



The project established two relocation sites (here Jilab Village, Garowe).



Settlement planning included public spaces.

the settlement, wherever possible, to inform the inhabitants on these criteria, which included:

- People displaced by the insurgency within the target areas.
- Drought-affected people who had lost their livestock and had no shelter.
- Rural self-settled: those outside the urban or peri-urban areas and those settled individually in small family groups on unoccupied land.
- Households hosting and supporting displaced people with housing challenges.

On top of these, the **vulnerability criteria included** age, disabilities, homeless widows, female-headed households, large families, diseases, and no access to livelihoods.

The organization carried out an **independent verification exercise** once the beneficiary lists were submitted. Although most beneficiaries were accepted, a few cases had to be changed in order to include the most vulnerable households. The verified families were issued with a beneficiary ID card, containing the information about their households.

COORDINATION AND PARTICIPATION OF DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS

The organization held a series of meetings with all stakeholders, to explain the implementation process. Firstly, awareness meetings were conducted with government officials. **A design workshop** was then initiated to share information with government officials from the Ministry of Interior, Regional Governor and Local Districts, IDP representatives, landowners and clan elders. Different shelter design options were presented, advantages and disadvantages were analysed, and the groups were requested to make recommendations to improve each design. **The coordination throughout the project avoided unnecessary conflicts** with the communities and other stakeholders, such as clan elders, local authorities, and NGOs.

The coordination with cluster members contributed to ensure that basic standards were maintained, based on cluster guidelines. Effective coordination and information sharing with other sectors, particularly the WASH Cluster, enabled the organization to learn from partners' experiences and achieve project goals successfully.

BENEFICIARY ENGAGEMENT

During construction, **the beneficiaries were responsible** for ensuring that the houses were built according to their expectations, as well as for receiving and taking care of the construction materials. The community was also able to **provide feedback through suggestion boxes** in each site. **Regular monthly meetings** were held with the government and beneficiaries to discuss project progress, achievements, challenges, areas of improvement, as well as follow on the feedback received.

LAND TENURE SECURITY

The organization advocated from the beginning of the project to secure land tenure for IDPs, as a precondition for building the shelters. One of the challenges was that the beneficiaries in most cases were from different clans than the land owners. It was decided that these households should be protected and have access to secure land tenure. Government officials agreed to provide titles, as long as the organization would cover the registration costs. The organization publicized the contents of land documents to all stakeholders and further worked with the media to **create public awareness**, that the shelter units provided under this project were not for rent or sale. The Ministry of Interior reposed any shelter unit that was being sold or rented and re-allocated them to other people still living in the IDP camp. This aimed at discouraging people from infiltrating the system with the aim of making profit.

However, the process to obtain tenure security was lengthy and delayed the project, especially in Garowe. Therefore, the team decided to separate the issues of Burtinle and Garowe, in order to not delay the whole project.

In Garowe, **the government was forced to stop the construction** of houses after the organization indicated that permanent houses could not be implemented on land with insecure tenure. The government was then requested to secure freehold land for the IDPs, if these houses were to be implemented as per the agreed design. **A meeting was held and broadcast on television**, with different sectors of the government, humanitarians, elders, and influential businessmen in the town, during which the government pleaded to allocate special land for the resettlement of IDPs. This resulted into a piece of land



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Households received construction materials and technical support, had to identify skilled labour and provide unskilled labour themselves.

measuring 1,000m by 150m being allocated to the organization for the shelter project, which was further subdivided into plots of 10m by 10m for each household.

In Burtinle, the process was smoother, as the organization was permitted to build on three existing sites that were identified for the upgrading of makeshift shelters into permanent houses.

Ultimately, the project's ambitious goal was achieved in both locations, with **land allocated without time limitations and relevant legal titles**, signed by the Ministry of Interior and issued to each beneficiary, as part of the handover process. In particular, the titles were legal documents recognized by the society and the sharia courts, and MoUs were signed with the organization. Notably, the project also included women as household title holders.

MAIN CHALLENGES

Apart from general **security and access constraints** for international staff, **one of the major challenges was related to staffing**, as it was hard to recruit local engineers. The organization therefore suggested to hire engineers from Somaliland, but faced stiff oppositions from the Ministry of Labour. This delayed the employment process, though ultimately local engineers were identified.

Another challenge was to **uphold humanitarian accountability principles**, given that the government tended to assume they would take the lead in communicating with the communities, instead of the organization. More advocacy on the importance of accountability to all stakeholders should have been factored in from the start.

MATERIALS AND SUPPLY

All the construction materials were procured locally. The suppliers were provided with information on the beneficiaries, including the resettlement site and plot number. The materials were then distributed to and received directly by the beneficiaries, using supplier's vehicles.

While the local market in Garowe was able to accommodate the higher demand, the project in Burtinle was partially delayed due to **lack of materials**. The project team held meetings with suppliers and government officials, in order to have the neighbouring businesses to assist, even though this was initially objected.

Due to the high demand, **the price of materials rose**. Meetings were held with the settlement leaders and the government officials, to explain that the project budget was fixed by the donor, thus higher prices would mean less beneficiaries. Additionally, in order to reduce the costs, the organization suggested to **order goods directly from manufacturers**. In the end, both suppliers and government officials agreed to keep the prices stable, unless it was demonstrated that the increase was due to external factors.

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

The long-term engagement with the regional government served not only to build the capacity of the government but also to legitimize its efforts and the goals of the overall project, particularly on land tenure issues. The organization helped to establish the government as a credible voice and partner in the well-being of Puntland residents. Reciprocally, the government formally recognized the site in Garowe as "Jillab Village".

One of the most striking discoveries in the impact evaluation was the **dramatic reduction of crime from the IDP camps to the resettlement sites**. In both sites, village elders reported only a handful of petty crimes within memory. Women, men and youth unanimously reported feeling safe in all parts of the compounds. Additionally, the evaluation indicated a **reduction in gender-based violence**, according to the elders and settlement leaders, to which they credited lockable windows and doors in the new shelters.

Finally, the **lessons learned from this project were applied** in another shelter project that the organization started in Dolow.

STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

MATERIALS LIST FOR ONE HOUSE (ESTIMATED BEFORE COMPLETION)

Description	Unit	Quantity	Rate (USD)	Tot. Cost (USD)
Stones	m ³	4.4	6.25	27.50
Aggregates for concrete (gravel)	m ³	0.5	10.50	5.25
Sand	m ³	1.3	6.25	8.13
Portland cement (50kg)	Bags	16	8.00	128.00
Blocks (40x15x20cm) made from 1:7 mix cement-sand	No	700	0.65	455.00
Stirrups, 6mm mild steel diameter, 6m long	No	8	2.50	20.00
Steel reinforcement 10mm diameter, 12m long	No	6	12.00	72.00
Roofing Nails	Kgs	3	2.50	7.50
Wire nails - assorted	Kgs	6	2.20	13.20
Galvanized iron sheets, 2.4m long of 28 gauge thickness	No	18	9.00	162.00
Galvanized iron ridge caps of 30 gauge thickness	No	1	9.00	9.00
Roofing timber, 2"x2", 3.9m long	No	9	5.00	45.00
Roofing timber, 2"x3", 3.9m long	No	15	6.00	90.00
Formwork timber, 1"x6", 3.9m long	No	8	6.50	52.00
Steel door complete with frame, hinges, locking system – 1x2.2m	No	1	60.00	60.00
Steel window complete with frame, hinges, locking system - 0.85x1m	No	2	30.00	60.00
Formwork timber 1"x2", 3.9m	No	2	2.50	5.00
Labour costs	Lump sum			343.00

WEAKNESSES

- **Staff turnover and lack of flexibility of internal systems** and processes impacted the project timeline. For example, the regional accountant and his deputy resigned during the implementing period and no replacement was found for long. This affected the timely processing of financial reports and delayed the procurement approval process, as some decisions had to be referred to Nairobi.

- **Limited female participation.** Gender inclusion in Somalia is bound by cultural and religious considerations, which affect the ability to engage female staff and beneficiaries to the same extent as males. **Programmatic gender analysis is necessary** and should be built into monitoring systems, in order to tease out power relations and influence biases, flag the level of women participation in the project, and inform actions to improve equitable participation.

- Although in Somalia the common practice is to build several single room shelters (*tukuls*) for one household, which offer privacy for parents, children, relatives and can accommodate large families, **this project provided only one-room shelters.** These could not meet these family needs, however, houses could be further expanded on the plot allocated to each family.

STRENGTHS

+ Achievement of **tenure security** and **establishment of a community** in the targeted areas. Positioning the Housing, Land and Property focal point to coordinate with the government contributed to the strategic engagement and capacity-building of the authorities.

+ **Continuous engagement of all stakeholders** to explain the beneficiary selection and the implementation process. This was found to have significantly contributed to managing the expectations of suppliers and local authorities, as well as reduce rumours of theft and misappropriation of project assets and materials.

+ **The selection criteria were established and agreed upon by all stakeholders.** Beneficiaries were able to understand and explain the reasons why they qualified for assistance; the same was true for those who were not selected. This shows how effectively the information was shared amongst the community, and how transparent the system was.

+ **Continued engagement of beneficiaries** and owner-driven approach to construction. This included **the transparent and accountable systems** that were established for the beneficiaries, to be in control of the materials received and accepted. For instance, beneficiaries refused to accept the supply of blocks when these did not meet the agreed upon standards.

LEARNINGS

- **Beneficiaries had to be incentivized to participate in owner-driven construction.** This required a good understanding of the local context and skilled community motivators. As the interest in participating in manual construction work was low, the project team advised beneficiaries that they would be given priority if they provided labour.
- **Being clear and consistent from the beginning** on the mandate of the project, and sharing the objectives with relevant authorities, forced them to identify a suitable piece of land.
- **The settlement-based approach allowed the team to consider the root causes of vulnerability in this region** and to avoid the “bandaid after bandaid after bandaid” situation. The organization has embedded disaster risk reduction and resilience building into its development and humanitarian practice, ever since.
- **Linking the programme to vocational training and saving groups helped people to build new skills and earn money.** Offering options is important, as it allows community members an **opportunity to exercise choice**, helping to ensure that they are more than passive actors in the process and can thus find solutions tailored to their needs.