

OVERVIEW

ECUADOR 2016 / EARTHQUAKE


CRISIS	<p>Ecuador Earthquake, 16 April 2016</p> <p>More than 2,000 aftershocks were felt in the 6 months after the earthquake. 9 of these were equal to / greater than 6 on the Richter scale, adding to the initial damage.</p>
RESPONSE LOCATIONS	<p>Primarily the Provinces of Manabí and Esmeraldas (total of eight affected provinces).</p>
TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED	<p>45,455 houses categorized as insecure or of restricted use (Government figures as of Dec 2016).</p>
TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED	<p>386,985 people (as per the Government Register).</p>
BENEFICIARIES OF THE RESPONSE	<p>151,699 people (38,045 families).</p>
RESPONSE OUTPUTS As of December 2016	<p>45,464 households reached with NFIs / kits.</p> <p>14,581 households reached with tarpaulins.</p> <p>1,186 tents.</p> <p>12,178 households trained.</p> <p>1,453 houses repaired.</p> <p>2,962 t-shelters built.</p> <p>505 households receiving construction materials.</p>



The earthquake affected primarily the two north-western coastal provinces of Manabí and Esmeraldas, with its epicentre near the town of Muisne.

SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE

On 16 April 2016, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck the coastal areas of north-west Ecuador, impacting eight different provinces across the country and damaging or destroying over 45,000 houses. The response was led by the government and consisted of an emergency subsidy package followed by a reconstruction plan for the longer term. The international community assisted primarily in the emergency and transitional phases in rural areas and with advocacy and capacity-building activities.



- 1 20 Apr 2016: Shelter Cluster activated.
- 2 28 Apr 2016: Establishment of Technical Working Group.
- 3 4 May 2016: Draft shelter sector strategy document agreed.
- 4 30 May 2016: Temporary shelter options submitted to government.
- 5 13 Jun 2016: Position paper submitted to government (MIDUVI).
- 6 20 Jul 2016: Updated shelter options presented to government.
- 7 11 Aug 2016: Finalisation of agreed key messages.
- 8 15 Aug 2016: Request from government (MICS) for implementation of transitional shelter solutions.

- 9 9 Sep 2016: Workshop on lessons learned.
- 10 12 Sep 2016: First Training of Trainers in use of key messages.
- 11 28 Sep 2016: Official cluster handover.



Families affected by the earthquake set up emergency shelters (Chamanga).



The urban area of Portoviejo was particularly affected by the earthquake. Here is an image of the centre, soon after the first earthquake in April 2016.



The initial response of the government was to set up 28 camps across the affected areas. About a year after the earthquake, many of these were still open.

CONTEXT

Ecuador is an upper-middle income country in Latin America, with a population of around 14.5 million people. It is a country that is resource rich, but also highly vulnerable to natural hazards. Around 96% of the population live in coastal and mountainous areas that are exposed to earthquakes, volcanic activity, floods, landslides and El Niño hazards including drought.

In the early to mid-2000s, the economy in Ecuador enjoyed a high growth, due in large part to its petroleum resources and strong global oil markets. Although there was rapid growth and progress in health, education and housing, it did not always ensure high standards. Income during this time also remained unequal and levels of poverty high in some provinces. In 2015 and 2016, the collapse of oil prices contributed to push the economy back into recession, further exacerbating disparities for vulnerable populations and increasing general pressure on society.

SITUATION BEFORE THE DISASTER

Prior to the earthquake, there were a number of pre-existing vulnerabilities in the country. The hardest hit provinces of Manabí and Esmeraldas had levels of poverty about 30% and 40% respectively. Both provinces were over 40% rural. Almost half of the homes lacked access to public water networks and only a third had access to a sewerage system. The livelihoods of many people in the affected coastal areas depended on fisheries, aquaculture and tourism.

In urban areas, poor land use planning in many towns had resulted in an increase of inadequate and informal settlements. A high proportion of the population across rural and urban areas had no access to recognized land titles. Sub-standard and unsafe building practices and regulations were in evidence across a number of different building typologies, from lightweight to masonry construction.

SITUATION AFTER THE DISASTER

The above vulnerabilities played a significant part in the high impact of the earthquake. Post disaster, an estimated 60% of the affected people found themselves without adequate housing and/or sanitation and little knowledge of how to access support. In some communities, up to 80% of the local housing stock was lost. Many people were forced to find alternative housing solutions away from their home, affecting critical socio-economic networks and support systems. In the first weeks following the earthquake, people sought refuge in makeshift camps or in community buildings, such as schools. Government-run, planned, camps - the official national solution - were established from May onwards and financial incentives were given during the emergency to support: 1) host families; 2) rentals (though the available rental stock was scarce).

Despite these options, many people chose to stay either on or close to the land they inhabited prior to the quake, often staying in unstable or inadequate shelter to retain links to their livelihoods, networks and assets, until more permanent solutions could be found. This presented a number of problems, not only because people stayed and rebuilt in dangerous situations, or designated no-build zones, but also as it hampered their access to formal assistance mechanisms.

NATIONAL SHELTER RESPONSE

Given the extent of the damage, the government requested international support. Two weeks later, the Shelter Sector leads established coordination services and set up a response team, ensuring co-leadership of the Sector with the Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MIDUVI). The Sector leads provided field and desk support and ran weekly meetings in the hubs of Quito, Portoviejo and Pedernales for the first four months and thereafter every two weeks, until the formal handover in late September 2016.

The government's reconstruction plan "Reconstruyo Ecuador", was released by MIDUVI in early May as a mechanism to provide rapid support for housing repair and reconstruction through financial assistance in the eight affected provinces. To complement these plans, which were mainly focused on urban areas and outskirts, Shelter Sector partners directed their assistance predominantly to the rural areas. The strategies of the Sector built up from immediate lifesaving activities, to transitional and permanent shelter options, along with technical assistance to communities, which included Build Back Safer messaging and Housing, Land and Property (HLP) support.

Sector partners were restricted in the early months of the response, especially with transitional shelter options, due to perceived conflicts with government reconstruction plans. Successful projects by humanitarian actors (including A.40), were able to provide assistance by being adaptable and not compromising the position of the humanitarian community, or the government. Such responses included distribution of relief items (tools and emergency shelter kits) along with brief technical training, to allow beneficiaries to make simple repairs to their homes, or build small impermanent shelters that allowed them to stay on their land. More durable solutions from the Sector were later approved in areas where the government was projected to take many months to provide permanent housing solutions.

The Shelter Sector also collaborated with the Protection Sector, to establish the HLP Working Group. This group has worked closely with the government at all levels to ensure more inclusive access to the reconstruction and repair incentive package, to respect people's rights in the reconstruction process (including relocations) and to improve the regulation in building codes, promoting the participation of non-governmental actors in the



Although initially challenged by the government, many agencies proposed temporary or transitional shelter solutions, that would use local materials (such as bamboo) and provide adequate living conditions in the time span between the emergency phase and the formal reconstruction process (planned by the government).

process. These efforts helped to enable the implementation of repairs and transitional shelters, and some regulations were modified or adopted in order to protect HLP rights.

COORDINATION CHALLENGES

Although the Shelter Sector was successful during the initial response in providing essential non-food items to the affected communities, the challenge was finding space to act in the transitional phase. With the presence of a strong government plan for reconstruction, with a short timeline, there was little political will to allow the implementation of transitional solutions from Shelter Sector partners (in spite of significant needs for such options).

These delays in the roll out of the incentive scheme and the construction of permanent housing meant that many affected families remained without adequate shelter for months. The Shelter Sector advocated successfully for the necessity of temporary shelters (including water and sanitation) in rural communities, especially where the government would take more than six months to provide permanent housing. The Sector also worked to gain approval for alternative permanent housing options as part of the reconstruction/recovery planning. There was resistance to this from government actors, due to the use of alternative materials (i.e. bamboo) or the incremental nature of sector partners' solutions.

LAND AND PROPERTY ISSUES

Estimates indicated that only between 20% and 30% of people in the affected areas had access to legally recognized or formal land titles. This presented a major challenge to the Sector as it meant that the majority of the affected population may be excluded from government assistance. The incentive package, when first offered by the government, only included legally recognized "owners" of land. The HLP working group advocated with government authorities to include a wider range of possible beneficiaries of the incentives, ensuring that the majority of the population that held no land tenure would

also be included. The advocacy was successful and resulted in the government reforming the regulation to recognize different forms of tenure, as appropriate or relevant to the context. For instance, *bona fide* landowners who may not have possessed legally recognized title, but could prove their link to the land, were granted tenure through "right of use". Moreover, the new regulation granted a grace period of three months after receiving the house, to deliver documents proving that the person was legal owner or *bona fide* landowner.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT

One consequence of the damage was a shift in support for non-standard construction materials. Many affected communities expressed a desire to move away from poorly built reinforced concrete buildings (which collapsed, causing many casualties), to use more lightweight materials that were seen as less dangerous. Although the use of local materials was advocated for by the Shelter Sector, it was also very important to protect natural resources and discourage use of protected or endangered species, especially timber. The Sector facilitated the production of a timber guideline that was circulated as a resource to all sector partners¹.

The Shelter Sector worked with key academic institutions in the affected area to develop a registry of alternative materials (bamboo, timber) which included resources required and available, sustainable producers and potential supply pipelines, in an effort to control pressure on these materials. During the response, the government developed new building regulations for the use of bamboo in construction (yet to be fully released). A detailed evaluation tool was developed to assist the government, sector partners and industry stakeholders in evaluating various models of permanent housing design in a more holistic way (including the social, environmental and economic impact of each model)².

¹ This guideline is available online at <http://bit.ly/2hNEHDs>

² All these documents, along with other resources, can be found on the Shelter Cluster Ecuador webpage, <http://bit.ly/2k0hTR0>

1A : UBICACIÓN DE LA CASA



No construir cerca de ríos o de una zonas inundables.



Es peligroso construir cerca de la costa (riesgo de tsunamis).



No construir sobre relleno sanitario o tierra agrícola.




No construir cerca de acantilados.




Construir separado del muro,os (no adosado y no apoyado).



No construir en barrancos ni zonas de derrumbe.




No construir sobre rellenos.




Mantener buena distancia al borde del relleno.


1B : FORMA DE LA CASA




Evitar las formas complicadas, creando juntas sísmicas. Mínimo 10 cm (recomendado 45-60 cm).



Mejor proporción: 1:1 Buena proporción: 1:2 Proporción máxima: 1:3



Cada fachada debe tener al menos una pared llena.



Las paredes deben ser colocadas continuamente, una encima de la otra. ¡del suelo hasta el techo!

KEY 'BUILD BACK SAFER' MESSAGES

Knowledge and implementation of hazard-resistant construction was low in Ecuador. Although the government scheme aimed to ensure the reconstruction of the majority of houses by qualified contractors, a significant number of affected people would not receive such assistance. In many of these cases, people started to rebuild immediately, repeating many of the same practices that led to previous construction weaknesses.

Starting from the observation that there were crucial and basic deficiencies in the use of construction materials and detailing, the Technical Working Group within the Shelter Sector decided to produce key messages, both for non-professionals and for local tradespeople, to develop Build Back Safer information and support an improved building culture in the affected areas³. These were produced within the working group and based on previous natural disaster responses, such as Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and the Nepal earthquakes⁴, contextualized and expanded with the assistance of local engineers and construction experts. A guidance document was produced to explain how to use the key messages and a training of trainers was developed, to assist sector partners in delivering the messages to affected communities at a larger scale.

The key messages were disseminated through official channels, partner NGOs and the private sector, including over local media avenues, such as radio and newspapers. A challenge in the collaboration with the authorities around the production of these key messages was to name them "support for self-construction", given the government position not to support alternative construction channels. This severely hindered the validation and distribution process.

³ All these documents, along with other resources, can be found on the Shelter Cluster Ecuador webpage, <http://bit.ly/2k0hTR0>

⁴ See A.8 (Haiyan Key Messages: <http://bit.ly/2iEFUwJ>) and A.3 (Nepal Key Messages: <http://bit.ly/28WJM5s>)

The first key message from the Cluster in Ecuador, as for other shelter responses, was related to the safe location of houses. Much of the vulnerability of the housing stock was in fact due to the location, often in informal, steep, or generally hazard-prone areas (Source: Shelter Cluster Ecuador and MIDUVI).



© Shelter Cluster Ecuador



© Shelter Cluster Ecuador

Most shelter options supported by the international community used locally available materials, supplemented by CGI roofing sheets or plastic sheeting.



Affected households received either emergency shelter solutions, mainly made of tarps and bamboo framing (left), or transitional shelters that would last longer (right). However, initially there were concerns that solutions seen as more “permanent” would have disqualified people from the government assistance.

LESSONS LEARNED

One of the main issues highlighted by this response was the need for the **humanitarian community to develop more flexible models and structures to work in middle-income countries**, wherein government capacity is higher than other crisis areas. The Sector should be adaptable and able to provide the appropriate assistance required by the host government and not simply operate with standardized approaches. The response mechanism needs to be ready for action, but flexible enough to be influenced by the context and adaptable. **The Sector should support the government directly** and include urban planning, hazard mapping and engineering expertise, along with relief, HLP, and recovery planning, in its activities. **The potential avenues of assistance need to be made clear** both to the government and existing in-country actors, who may not have an understanding of the humanitarian system and the potential added value it can bring.

It is necessary to establish **clear and consistent sectoral coordination under government leadership**, or at least under a co-leadership arrangement, and be complementary to existing response structures. The Shelter Sector in Ecuador operated well for five months with the co-leadership of one international agency and the ministry for housing (MIDUVI), however the relationship could have been strengthened by increasing collaboration from the outset, to clarify roles and responsibilities; **targeting other key ministries** that may have been able to assist in any bottlenecks and handover; and having more crossover with national disaster response mechanisms.

In relation to HLP, the Shelter Sector should continue to work together with the protection cluster and governments with the support of the international community, to **promote HLP studies as a means of prevention and disaster preparedness**. There is also a need to **build the capacity of local governments**, who were responsible for many territorial planning, urban planning and building regulations issues, but who were unable to play a strong role in this regard.

The Sector should also work closely with national and local authorities in order to ensure that policies and implementation modalities do not exclude affected populations due to, for instance, their tenure status. **Ensuring tenure security** (not



Humanitarian organizations built transitional shelters made of local bamboo, often with the help of volunteers from local NGOs.

necessarily formalisation) **needs to be a focus of all sheltering activities.**

Although they took some time to complete, due to the collaborative nature of the process, the key messages were a largely successful part of the response. The fact that the **messages were produced directly in Spanish** was seen as a strength, and the accompanying guidance notes and subsequent trainings were a further positive step forward in making the messages both relevant and immediately usable.


The potential of the Shelter Sector is reflected in the following case study (A.40) that demonstrates flexibility, collaboration and a locally based approach, that ensured an appropriate and effective outcome. The international humanitarian actors provided technical and resource support to an existing organization working on the ground, acting within the local government structures. Each organization worked to their strengths to deliver a coordinated and well-rounded response that assisted families in the recovery process, gave advice where needed and strengthened community knowledge.

CASE STUDY

ECUADOR 2016 / EARTHQUAKE

KEYWORDS: Emergency shelter, NFI distribution, Capacity-building, Community participation, Partnerships

CRISIS	Ecuador Earthquake, 16 April 2016.	
TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED	45,455 (Government figures as of December 2016).	
TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED	386,985 people (source: Government of Ecuador).	
PROJECT LOCATIONS	Selected parishes in Portoviejo, Manabí Province.	
BENEFICIARIES	3,290 households (Approx. 16,450 people, with five persons per household).	
PROJECT OUTPUTS	3,290 Emergency Shelter Kits. 220 Construction Materials Kits. 2,100 Water filters. 2,680 NFI kits (Mosquito nets, Jerry cans, water filters, kitchen set, solar lamps).	
SHELTER SIZE	Approx. 24m²	
SHELTER DENSITY	Approx. 4.8m² per person.	
MATERIALS COST PER HOUSEHOLD	Phase 1: USD 71 (Not including labour: Households invested approximately USD 32). Phase 2: construction materials kit cost: USD 340.	
PROJECT COST PER HOUSEHOLD	Approx. USD 132 (Phase 1).	
OUTCOME INDICATORS	<p>1/ Knowledge and skills: 75% of surveyed beneficiaries agreed with the statement that “the shelter training provided was useful”.</p> <p>2/ Reduced Displacement: 85% stated that they had built their shelter on their original plot. 90% stated that the distribution of shelter items made it easier to stay on their plots.</p> <p>3/ Reduced Stress and Anxiety: 70% stated that by receiving shelter aid they could concentrate on meeting other critical needs (Source: Post Distribution Monitoring Report).</p>	
PROJECT SUMMARY		
<p>This project was the result of a collaborative effort between two international organizations (INGO) and a local NGO, to assist earthquake-affected families through the provision of emergency shelter kits and non-food items, coupled with technical support and trainings. Further construction materials were distributed for particularly vulnerable households in the second phase of the project.</p>		



- 1 17 May 2016: Home distribution of shelter kits
- 2 1 Jun 2016: Start of materials distribution
- 3 30 Jul 2016: Completion of first phase distribution

STRENGTHS

- + Excellent community ties of the local partner.
- + Well established relationships amongst project partners and complementarity of approaches.
- + Capacity-building components and community ownership.
- + Focus on one geographic location.

WEAKNESSES

- Potential delays due to limited staff available for the project.
- The integration of community volunteers was not very high.
- Mosquito nets were not included for all households.
- Implementation by local leaders was not always consistent with the training and advice given by project partners.



The project provided earthquake-affected families with emergency shelter kits and trainings at the community level, so that they could be better able to build shelters.

CONTEXT

For more information on the background and the shelter response, see overview A.39.

PROJECT GOALS AND PHASES

Through effective partnerships at global and national level, the project aimed at addressing the emergency shelter needs of people in targeted locations affected by the earthquake, minimizing displacement and paving the way for self-recovery strategies. This was achieved through a first phase distribution of shelter kits and NFIs (three months), and a second phase distribution of construction materials to selected vulnerable households (two months).

LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION

The project areas were selected in coordination with national and local governments and shelter sector coordinators. The local partner had established links with the targeted communities and most agencies had focused their response on other areas. At the time of implementation, this project was the only visible shelter project in the area. Households were selected following government damage surveys (red = destroyed/uninhabitable, yellow = partially restricted use, green = safe). Houses categorized as red were all targeted. Households with specific vulnerabilities, such as female-headed households, those with members with disabilities, or with children under five years or elders, were selected for additional assistance in the second phase of the project and received extra materials and labour support.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The project was implemented through distributions and trainings at the community level, primarily by the local partner, with approximately 10 staff. INGO partners sent a total of six staff and provided remote support throughout. Firstly, **a training of trainers for the local organization staff and community representatives was conducted** by one INGO partner on the use of the shelter kits and distribution methods. Subsequently, **the local partner took care of the technical supervision** of trainings and distributions, while monitoring was undertaken by an INGO partner. **The trained community representa-**

tives acted as focal points in each community, to enable beneficiaries to have clear guidance from within their own community, rather than from external agencies. This approach aimed at developing a sense of community ownership over the process of self-recovery. Distributions were carried out at community centres, the local community being informed well in advance of the date and time. Project partners ensured that there was a high level of community representation, with community members actually distributing many items themselves. **Beneficiaries were also trained, during the distributions, on the use of the kits.**

In the second phase (also implemented by the local partner), selected households were given additional construction materials funded by one INGO and trainings that complemented the distributions in phase one. **Demonstration shelters were built** to provide a reference to the communities. The second phase was designed to build on the first phase, to support households in their recovery efforts, and focused only on a part of the first caseload. Initial technical supervision of phase two was provided by one INGO and then passed on to the local partner.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

The affected populations were considered as key partners in the project, being actively engaged by project partners during beneficiary selection and implementation, thanks to the training of trainers approach. In all cases, the partners worked within existing community structures to allow as much involvement and ownership as possible. This led to a **highly community-driven assistance model**, which was praised by project partners and sector coordinators, as households felt comfortable and supported along the process. It was also seen that the cascade training methodology led to high levels of uptake of best practices, especially in the use of shelter kits. In a monitoring visit, around 70% of the shelter kits distributed were seen in use 48 hours after distribution. Of these, around 95% were seen using techniques that had been taught to community members. Conversations with beneficiaries showed that they knew the focal points in their community and felt supported by community structures in the use of the shelter kits.



The project had a high level of community engagement and training. Community representatives would act as focal points to ensure a smooth implementation.

COORDINATION

Prior to this response, there had been good coordination between the two INGO partners at the global and regional levels. This had been initiated through Shelter Cluster mechanisms, and meant that both parties communicated and were familiar with their methods. The continuous support from sector coordinators also facilitated the implementation process. At the response level, coordination was passed on to the local organization, to encourage local solutions and capacity-building. The local organization also had good links with the municipal government, paving the way for a smooth process and good access in targeted areas.

MATERIALS SOURCING

The NFIs and shelter kits for phase one were all sourced internationally by one INGO partner and imported during the emergency phase. Stocks were sourced in this way so as to ensure swift delivery at scale, to the correct specifications, when there was not the time to complete full market surveys and procurement in country. As the kits were standard IFRC specification, procured from accredited manufacturers, the quality control was built-in and no issues were identified at the time of the project, nor in subsequent evaluations.

In phase two, materials – such as untreated bamboo and timber for framing – were locally sourced by the affected population. Bamboo was chosen as it was abundantly available, relatively cheap (when untreated) and locally accepted. Many of the affected communities seemed highly skilled in its use, being able to produce secure frames very quickly. Additionally, many households were salvaging timbers and other materials.

Remarkably, the emergency shelters funded by one INGO were built upon the kits initially provided by the other INGO, generating significant economies of scale.

TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS

In phase one, the use of locally available, low-tech, skills and materials was encouraged, and simple techniques were designed so that community members could easily understand and use them. The local partner representatives were trained in the use of the shelter kits, such as standardized fixing techniques for tarpaulins to timber, bamboo and rope. These techniques were in line with Shelter Cluster guidance.

In phase two, 220 extremely vulnerable families from two parishes received additional construction materials, to improve the quality of their temporary shelters. **According to the different needs and land typologies, two different kits were designed.** In Crucita, a coastal parish, the design considered

the use of the shelter kit provided in advance and included bamboo structures and a concrete floor. The other type of materials kit was designed for Rio Chico, a parish affected by seasonal floods, and allowed the households to raise their shelters with a bamboo structure and wooden floors. In the future, this temporary shelter can be used as a storage unit.

In all of the cases, tarpaulins were used for walls and coverings. Families were instructed not to use permanent materials for their temporary shelters, as it would potentially disqualify them for future government support towards a permanent house, and add additional weight on the limited load-bearing structure.

MAIN CHALLENGES

TIMELINESS. Although initially some partners felt that the shelter kits had taken too long to be procured (approx. one month), a post distribution survey found that beneficiaries were satisfied. Most of the procurement challenges were overcome thanks to the local partner, who could act as a consignee to import the kits.

DEVELOPING THE PARTNERSHIP. Although it was seen as a key project strength, the development of the partnership between the two international and one local partners required time and input from all three parties. This challenge was mitigated through pre-existing agreements between the two INGO partners and the in-country relationship between one INGO and the local organization. Agreements and working methods were established in a timely manner, thanks to effective coordination at global, regional and field levels.

DEFINING A CASELOAD. In the initial phase, the three partners selected beneficiaries based on damage data compiled by the government. Once a caseload had been defined, further aftershocks caused some areas to be reassessed and some previously excluded households became eligible for assistance. This could not be covered by the first round of distributions, as it happened after the logistical mobilization of the kits. However, it was addressed with a second round of emergency assistance that mirrored the first. It was highly beneficial that the local partner was continuously active both at field and capital levels to understand the changing needs, and that the INGO partners continued to coordinate and had resources to enable the second round.

WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT

As shown in the Post Distribution Monitoring report, the project **helped communities in their self-recovery**, both through technical trainings and promotion of community ownership of the process. The project avoided displacement, as most beneficiaries were able to stay on their original plots, without leaving their communities and livelihoods. They also felt that, thanks to the shelter intervention, they were able to focus on other critical needs.

Additionally, INGO partners felt that the **project led to increased capacities**, both within the local organization and the communities, in terms of dealing with shelter issues in response to a natural disaster. Such capacities are both “hard” and “soft”, as communities now have clear systems and focal points to respond to a disaster. It was also felt that relationships between the communities and the local organization were strengthened by the project.

Shelter sector coordinators, who visited project areas and distributions, praised the project approach, especially for its community focus and capacity-building aspects. The success assessed by partners, communities and coordinators, has led one of the INGO partners to **consider replicating this model of assistance in other contexts.**

STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STRENGTHS

+ **Capacity of the local implementer**, who had excellent community ties.

+ **Well established relationships amongst project partners.** The two INGO partners had good relationships at the regional and global levels, and had worked together before. These relationships had been created and fostered through Shelter Cluster mechanisms. The relationship between the two INGO partners is based on the **complementarity of approaches**, as one has a focus on emergency shelter, while the other has a more recovery-based focus, whilst the local organization had community ties and knowledge of the local context. The partnership hopes to enable good quality shelter programming throughout the post disaster phases, thanks to elements of continuity from the emergency phase through early recovery, as well as the continued dialogue and assistance between actors.

+ **Capacity-building components and community ownership.** The cascade-style training of trainers reinforced community recovery efforts, even though the items and trainings were provided by project partners. Particularly, the training of community leaders (as a network of local focal points to support families in the proper use of shelter kits) ensured the sustainability of the intervention.

+ **Focus on one geographic location**, rather than attempting to cover more areas than capacity allowed.

WEAKNESSES

+ **The decision to use minimal staff** for the project meant that project timescales were potentially lengthened.

+ **The integration of community volunteers was not as high** as was hoped, primarily due to a lack of monitoring capacity.

+ **Mosquito nets should have been included** since the start and for all beneficiaries, as many shelters had open gables to allow airflow, and the first round of distributions did not include mosquito nets for all households.

+ **Implementation by local leaders was not always consistent with the training and advice given by project partners.** This was mainly due to a lack of project staff at site level. It was agreed by project partners that greater levels of monitoring, immediately post distribution, would have enabled a more consistent implementation.



Shelter kits (and construction kits in phase 2) were distributed by the local partner (see materials list below), while supervision and programme design, monitoring and evaluation was done by the two INGO partners.

MATERIALS LIST

Shelter Kit, http://bit.ly/2ohLMxI	1 kit per HH		USD 30
CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL KIT - TYPE 1			
Bamboo 12 yards	Pole	3	USD 320 per kit
Bamboo 8 yards	Pole	1	
Bamboo 7 yards	Pole	4	
Bamboo 4 yards	Pole	2	
Nails 2 lbs	Box	17	
Split Bamboo 3 yards	Pole	2	
Cement	Bag	13	
Sand	m ³	1.5	
Rubble	m ³	1.5	
Thread 3/8	Unit	4	
Screw	Pound	2	
CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL KIT - TYPE 2			
Bamboo 12 yards	Pole	10	USD 380 per kit
Bamboo 8 yards	Pole	1	
Bamboo 7 yards	Pole	6	
Bamboo 4 yards	Pole	2	
Nails 2 lbs	Box	2	
Split Bamboo 3 yards	Pole	17	
Wood Board	unit	23	
Cement	Bag	13	
Sand	m ³	1.5	
Rubble	m ³	2	
Thread 3/8	unit	4	
Screw	pound	2	

LEARNINGS

- **Training of trainers, directly targeting community representatives**, greatly enhances self-recovery.
- **It is important to foster ownership with a community-based approach and engage local leaders since the start.** In this project, they were responsible for different activities, supporting communities towards their own recovery.
- **Continued dialogue between INGO partners** at the regional and global levels, outside of times of calamity, will lead to increased coordination and partnerships at field level. This can be achieved through official coordination mechanisms, such as the Shelter Cluster and bilateral conversations.
- **Working alongside – and building the capacity of – local organizations** can be key to gaining sustainable access to affected communities and can lead to a longer-term presence, than if works are carried out by international actors alone.